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Abstract
This thesis evaluates Adult Drug Court in Maine through Foucauldian and carceral state
perspectives. The expansion of the U.S. penal system through key political events including the 1960s
War on Crime and the 1980s War on Drugs fueled the rise of the “carceral state.” This punitive turn in
American governance has created serious problems of mass incarceration, bias in criminal justice, and
societal and political marginalization of ex-offenders, especially in connection with drug crime. Adult
Drug Court was first adopted in the United States in 1989 as an alternative to incarceration for drugaddicted offenders and has since spread to every state and territory. It is a drug treatment program led by
a team of legal and treatment professionals and has been reported as a success largely in terms of reducing
recidivism. Determining whether drug court is an alternative to traditional incarceration, however,
requires evaluating its relationship to the carceral state and whether it reproduces or counteracts core
problems of punishment, surveillance, and bias. This thesis gauges the relationship of Adult Drug Court
to the carceral state in Maine through interviews with drug court and traditional criminal justice
professionals as well as direct observations of the program. I conclude that drug court in Maine is an
improvement upon carceral state conceptions of punishment and surveillance as well as success and
effectiveness. However, it is another vehicle of carceral state development in that it relies on the threat of
punishment and does not fully address important structural obstacles to reintegration.
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Introduction
“Do what they tell you!”1 said the defense attorney when I asked him how he advises clients in
drug court. Rather than being incarcerated, drug court participants are handed down to a team of
treatment and legal professionals, and the consequence of failure in the program is the fearful prospect of
going to prison. The defense attorney urges his clients, “Just do it. There’s no negotiation. Negotiation’s
over. You’re turning yourself over to this treatment team.”2
In his Discipline and Punishment, Michel Foucault explained how carceral mechanisms of
punishment and surveillance have become normalized within ordinary society.3 He identified the
completion of “the carceral” with the opening of Mettray prison colony in 1840.4 At Mettray, the chiefs
and deputies “were technicians of behavior” with the duty of transforming people into compliant and
capable beings.5 Upon entering Mettray, children underwent an “interrogation” of their backgrounds,
including information about their family and their criminal histories.6 The “modelling of the boy”
produced a “knowledge of the individual” that was instrumental for compelling obedience and fostering
the acquisition of new skills.7 In other words, submissive subjects were produced using the vast amount
of information known about them. Foucault depicted Mettray as involving a type of carceral supervision
in which knowledge of the individual was used as power over those who violated disciplinary norms.8
According to him, “the carceral” extends beyond the prison into normal society through the legal vehicle
of justice and the extra-legal vehicle of discipline.9 Even with rehabilitative institutions, the prison is
reproduced through society’s continued use of disciplinary mechanisms.10
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Defense Attorney X (non-drug court), interview by Claire Brown, November 14, 2016.
Ibid.
3
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, vol. 2nd Vintage Books (New York: Vintage
Books, 1995).
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Ibid., 293.
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Ibid., 294.
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Ibid., 296.
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Upon entering drug court, the participant moves from incarceration and the courts back into the
community but, in a potentially Foucauldian fashion, is under another form of disciplinary control. From
the cravings of drug dependency, from the prosecutor who offers a nonnegotiable plea deal, from the
judge who imposes a conviction and a sentence, and from the constant watch of the prison guard, to the
control of the drug court team, the sources of power over the individual are evident from multiple
perspectives. Drug court uses a great deal of knowledge about people to reshape them into sober, lawabiding citizens. The drug court team knows nearly everything about the participants from where they
live, to their daily routines, to their relationships. The knowledge extends beyond their criminal histories
and is far more than a judge would know about a typical defendant. Having deep knowledge of the
participants is considered critical for being able to rehabilitate them from drug abuse and crime as well as
reintegrate them into normal society.
I became interested in the connection between drugs and the justice system over the course of my
four undergraduate years as an intern at the Lewiston District Court. Whether the case was criminal,
protective custody, family matters, etc., I noticed that a great deal of strife in the parties’ lives was often
caused by drug abuse. Even when people were incarcerated multiple times and had their children taken
away, they were addicted to drugs and could not seem to change. And upon leaving court or being
released from jail or prison, they were never actually free because they still wanted drugs and I would see
them in court soon after. What I knew about them was based on their testimony and what I had read in
their case files. Hearing attorneys question them about their histories of drug abuse and seeing the
extensive lists of counts on police reports, I was shocked and frustrated. I wanted to take these people
aside, shake them and say, “Get treated and make your own life.” But I didn’t really know what their
lives were like.
One of the judges would hold Family Treatment Drug Court hearings on Fridays in Courtroom 5.
I vaguely knew that the drug court docket consisted of drug-addicted parents involved in child abuse and
neglect cases. Usually I would be assigned to record in another courtroom, so it was a while before I
learned what was actually happening in Courtroom 5. Eventually I had the opportunity to sit in on one of
2

the hearings. My fellow intern told me, “It’s not real law, but it’s interesting.” And in a way both of
these characterizations proved true once I entered the courtroom. What I saw was not two attorneys
leering at each other from separate tables and battling it out with premade questions. I saw twelve
mothers seated around a semi-circle table talking directly with the judge and with each other. Talking
informally about how they were doing, how their treatment was going, about their lives. I felt I was
getting to know them.
Then there were criminal arraignments in Courtroom 2, where I truly observed the cycling of
people in and out of the criminal court system. Among the same orange and tan jumpsuits were also the
faces that would appear again and again on new charges. A lot of these charges were drug-related and
many of the alleged offenders were likely users themselves. I knew there were other types of drug courts
besides Family Treatment Drug Court and that Adult Drug Court dealt with criminal cases. One day
during dispositional conferences the judge introduced me to an Adult Drug Court prosecutor and then I
was scheduled to observe drug court the following week. As in Family Treatment Drug Court, what I
observed was a completely different interaction of a group of people talking directly with the judge and
the other team members and with each other about their lives.
Foucault also said the carceral “naturalizes” the legal power to punish as it “legalizes” the
technical power to discipline.11 The power to punish in part defines the carceral state, as knowledge of
individuals’ criminal histories is used to exclude them from key aspects of public life and citizenship
while they are also placed under high surveillance. Worse is that people can be disproportionately subject
to punishment and surveillance based on their race, immigration status, or socioeconomic status.
Essentially, knowledge of individuals’ criminal histories and ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds,
absent knowledge of who they are as people, becomes a justified means for subjecting them to carceral
control.

11

Ibid., 303.
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The success of drug court in reducing crime is largely attributed to how it addresses the
underlying cause of the crime, drug addiction. The drug court team intensely monitors and gets to know
the participants on a personal level beyond what their criminal histories suggest. Program success and
effectiveness have been principally measured against the goals of reducing recidivism and substance
abuse, and lowering costs in the justice system. And yet, as Foucault’s analysis of punishment, discipline,
and surveillance suggests, we might evaluate this program from a perspective other than policy
outcomes.12 In other words, to gauge whether drug court is an alternative to the carceral state, we must
examine whether its operative mechanisms are characterized by qualities distinct from Foucault’s
assessment of “the carceral.” Or does drug court, even as it is a programmatic alternative to traditional
incarceration, reproduce the problematic aspects of punishment, surveillance, and bias even if by other
means. In other words, is drug court simply another form of carceral state development that uses its great
knowledge of the person to discipline and thereby retains problems in the areas of punishment,
surveillance, and bias, or is it an alternative approach to rehabilitating offenders addicted to drugs? In
utilizing a Foucauldian and carceral state theoretical framework to evaluate drug court’s relationship to
the carceral state, this thesis uncovers what is hidden by a focus on recidivism.
The thesis specifically focuses on drug court in Maine through a case study of two drug courts in
County X and County Y. The locations of the courts are not disclosed in order to maintain
confidentiality. I answer my research question using interviews with members of the two drug court
teams to learn how they view the program in relation to the themes of punishment, surveillance, and
access and bias. I also gauge the interviewees’ impressions of drug court as an alternative to incarceration
and probation and how they view their roles in comparison with those in a traditional criminal court. I
also use interviews with traditional criminal law professionals in County X to obtain a purely traditional
criminal justice perspective on the program. In addition to interviews, I draw on my observations of drug
court in County X to understand how drug court is implemented in Maine.

12
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Chapter 1 is the literature review. Part I reviews the literature on the carceral state and suggests
that critiques of the American criminal justice system are best conceptualized within the term “the
carceral state,” which looks beyond prison growth to the impact of “tough-on-crime” policies and
authoritative decisions on the treatment of ex-offenders and suspected criminals. The chapter outlines
scholars’ perspectives on the origins of the carceral state and the development of its three defining
features of punishment, surveillance, and bias, including the impact of turning points such as the War on
Drugs. Part II on Adult Drug Court discusses the history and key components of the program. The
section also reviews recent evaluations that indicate drug court is primarily evaluated in terms of reducing
recidivism. The chapter frames my research question by emphasizing how existing evaluations on the
subject of recidivism and other end goals do not sufficiently capture the program’s relationship to the
carceral state. In this thesis I seek to understand whether drug court is in fact an alternative to the carceral
state or if it merely reproduces core problems of punishment, surveillance, and bias.
Chapter 2 outlines my methodology for answering my research question. The chapter first frames
my case study of drug court in Maine within a national evaluation of the program and its performance.
The study portrays drug court as a success in terms of reducing recidivism and illicit drug use, as well as
being cost-effective, and thus justifies my research into its relationship to the carceral state. The study
also contains demographic data in terms of admission and success rates, which serves as a base from
which I evaluate access and bias in Maine’s drug courts. The chapter then introduces the two drug courts
that I study in County X and County Y. Next I describe my research methods beginning with the thirteen
semi-structured interviews with drug court team members and traditional criminal justice professionals. I
utilize the literature on qualitative semi-structured interviewing to explain my methods of questioning.
The final section describes my approach to observing drug court in County X while utilizing the literature
on participant observation.
Chapter 3 examines drug court’s relationship to the carceral state in terms of punishment. It
shows that drug court is an improvement upon the carceral state in its focus on drug treatment as opposed
to monitoring and punishment, and in how it conceptualizes punishment within a fairer system of
5

graduated sanctions. I nonetheless conclude that drug court can never be a true alternative to the carceral
state given its reliance on the threat of punishment in order to motivate compliance. Furthermore, I find
that the power to punish is expanded by the drug court team’s ability to subjectively define which
violations are deserving of more severe and punitive sanctions.
Chapter 4 examines drug court’s relationship to the carceral state in terms of surveillance. It
shows that the unique type of surveillance in drug court that rests on mutual accountability between the
team and the participants and the participants and each other is more humanizing than in probation,
incarceration, and traditional criminal court. The team becomes familiar with the participants as people
and not just criminals and these personalized interactions foster mutual trust between the team and the
participants. However, it ultimately suggests that the intense surveillance can create problems for people
living in disadvantaged and drug-involved communities as they leave drug court and are not able to resist
temptations to relapse and recidivate. Therefore, even though the type of surveillance in drug court is
more humanizing, it is not an alternative to carceral state surveillance because it does not sufficiently
respond to larger structural problems surrounding reintegration.
Chapter 5 examines bias in access to drug court at the stages of applying, admissions, and
participants’ success in the program. The chapter suggests there is bias in access to drug court at multiple
levels, including the threat of punishment as a barrier to access, exclusions of certain types of persons, as
well as some bias in favor people with the “right attitude” and structural advantages. It also finds that the
drug court team members have various and more substantial definitions of success and effectiveness other
than the traditional definition of reducing recidivism. Nonetheless, the presence of certain types of bias in
drug court shows it is an extension of carceral state development in this respect.
Chapter 6 is the conclusion. The chapter answers my research question by revisiting Foucault’s
characterizations of punishment and “the carceral” as well as arguments from the literature on the carceral
state. The chapter concludes that while drug court is an improvement in its conceptions of surveillance,
punishment and success and effectiveness, it is nonetheless another vehicle of carceral state development

6

in that it relies on the threat of punishment as a source of control and does not adequately respond to
structural obstacles surrounding reintegration.
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Chapter 1: Drug Court and Treating the U.S. Prison Addiction
“Mass incarceration” tends to be the buzzword used in critiques of the American criminal justice
system. However, the problems extend far beyond prison and jail and are better encapsulated by the term
“the carceral state.” This chapter conceptualizes the carceral state broadly, defining it not only in terms of
prison construction and material capacity, but also to include the set of laws, policies and authoritative
decisions whereby criminals and suspected criminals are disadvantaged in policing, prosecution, parole
and probation, and upon reentry. Part I reviews the literature on critiques of the American criminal
justice system and the carceral state. Part II introduces Adult Drug Court as a possible alternative to
traditional incarceration. Part III assesses how we might evaluate drug court beyond a focus on
recidivism and considers whether the program challenges or paradoxically reinforces the qualities of
punishment, surveillance, and bias that are at the foundation of the carceral state.13
Part I begins by defining the magnitude of mass incarceration and traces the rise of the carceral
state through the intensification of law enforcement and criminal law policy from the War on Crime to the
War on Drugs. The literature on the carceral state reveals its three main qualities to be: 1) an emphasis on
punishment rather than rehabilitation, 2) surveillance in a way that undermines human dignity, and 3)
systemic bias, particularly racial bias, in the application of punishment and surveillance. The section
shows how carceral state policies have historically had the effect of relegating large numbers of citizens
to a socially and politically marginalized criminal status. Part I concludes with Marie Gottschalk’s
criticism of the traditional ways of evaluating carceral state solutions based on reentry, recidivism, and
justice reinvestment. She suggests these metrics do not sufficiently address carceral state development in
their tendency to ignore problems of punishment, surveillance, and bias. These disturbing effects of
carceral state development need to be addressed by any attempt at reducing mass incarceration, the visible
manifestation of these underlying problems.

13

Ibid.
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Part II begins by describing the contemporary shift in American criminal law policy from
incarceration of drug-addicted offenders to treatment. It reviews the literature on drug court in general
and then focuses on Adult Drug Court, a widely-used program alternative to incarceration for drugaddicted offenders that emphasizes treatment and rehabilitation. The section provides an overview of
Adult Drug Court, describes how it differs from traditional criminal court, and gives an historical account
of the program and its expansion across the United States. The chapter also summarizes key components
and best practices of drug court, as well as the criteria used for its evaluation. It is in part meant to alert
readers to parallels between the carceral state and drug court in terms of their structure and evaluation.
Having given an overview of the carceral state and Adult Drug Court as a programmatic
alternative, the chapter grounds my research question: Does Adult Drug Court in Maine present an
alternative to the carceral state, thereby inhibiting its growth, or can it be viewed as simply another
vehicle of carceral state development? Part III asserts that the main ways in which Adult Drug Court has
been evaluated - rates of recidivism and drug abuse as well as cost-effectiveness - do not sufficiently
account for its impact on carceral state development. I seek to assess the relationship between drug court
and the carceral state both empirically – how drug court’s design, operation and societal impact compare
with the carceral state, and critically – the extent to which any similarities or deviations from the carceral
state model are justified responses to crime and drug addiction.
My case study of drug courts in Maine is necessitated by two factors. First, as I am limited to
writing a year-long thesis, I do not have the time or the financial resources to accomplish a systematic
comparative study of the program throughout the United States. Second, the case study of Maine is
normatively important since, as I will show, Maine has been severely impacted by the opioid and heroin
abuse crisis.

9

I. Sentenced to Life under the Carceral State
The United States incarcerates more people than any other country, with 2.2 million people in the
nation’s prisons and jails in 2014. This marks a 500% increase in the incarcerated population over the
previous forty years (see Figure 1-1). Changes in sentencing laws and policies, not crime rates, explain
most of the increase.14 The trends have resulted in prison overcrowding and fiscal burdens on states to
accommodate rapid penal expansion (see Figure 1-2 for a representation of the rapid increase in
corrections expenditures from 1985-2013).15 Despite growing evidence that it does not effectively deter
crime and ensure public safety, the U.S. continues to incarcerate unprecedented numbers of people.16
Figure 1‐1

17
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"Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections," The Sentencing Project, accessed November 4, 2016,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Bureau of Justice Statistics Prisoners Series, "U.S State and Federal Prison Population, 1925-2014," (The
Sentencing Project, 2014).
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Figure 1‐2

18

Mass incarceration is particularly pronounced in drug offending. The number of Americans
incarcerated for drug offenses rose from 41,000 in 1980 to nearly half a million in 2014. This increase
was largely due to harsh sentencing laws such as mandatory minimums that have continued to keep many
people convicted of drug offenses in prison for longer periods.19

“Mass incarceration” is often the term used in critiquing the U.S. criminal justice system. The
literature in political science and sociology however indicates that the problem is not merely the number
of people in jail and prison. The persistence of tough-on-crime policies that have led to rising
incarceration rates and infiltrated conceptions of U.S. governance and citizenship are better encapsulated
by the term “the carceral state.” Scholars have not settled upon a singular definition of the carceral state
but most view it as a collection of punitive institutions and policies employed in U.S. governance. David
Garland’s conception of the “penal state” focuses on the authorities, e.g., the state legislature, executive,
and judiciary, and agencies, e.g., police commissioners, chief prosecutors, judicial elites, justice
department chiefs, correctional commissioners, etc. which enact and enforce penal rules.20 He clarifies
that “the penal state” is a more neutral term than “the carceral state” in that all states possess leadership

18

National Association of State Budget Officers, "State Expenditures on Corrections in Billions, 1985-2013," (The
Sentencing Project, 2013).
19
"Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections", 3.
20
David Garland, "Penality and the Penal State," Criminology 51, no. 3 (2013): 494, 96.
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for managing their penal policies.21 Given that I am studying Adult Drug Court in light of critiques of the
American criminal justice system, I comparatively analyze the institution against the more critical term of
“the carceral state.” Following the practice in the extant multi-disciplinary literature on mass
incarceration, I define the carceral state in terms of the policies and mechanisms as well as the
authoritative decisions whereby criminals and suspected criminals are systemically disadvantaged in
policing, prosecution, probation, parole and upon reentry.
Having read across different interpretations of the carceral state, I have identified three primary
characteristics that define its policies and practices: 1) an emphasis on punishment rather than
rehabilitation, 2) a system of surveillance that undermines human dignity, and 3) bias in the application of
punishment and surveillance. The following section outlines a historical account of how punishment,
surveillance, and bias came to be the defining features of the carceral state.

I.a. An Account of Carceral State Development
Elizabeth Hinton identifies the origin of the carceral state with President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
conflicting efforts to combat poverty and crime. While federal policymakers and officials suggested
problems of unemployment and inadequate urban schooling contributed to poverty and crime, incidents of
collective violence during the 1960s turned them away from structural solutions.22 As part of the Safe
Streets Act of 1968, which invested $400 million in the War on Crime, Johnson created the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA) to fund the enhancement of state criminal justice systems.23 The
President and Congress passed the LEAA in order to expand supervision and control over low-income
urban communities.24 While the law was written in race-neutral terms, it in part stemmed from
policymakers’ perceptions of black urban youths as possessing individual and cultural deficiencies that

21

Ibid., 494.
Elizabeth Kai Hinton, "Introduction: Origins of Mass Incarceration," in From the War on Poverty to the War on
Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016),
12.
23
Ibid., 1.
24
Ibid., 3.
22
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impeded their performance in society.25 Policymakers, federal administrations, law enforcement officials,
and journalists portrayed black urban youths as criminals and law enforcement began to target them.26
Others highlight the seemingly race-neutral “law and order” rhetoric of Barry Goldwater’s 1964
presidential campaign that was used again in Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign.27 They highlight Nixon’s
association of crime with citizen protest movements, including the Civil Rights Movement, the Antiwar
Movement, and the movement for women’s rights.28 At the same time that these movements were being
denounced as threats to law and order, the FBI reported significant increases in the national crime rate.
While plausible explanations for the rise in crime were population growth with the baby boom generation
or improvements in crime reporting, Nixon blamed citizen activism.29 Michelle Alexander describes
Nixon’s implication of the Civil Rights Movement as key to his electoral strategy of pitting poor and
working class whites against blacks in order to recruit them into the Republican Party and secure their
votes.30 Once in office, Nixon introduced harsh sentencing reforms, supported targeted stationing of
undercover police, and incentivized prison building.31
Drugs became the focus of the War on Crime during Nixon’s presidency. The Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 created the ‘scheduling’ table that assigned prohibitive weight to substances
based on their medical value, harmful effects on human health, and addictiveness.32 Drug scheduling led
to the rapid expansion of federal drug law enforcement.33 In 1973, Nixon assembled the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). DEA agents were trained by the FBI to fight organized crime and
the DEA built a large intelligence division that included former CIA personnel to fight the drug war.34

25
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Ibid., 12.
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The War on Drugs intensified during Ronald Reagan’s presidency and onward. From 1980 to
1984, FBI antidrug funding increased from $8 million to $95 million, and Drug Enforcement
Administration antidrug spending grew from $86 million to $1,026 million.35 The economic recession of
the 1980s presented limited employment opportunities for many inner-city residents who resorted to
selling drugs.36 The Reagan administration publicized the crack epidemic to build support for the drug
war. Crack dealing was more common among blacks, Hispanics, and Latinos, and the media reinforced
these racial stereotypes by disproportionately featuring black “crack whores,” “crack babies,” and
“gangbangers.”37 Reagan also signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which established mandatory
minimum sentences for distribution of cocaine that were far more severe for crack than powder cocaine.38
(The sentence was the same for possession of 1 ounce of crack and 100 ounces of cocaine powder).39
Mona Lynch notes that the federal government addresses only a small proportion of drug offenses
whereas most drug law enforcement occurs at the state and local levels.40 In fact, state and local law
enforcement were at first reluctant to wage the drug war since it meant diverting resources from more
serious crimes.41 They nonetheless agreed to participate after President Reagan offered huge cash grants
to law enforcement agencies that would prioritize drug-law enforcement.42 As part of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988,43 the Byrne program provided federal aid to law enforcement agencies to fight the
drug war.44 The program funded special drug enforcement units, anti-gang efforts and expanded narcotics
task forces.45 The DEA offered free training, intelligence, and technical support to state highway patrol
agencies to conduct highway drug interdiction, and the Pentagon provided military intelligence and large
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Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 43.
Ibid., 51.
37
Ibid., 52.
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Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics, 33. Alexander, The New Jim
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funds to state and local agencies for mounting military drug war responses.46 By the late 1990s, an
overwhelming majority of state and local police forces in the country had boosted their military drug war
operations.47 Another way in which the Reagan administration incentivized state and local law
enforcement to wage the drug war was through drug forfeiture laws, which allowed them to keep most of
the cash and possessions that they seized.48 Police departments could inflate their budgets by seizing the
belongings and homes of people based on mere suspicion of illegal drug activity and without notice or
hearing as long as they showed probable cause that the property had been “involved” in a crime.49
The electoral defeats of 1980, 1984, and 1988 communicated to Democratic presidential
candidates that they could not appear soft on crime.50 In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed a $30 billion
federal crime bill that created many new federal capital crimes, mandated life sentences for some threetime offenders (three strikes laws) and allocated over $16 billion for state prison grants and the
enhancement of state and local police forces.51 Clinton also made it easier for federal assisted public
housing projects to exclude people with criminal histories, which disproportionately affected racial and
ethnic minorities.52
Common among the criminal justice policies of the different presidents were the enhancement of
surveillance and policing, the creation of more stringent punishment policies, and the disproportionate
impact of these policy decisions on poor and minority communities. These defining features have since
persisted in the development of the modern carceral state. The following subsections discuss how these
three features of punishment, surveillance, and bias presently operate within a variety of criminal justice
and extra-carceral settings, including plea bargaining, monitoring by police and probation and parole
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officers, and ex-offender discrimination. The discussion is followed by an analysis of the implications of
carceral state policies for American political development.

I.b.i. Punishment
As a result of the punitive turn in American governance, prosecutors now wield extreme power
through plea-bargaining, in which a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence.53 Fearing
a longer sentence if they lose in court, defendants may feel compelled to accept plea deals even when they
are in fact innocent. The pressure to plead guilty has increased exponentially with the War on Drugs,
especially the Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s establishment of mandatory minimum prison sentences for lowlevel drug dealing and possession of crack.54 In exchange for monetary rewards, states willingly adopted
get tough policies such as harsh drug laws and three strikes laws.55 Additionally, whereas in other nations
and earlier in American history, probation and parole are intended for rehabilitation, in the United States
today they prioritize policing and risk management. 56
Beyond direct involvement in the criminal justice system, the status of “ex-offender” can come to
define one’s place in society. As Michelle Alexander suggests, felons may be relegated to second-class
citizenship through social and political discrimination reminiscent of the Jim Crow era.57 Gottschalk
similarly says many ex-felons and some former misdemeanants suffer a “civil death” of exclusion from
public life and citizenship.58 Both authors stress that former criminals, especially drug offenders, are
highly restricted in employment, housing, education, public benefits, voting, and jury service, many of
which are critical for leading productive, law-abiding lives.59
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Joshua Kaiser argues that a major problem with these extra-carceral punishments is that they are
“hidden sentences” - “punishment[s] imposed by law as a direct result but not as part of a formally
recognized, judge-issued sentence.”60 For example, the federal housing code bars drug offenders from
public housing and two other areas of federal law bar them from receiving food stamps or education
loans.61 To illustrate the scope and multiplicity of hidden sentences, Kaiser presents the National
Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC), a dataset consisting of all codified,
post-release hidden sentences across 53 U.S. jurisdictions compiled by The American Bar Association’s
Criminal Justice Section and the National Institute of Justice in July, 2014.62 More than 35,000 U.S.
laws impose over 42,000 deprivations or harms based on a conviction or other criminal status.63 An
average of 2,100 laws per jurisdiction are punishments and severely impact offenders’ rights and
opportunities.64
Kaiser indicates a number of inaccuracies and consequences that result from these sentences
being hidden. First, they may be seen as of secondary in importance to “real” punishments.65 Yet hidden
sentences basically impact the totality of ex-offenders’ lives.66 “Whole communities face political
disempowerment, extreme poverty, damaged collective efficacy, and severe cynicism about government
and law enforcement, yielding a cycle of community disadvantage and escalating violence.”67 Secondly,
hidden sentences are often masked as unintended “collateral consequences.”68 Kaiser argues that the
legislators, administrative agencies, and (non-convicting) judges who created them did so intentionally
and directly based on criminal status.69 Lastly, “collateral consequences” misconstrues hidden sentences
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as byproducts of punishment rather than actual punishments.70 And in the case of a hidden sentence, the
punishment need not follow from actual wrongdoing, but merely an authority’s perception of
wrongdoing.71 According to Kaiser, fundamental to addressing this problem is revealing hidden
sentences for what they are, real, intended punishments.72
In conclusion, the expansion of law enforcement and penal policies during the 1980s and 1990s
fostered a larger practice of what Gottschalk calls “governing through crime.”73 The criminal justice
system has tended towards punitive solutions to reducing crime that have allowed for the continuation of
punishment upon reentry.

I.b.ii. Surveillance
Apart from the constant supervision endured in prison and jail, the state continues to watch and
place restrictions on former offenders and will swiftly punish them when they falter. Every day over 7
million people – 1 in every 32 adults – are incarcerated or on probation or parole or under some form of
community supervision.74 Those on probation or parole may be under constant police surveillance and
stopped and searched (with or without consent) arbitrarily.75 They also face restrictions on travel and
behavior (e.g. engaging with other felons), frequent and unannounced drug tests, and various conditions
such as paying fines and meeting with probation officers.76 Violation of these conditions or failed drug
tests can lead to re-incarceration. Extensive surveillance in policing has fostered distrust in the criminal
justice system. Men on parole or probation with outstanding warrants avoid the police and the courts in
fear of being sent back to prison or jail. This is true even for those who incur violent attacks and other
serious crimes.77 People also refrain from visits to local hospitals and steady employment for fear of
70
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being located by the police.78 The surveillance also extends to institutions outside of the criminal justice
system. Schools may employ school-based law enforcement, drug searches, uniforms, metal detectors,
zero-tolerance rules and employers may use drug testing and other intrusive ways of monitoring their
workers.79 Welfare agencies and law enforcement have access to each other’s databases, allowing the
police to use the welfare system to locate people with outstanding warrants.80 For many former offenders,
receiving benefits is largely contingent on drug testing, finger printing, home searches and welfare
hearings, which, when unsuccessful, can lead to criminal prosecution and incarceration.81
Carceral state surveillance has also expanded through blurred distinctions of civil, administrative,
and criminal law. 82 In order to combat disorder, many cities have adopted expansive and legally complex
social control mechanisms, including civil gang injunctions, no-contact orders, and exclusion laws that
ban individuals seen as disorderly from urban spaces.83 The state can thereby deem violations of civil or
administrative orders to be criminal and follow up with criminal punishment.84 The shift to a lighter
burden of proof than the criminal statute further enhances the power to punish through civil sanctions and
the creation of new crimes.85
The growing reach and various forms of penal supervision demonstrate an intent to “catch em’ in
the act” and punish rather than facilitate reentry. The carceral state has developed creative ways of
finding ex-offenders in violation and thereby prohibiting them from entering certain spaces and accessing
needed resources. The high level of surveillance also indirectly prevents reentry by conditioning
abnormal behaviors of disengagement from public life for fear of being sent back to jail or prison.
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I.b.iii. Bias
Even with the end of slavery, the American criminal justice system has continued to
disproportionately target certain racial groups, particularly African Americans, through convict leasing,
segregation, racialized law and order rhetoric and polices, and now mass incarceration.86 People of color
make up 37% of the United States population but 67% of the prison population (see Figure 1-3). Black
men are nearly 6 times as likely to be incarcerated as white men and Hispanic men are 2.3 times as
likely.87 People of color are more likely to be stopped, searched, arrested, convicted, harshly sentenced
and have lifelong criminal records.88 Trends of racial bias have been particularly pronounced in drug
offending. Although rates of drug use and sales are similar among whites and people of color, blacks and
Latinos are far more likely to be criminalized for drug offenses than whites. Blacks comprise 13% of the
U.S. population but make up 31% of those arrested for drug law violations. Latinos comprise 17% of the
US population but make up 20% of people incarcerated in state prisons for drug offenses and 37% of
people incarcerated in federal prisons for drug offenses.89
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Figure 1‐3
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Bias is also evident in the criminalization of immigrants. According to Jonathon Simon, since the
1980s immigrants have been primary targets of the American criminal justice system, beginning with the
sanctioning of employers who hired undocumented workers and in in the 1990s with harsh "criminal
alien" laws that mandated the deportation (and detention until deportation) of aliens with convictions for a
number of state crimes.91 In recent years, federal and local authorities have been detaining an increasing
number of immigrants, both documented and undocumented in jails, prisons, and detention facilities.92
Over the past few decades, a new system to capture, detain, and punish immigrants, including legal
residents with green cards, has operated through the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).93 The system was built by incorporating many of the theories and
practices of law enforcement into immigration enforcement, as well as the racialized law-and-order
rhetoric.94 The consequences of combining criminal justice with immigration enforcement have been
severe for many immigrants. Arrests for minor infractions have been used to deport people and who are
not entitled to defense counsel and other legal protections.95 Many deportees face discriminatory,
inhumane, and sometimes life-threatening conditions upon returning “home.”96 The criminalization of
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immigrants has also fostered the common misconception that they are responsible for a disproportionate
number of serious crimes when in fact research indicates that immigration decreases crime rates.97
In addition to there being clear racial bias, the carceral state targets people of lower
socioeconomic status. According to Steven Maynard-Moody, American sentencing laws that have been
essential to fueling mass incarceration disproportionally impact the lives of the poor, especially poor
minorities.98 Jail, prison, probation, parole, warrants, and car and pedestrian stops have become regular
occurrences within these communities.99 Gottschalk argues that the carceral state has launched a “war on
the poor.”100 Budget cuts in corrections have burdened offenders with more fees and other financial
obligations as well as not being able to afford even minimum bail costs.101 Criminal law and policy have
also led to high eviction rates in inner-city minority communities, which inhibit the poor from acquiring
wealth and impede their ability to pay their criminal costs.102
The literature indicates that the intense surveillance and punishment of the carceral state
disproportionately affect people of color, immigrants, and the poor. Any alternative to the carceral state
should seek to undermine racial and class discrimination in the criminal justice system.

I.c. Barred from Democratic Participation
Punishment, surveillance and bias within the carceral state have important implications for
American political development. The United States disenfranchises most of its prisoners and is the only
democracy that disenfranchises large numbers of non-incarcerated offenders and ex-offenders.103 Amy
Lerman and Vesla Weaver also show that criminal justice interactions negatively affect people’s
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conceptions of democracy and their political positions within it.104 And those belonging to historically
targeted groups may come to view their groups and themselves as of lower political status.105
In November of 2010, Lerman and Weaver published an empirical study examining how criminal
justice encounters affected individuals’ perceptions of the government and civic participation. The study
showed declining participation at every level of contact with the criminal justice system. Even a minor
police encounter that did not result in an arrest was linked to reduced likelihood to vote in an election.106
Additionally, “those who experience punitive interventions – from police questioning to incarceration –
are much less likely to seek out civic society and participate in cultural, social, or political groups.”107
These people were much less likely to believe in the importance of voting, serving on a jury, performing
community service, or serving in the military. The findings suggest that exposure to “the supervisory,
punitive side of the state” renders one less likely to be engaged in civic society and to have less trust in
the government and the democratic process.108
Also relevant to the political implications of the carceral state, Joshua Kaiser claims that “hidden
sentences” are adverse to democracy and rule of law.109 In a representative democracy, public
participation in voting relies on at least some informed discussion of policy, and elected officials need be
held accountable. The hiddenness also contradicts rule of law, “consistent and predictable laws of the
land ought to supersede arbitrary action by government officials,” and which must be made transparent to
the public and to the officials themselves.110 To the extent that freedom and equality are central to
democracy, how can 42,000 punishments that permanently subordinate an enormous portion of the
population ever be democratic, whether hidden or not?111
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Underlying carceral state development and its political implications is the problem of unfairness.
The carceral state not only locks away massive numbers of people, but it tells ex-offenders that their
periods of doing time are never over. In a nation built on the principle of equal opportunity, it is unfair
that such a large portion of citizens are forever restricted from pursuing the American dream. Rather they
live in a perpetual nightmare in fear of being sent back to jail or prison and they withdraw from key
aspects of civilian life and democratic participation. The unfairness of the situation is compounded by the
disparate impact of punishment and surveillance, in which those relegated to this status of incomplete
citizenship are largely, poor, African American, Hispanic, or immigrants.

I.d. Evaluating the Carceral State: “The Three R’s”
Marie Gottschalk indicates that carceral state solutions have chiefly been evaluated through the
three R’s – reentry, recidivism, and justice reinvestment.112 She contends that the approach
problematically stresses repairing the individual while ignoring structural obstacles to reintegration.113
Reentry programs are aimed at cultivating personal traits of employability that are said to reduce
recidivism, including social skills, personal appearance, and attitude.114 The top reentry programs,
however, have been shown to have little impact on reducing unemployment and recidivism among former
offenders.115 Prison-based GED, basic education, life skills, cognitive skills, and secondary and postsecondary education programs result in only short-lived boosts in earnings and employment and much of
the literature suggests many programs have no impact on recidivism.116
Gottschalk argues that rather than personal traits, social and economic conditions are largely the
predictors of successful reintegration.117 Finding a job is often a parole condition even though most of the
difficulties in seeking employment are out of the control of former offenders, such as the refusal to hire
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felons. Ex-offenders returning to economically disadvantaged neighborhoods have more difficulty
finding employment and are more likely to recidivate. “African American men released to areas with
higher unemployment rates for blacks are also more prone to violent recidivism.” 118 Limited low-skill
urban labor, racial discrimination, and punitive attitudes of voters and lawmakers are all critical barriers
to reintegration that are largely ignored by reentry programs aimed at reducing recidivism.119
Recidivism rates are seen as essential for judging the value of investments in corrections by
states, municipalities, and taxpayers. “Recidivism” is nonetheless an ambiguous term and can mean
rearrest, reconviction, or reincarceration.120 In fact, most offenders are reimprisoned for minor crimes or
technical parole violations. Depending on how it is defined, a focus on recidivism can mean little for
improving public safety. Lower recidivism also does not necessarily indicate better policy.121 States that
incarcerate more low-level offenders rather than place them on probation or other alternatives tend to
have lower recidivism rates, although they incur high incarceration costs. By contrast, states that sentence
large numbers of released prisoners to parole generally have higher recidivism rates since parole officers
will detect more violations.122 Recidivism rates also do not necessarily explain crime rates. Arrest rates
are as much dependent on policing and policy choices as the level of criminal activity.123 Those targeted
by police surveillance, including young minority men, residents of high crime areas, and people with prior
criminal records, tend to be arrested more often.124
Justice reinvestment was initially based on the idea that local communities would lead the effort
in solving their problems by redirecting money and resources from the criminal justice system to schools,
healthcare services and areas of economic development.125 Nowadays power and resources tend to
remain within law enforcement and the penal system and are primarily aimed at avoiding prison costs.126
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Yet the states leading in justice reinvestment have not seen significant reductions in prison populations
nor major shifts in resource allocation from corrections to local communities. Much of the money saved
has been allocated to community corrections and law enforcement agencies.127
Reentry and reintegration overlook the general disregard of law enforcement for offender
rehabilitation. Many parole officers have adapted the rehabilitative rhetoric of reentry to their punitive
techniques of surveillance, sanctions, and utilizing (or threatening) reimprisonment.128 Gottschalk warns
that so long as recidivism remains the principle measure of correctional effectiveness and is so vague as
to include anything from rearrest for a minor technical violation to conviction for a serious crime, the
punitive tendencies of law enforcement will continue to go unchecked.129 The focus will be on enabling
parole and probation officers to detect more violations and impose swifter sanctions while structural
obstacles that prevent ex-offenders from meeting their conditions of release will be ignored.130
Essentially, Gottschalk criticizes that the current framework for curbing crime and mass
incarceration ignores the core problems of carceral state development. The 3-R approach fails to
acknowledge that individuals who develop beneficial qualities through reentry programs may still be
barred from using them to their advantage. Rather than recognize the potential to move on from past
wrongdoings, the carceral state tends to focus on catching people in error to justify continued use of
punishment outside of prison and jail. Moreover, the punishment and surveillance target specific groups,
namely African Americans, Hispanics or Latinos, immigrants, and the poor. A viable alternative to
incarceration must therefore address the three problematic features of punishment, surveillance, and bias.
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II. Drug Court
The Office of the National Drug Control Policy of the White House during President Barack
Obama’s term acknowledged that states bore large financial costs from mass incarceration and that too
many people continued to abuse drugs and commit crimes upon reentry.131 In its National Drug Control
Strategy, the White House asserted that too often people with substance use disorders have been
incarcerated when drug treatment – or alternatives such as drug courts – can achieve better outcomes at
lower costs.132 The administration supported the use of drug courts and other problem-solving courts to
assist offenders with substance abuse disorders.133
Drug court is the most prominent problem-solving court in the United States. A problem-solving
court consists of a judge working with a community team to develop a case plan and monitor defendants’
compliance.134 Drug court provides eligible drug-addicted offenders with an alternative to traditional
incarceration through intensive, judicially-monitored drug treatment.135 It differs from the traditional
criminal justice system in important ways: the judge interacts directly with the defendant rather than
through an attorney, the ultimate goal is to rehabilitate the individual from a life of crime and drug
addiction, and instead of the defense and prosecution distinctly representing the defendant and the state
respectively, they work together as part of a team.136 The multidisciplinary team may consist of judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, community corrections, social workers, and treatment service
professionals.137
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II.a. The Origin of Drug Court
The first drug court opened in 1989 in Dade County, Florida’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit in
response to an increased caseload during the 1980s and the suspected connection between illicit drugs and
public safety. It was founded on the idea that court-monitored drug treatment could reduce demand for
illicit drugs as well as crime and re-involvement in the court system by substance abusers.138 In the ten
years after the first drug court was founded, 492 drug courts were opened in the United States. In
December of 2014, it was estimated that over 3,000 drug courts were operating throughout the country,
1,540 of which were Adult Drug courts.139
Adult Drug Court is generally aimed at reducing recidivism and substance abuse among
nonviolent substance abusing offenders and facilitating their reintegration. Other types of drug courts
include Juvenile Drug Court, Driving While Impaired (DWI) Court, Veterans Treatment Court, etc.140
Drug courts usually process cases in one of two ways: 1) “Deferred prosecution, or diversion” is when
defendants enroll in drug court before entering a plea, “and those that complete the program are not
prosecuted further or may have their charges dismissed.”141 Failure to complete the program results in
prosecution for the original offense.142 2) In “Post-adjudication” drug court “participants are required to
plead guilty to the charge or charges against them, and their sentences are suspended or deferred if they
agree to participate in the program. If participants successfully complete the program, their sentences are
waived.”143
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II.b. Key Components of Drug Court
Drug courts generally operate according to the guidelines of the 1997 document, Defining Drug
Courts: The Key Components, produced by the coordinated efforts of drug court practitioners and other
experts that were convened by the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP). The
committee included representatives from courts, prosecution, public defense, treatment, pretrial services,
case management, probation, court administration, academia and others involved in drug court.144
Defining Drug Courts outlines the basic elements of drug court - explaining the purpose of each and
listing several performance benchmarks. To convey the overall design and purpose of drug court, I
summarize the main points below.
Drug court operates through the coordinated efforts of a team, consisting of judges, prosecutors,
defense counsel, probation officers and other corrections personnel, law enforcement, pretrial services,
treatment providers, evaluators, local service providers, and the greater community. 145 Judges and other
legal professionals can educate treatment professionals on criminal justice and court procedure, while
treatment professionals can provide insight into the nature of substance abuse and effective treatment.146
Drug court typically occurs through a multi-phased treatment process that entails more intense
supervision in the early phases. Supervision may be increased or reduced based on the participant’s
demonstrated compliance and progress.147 The team uses various incentives and sanctions to encourage
good behavior and discourage or sanction noncompliance. 148 Incentives can be praise from the judge,
ceremonies and tokens of progress, reduced supervision, and fewer court appearances.149 Sanctions can
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be warning or reprimand by the judge, demotion to earlier phases, more frequent drug testing and court
appearances, jail sentences, and up to termination from drug court. 150
While ending drug addiction is the ultimate goal, drug courts should also acknowledge
incremental progress, e.g. attending all status hearings, punctuality, and commitment to treatment.151
Additionally, “treatment” should not be limited to drug treatment but should also include primary health
and mental health care, as well as social and other support services.152 Drug courts should work to partner
with each other as well as with public agencies and community-based organizations to expand the types
of services available to participants and to educate the community about drug court.153
To monitor its effectiveness, existing policy indicates that drug courts should measure
fulfillment of their operational and administrative goals – e.g. implementation of treatment, as well as
long-term goals – e.g. lowering recidivism.154 Additionally, drug courts should evaluate whether they are
cost-effective by calculating reductions in costs for the court, law enforcement and corrections, health
care, as well as increased economic productivity.155

II.c. Evaluations of Adult Drug Court
According to the NADCP, scientific evidence confirms that Adult Drug Court reduces drug abuse
and crime and at far less of a cost than other judicial strategies. The NADCP’s Adult Drug Court Best
Practice Standards Vol. I (2013) and Vol. II (2015) highlight which aspects of Adult Drug Court are most
important for success. The volumes find that good performance depends on adhering to the Key
Components and they highlight best practices in ten general areas of the program’s administration.156
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Volume I
Volume I identifies best practices concerning target populations, historically disadvantaged
groups, roles and duties of judges, incentives, sanctions, and therapeutic adjustments, and substance abuse
treatment.157 Eligibility and exclusion criteria for admission to drug court should be objective, and not
reflect subjective impressions of motivation for change or readiness for treatment. Eligibility should
rather be determined by predicting recidivism and failure in community supervision, and identifying
substance dependency or addiction.158 Additionally, drug courts should ensure that people who have
historically been discriminated against or have had fewer opportunities because of their ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation, sexual identity, physical or mental disability, religion, or socioeconomic status have
equal opportunity as everyone else to participate and succeed in drug court.159
Participants should appear before the same judge over the course of the program and be required
to attend drug court hearings more often in earlier phases.160 The frequency of status hearings may be
reduced following consistent demonstration of restraint from substance use as well as engagement in
treatment.161 Participants also meet individually with a treatment provider or clinical caseworker at least
once per week during the first phase. Fewer meetings may be required later on if unlikely to cause
behavioral problems or relapses.162 In the final phase, participants develop continuing-care plans with the
help of their counselors to ensure continued engagement in prosocial activities and peer support groups
upon graduation.163 For at least the first 90 days after graduation, treatment providers or clinical case
managers should attempt to contact former participants periodically to check on them, offer advice and
encouragement, and provide referrals for additional treatment services if needed.164
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Volume II
Volume II identifies best practices in complementary treatment and social services, drug and
alcohol testing, the multidisciplinary team, census and caseloads, monitoring and evaluation.165
Participants receive complementary treatment and social services apart from substance abuse treatment
for conditions that may interfere with their participation, lead to criminal recidivism, or inhibit their
progress.166 Frequent drug and alcohol testing provides an accurate, timely, and comprehensive
assessment of unauthorized substance use and helps ensure proper implementation of incentives or
sanctions and adjustments to treatment and supervision.167 Testing is random and unpredictable, meaning
the likelihood of being tested on weekends and holidays is the same as for normal week days.168
Adult Drug Court is run by a multidisciplinary team of professionals. Team members review the
participants’ progress in pre-court staff meetings and in-court status hearings, provide observations and
recommendations within their fields of expertise, and conduct or oversee the administration of legal,
treatment and supervision services.169 The judge considers the input of all team members before making
decisions and explains his or her decisions before the team and the participant.170
Volume II also offers guidance on determining the appropriate caseloads for drug courts,
probation and other community supervision agencies, and clinicians. Each should seek to serve as many
eligible individuals as possible without compromising adherence to best practices.171
Volume II concludes by providing guidelines for monitoring and evaluating drug court. It
emphasizes evaluating its adherence to best practices, in-program outcomes, and criminal recidivism.172
In-program evaluations look at attendance at meetings, drug and alcohol test results, graduation rates,
retention, technical violations, and new arrests during participation. Evaluations of criminal recidivism
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monitor new arrests, new convictions, and new incarcerations for at least three years following the
participant’s enrollment in drug court.173 Drug court should also monitor admissions rates, services
received, and outcomes for members of historically disadvantaged groups.174
A Note on the Commentaries
In both volumes, the commentaries on the research confirming the effectiveness of each practice
give insight into the ways in which the effectiveness of Adult Drug Court has been traditionally
measured. Firstly, effectiveness is measured by successful outcomes for participants, such as remaining
in treatment and complying with program requirements, improved access to services, and increased
graduation rates.
Common across the commentaries were more general evaluations of reduced substance abuse,
reduced criminal recidivism, and cost-effectiveness. At least one these three criteria were mentioned in
each commentary. For example, in discussing drug and alcohol testing, Volume II cites a study of around
70 drug courts that reported significantly greater reductions in criminal recidivism and significantly
greater cost benefits when the teams received drug and alcohol test results within 48 hours of collecting
samples. Drug courts that received test results within 48 hours were 73% more effective at reducing
crime and 68% more cost-effective than drug courts receiving test results after more than 48 hours.175

II.d. Research Question
The literature on the carceral state and drug court emphasizes measuring effectiveness through
rates of recidivism. And yet, political scientist and development scholar Marie Gottschalk warns that
recidivism is not always a reliable measure of policy effectiveness.176 Furthermore, Foucault’s analysis of
power and punishment suggests that we might do well to consider whether and how this programmatic
alternative to traditional incarceration comports with or challenges the dimensions of “the carceral” that

173

Ibid.
Ibid., 60.
175
Ibid., 33.
176
Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics, 103.
174

33

he described. Indeed, evaluations based on recidivism might suggest that drug court is a success, but they
can also mask the punitive nature of policies and thus how the program is reinforcing rather than
challenging these dimensions. Additionally, a focus on recidivism does not address the structural
obstacles, whether they be the stigma of the criminal label or racial discrimination that can bar people
from reintegration. It is not clear that the remaining criteria for evaluating drug court, rates of substance
abuse and cost-effectiveness, place an obligation on drug courts to assess how they compare with the
carceral state.
Given the rapid growth of this institution and its being lauded as an alternative to traditional
incarceration, a complete assessment of drug court must inquire into its impact on the carceral state. In
other words, to conceptualize whether drug court is an alternative to the carceral state, we have to assess
whether or not it reproduces the core problems of punishment, surveillance, and bias. I seek to
understand whether drug court’s unique structure and goal of rehabilitation help retain the human dignity
and citizenship of the offender that would otherwise be diminished under the punitive governance and
surveillance of the carceral state. In other words, does drug court treat the participants in ways that are
truly rehabilitative or is it simply creating punishment and surveillance by other means? The literature
on drug court indicates that surveillance techniques such as frequent drug and alcohol testing as well as
sanctions for noncompliance are key components of the program. The question is whether the ways in
which drug court utilizes surveillance and punishment or not is less dehumanizing. I also assess whether
there is any kind of bias such that certain types of persons (by race, class, gender, etc.) have more or less
access or are more likely to succeed in this program. I use these examinations to evaluate whether drug
court is an alternative to the carceral state.
Some of drug court’s best practices, e.g. drug testing and sanctions, appear as though they may
mimic carceral state mechanisms of punishment and surveillance. Through a comparative analysis of the
structure and implementation of drug court with that of traditional incarceration, I will answer the crucial
question of whether drug court is an alternative to incarceration, or is it merely an extension of the
carceral state. It is vital to examine how punishment and surveillance in the carceral state compare with
34

drug court because they have been shown to impede reintegration, confidence in the democratic process,
as well as trust in the government and motivations for civic engagement.
Secondly, the literature shows that high levels of discretion have made prosecutors and law
enforcement more powerful and punitive and less accountable to the public. Since prosecutors and law
enforcement serve on the drug court team, it is important to assess whether the design of drug court,
namely multiple entities working on a team, counteracts problematic features of the carceral state. In
other words, does the design of the program improve the dynamic between the citizen (drug offender) and
the justice system or is it merely a new version of expanded and intrusive carceral state surveillance?
In fact, Mona Lynch argues that drug courts and other treatment alternatives have intensified
punishment and surveillance. “Research indicates that the presence of a drug court increases the number
of offenders arrested in a given jurisdiction.”177 Police are more likely to arrest in low-level drug cases in
believing that drug courts will provide the necessary positive intervention. Drug courts in turn augment
the concentration of law enforcement in areas already under high surveillance, further deepening the
racial and socioeconomic discrimination in criminal justice interactions.178
As seen in the White House’s National Control Strategy, drug treatment and drug court as a
strategy are central to how we now consider drug crime to be both a public health and public safety
issue.179 When considering drug court in light of the literature on the carceral state, it is important to note
that “drug treatment” like “law and order” is a race-neutral term. Yet racial discrimination has
consistently reemerged in American politics even when the dominant discourse has been race-neutral. It
is important to assess whether drug court effectively counteracts biases within the carceral state or marks
another phase in the long history of decreasingly race-neutral rhetoric with consistently racist
implications.
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Mona Lynch criticizes that drug courts essentially “sort” which drug offenders are brought into
the criminal justice system, due to their strict eligibility criteria.180 Structural inequalities beyond the
courts ensure that more indigent defendants and those of color are barred from drug court, while white
and more affluent defendants are welcome to participate. Poor participants who are mostly of color are
less able to succeed due to lack of resources – transportation, money, time, and social support resources
needed for successful participation.181 She claims women are also at a disadvantage in drug court. Drug
courts often do not distinguish between male and female participant needs and women, especially
mothers, are less likely than men to have the supports they need. The consequences of failing out of drug
court can be worse than if one had not participated at all.182 For example, research on New York drug
courts suggested that those who ‘failed’ in drug court were much more likely to be incarcerated and for
much longer periods than those who were eligible but did not participate.183

II.e. Case Study of Maine Adult Drug Courts
I have chosen to study Adult Drug Court in Maine not only because it is convenient for me in
terms of location, but also Maine is one of the states that has been most affected by the opioid and heroin
abuse crisis. Drug overdose deaths in Maine this year are on track to exceed last year’s record by almost
40%. Addiction to opioids, including heroin, fentanyl, and prescription painkillers caused most of the
deaths.184 About 25,000 to 30,000 Mainers have been unsuccessful in accessing drug treatment programs,
according to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.185 As a prevention
measure, Maine recently adopted some the nation’s strictest rules for regulating opioid prescriptions,
requiring doctors to use the state’s prescription monitoring program and capping the dosage for opioids.186
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In May of 2016, the Maine Opiate Collaborative published a set of recommendations for
addressing the heroin/opiate epidemic. The Collaborative consisted of professionals and experts in law
enforcement, education/prevention/harm reduction, and treatment to discuss issues of supply, demand and
addiction.187 Law enforcement stressed approaching the crisis as both a public safety and public health
problem. The public health aspects (e.g. low-level users) should be addressed through health services
such as drug court and diversion.188 Law enforcement recommended expanding access to problemsolving courts, such as drug courts. It also suggested creating a system to track recidivism rates to
determine the effectiveness of problem-solving courts and to guide treatment options.189
The opioid crisis creates an important role and presents unique challenges for Adult Drug Courts
in Maine. It will be interesting to try and understand the impact the opioid crisis has had on the
effectiveness of Maine’s drug courts.

III. Conclusion
Alternatives to traditional incarceration cannot simply feed into carceral state development.
Criminal justice institutions can forever constrain the lives of many who are labeled criminal, branding
them as second-class citizens and setting them up for reimprisonment rather than reintegration.
Punishment, surveillance, and bias extend beyond prison and jail, from policing, prosecution, and
probation to housing and employment, to civic engagement. Whether they be “hidden sentences”190 or
“race-neutral” calls for law and order,191 the overall reach of the carceral state is less apparent than mass
incarceration, but it cannot be ignored.
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Adult Drug Court is becoming a widely-used alternative to incarceration for substance abusing
offenders as the nation comes to view illegal drug use primarily as a problem of addiction rather than
criminality. The program has been hailed as a success by many for lowering rates of recidivism and
substance abuse and saving money. As with mass incarceration, however, these evaluations do not
sufficiently examine the extent to which the underlying problems of the carceral state are reproduced.
Given that the carceral state has come to affect various areas of social and political life beyond
prison and jail, we need to assess the extent to which drug court is an alternative or a mere extension of
the carceral state. This thesis will answer the question, Does Adult Drug Court in Maine present an
alternative to the carceral state, thereby inhibiting its growth, or can it be viewed as simply another
vehicle of carceral state development? I assess the ways in which drug court deviates from or utilizes
comparable mechanisms of punishment and surveillance and whether there is bias in access and success
comparable with biases found in the carceral state. I narrow my focus to drug courts in Maine, which is
an important case study given that Maine currently faces a heroin and opioid abuse crisis. A thorough
examination of Maine’s Adult Drug Courts enables me to determine the extent to which the problematic
pathologies of the carceral state are either continued or resolved within the program.
As greater numbers of people are being swept into prison and jail, the carceral state becomes
more a part of American political development by relegating an enormous portion of the population to the
margins of society. We must assess how the extensive reach of incarceration is affected by the institution
of alternative programs like drug court. As more people are diverted from traditional incarceration to
drug court, does this intentionally rehabilitative program present an alternative to the carceral state?
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Chapter 2: Methodology
This chapter explains the methods of data collection and analysis I use to assess the relationship
of Adult Drug Court (henceforth also known as drug court) to the carceral state in Maine. Part I presents
the first data set, The National Drug Court Institute’s most recent “Painting the Current Picture” survey
on the effectiveness of the program nationally. The survey indicates that drug court is successful at
reducing recidivism, reducing drug illicit use, and saving money. It also portrays the demographic
distribution of participation in the program and suggests evidence of racial disparities in access and
graduation rates.192 This national data provide a comparative base for framing my case study of Maine’s
drug courts. As explained in Parts II and III, most of my data comes from qualitative interviews and
observations of two drug courts in Maine in County X and County Y. I use a combination of one-on-one
interviews with members of the drug court teams and criminal law professionals who are unaffiliated with
drug court, as well as direct observations of drug court. The qualitative data provide explanations for
Maine’s drug court operation and performance. Gauging these possible explanations enables me to assess
whether the performance is based on continuing or deviating from carceral state practices of punishment,
surveillance, and bias.

I. “Painting the Current Picture” of National Drug Court Performance:
The June 2016 survey, “Painting the Current Picture: A National Report on Drug Courts and
Other Problem-Solving Courts in the United States” provides the most recent analysis of drug courts and
other problem-solving courts in every U.S. state and territory. The National Drug Court Institute (NDCI)
has been conducting the PCP Survey twice a year since 2004. 193 The survey evaluates the effectiveness
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of drug courts, identifies which individuals are most likely to succeed, and highlights practices that lead to
better outcomes for participants and for society.194

I.a. Recidivism and Cost-effectiveness
The survey indicates Adult Drug Courts work. At least 9 meta-analyses, systematic reviews, and
multisite studies conducted by leading scientific organizations have shown that they significantly reduce
criminal recidivism – typically measured by rearrest rates over at least two years – by an average of
approximately 8 to 14% (see Figure 2-1).195 The most effective drug courts have been found to reduce
recidivism by 35 to 80%.196 Two randomized experiments and one meta-analysis determined that the
effects of Adult Drug Courts lasted for at least three years after participants had left the program.197
Additionally, a national study of 23 Adult Drug Courts – Multisite Adult Drug Court Evaluation
(MADCE) – found that participation significantly reduced illicit drug and alcohol use, improved family
relationships, reduced family conflicts, and increased access to needed financial and social services.198
The survey also highlights that the program is cost-effective. Several meta-analyses and the MADCE
concluded that these drug courts yielded an average return on investment of approximately $2 to $4 for
every $1 invested, amounting to a 200 to 400% return on investment.199 These calculations convey a net
economic savings for local communities of approximately $3,000 to $22,000 per participant.200
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Figure 2‐1

201

I.b. Race and Ethnicity
The NDCI has expressed concern that African-American and Hispanic or Latino persons appear
to be underrepresented in some drug courts relative to jail and prison populations, and are graduating at
rates substantially below those of non-Hispanic Caucasians.202 The NDCI has emphasized that drug
courts must determine whether access or outcomes differ for some racial or ethnic groups and, if so, they
must work to undermine these disparities.203
A 2014 study concluded that, on average, Caucasians represented 2/3 (67%) of drug court
participants and African Americans represented 17% of drug court participants.204 There was a small
increase in Caucasian representation since 2008 (from 62% in 2008 to 67% in 2014) and a small decrease
in African-American representation (from 21% to 17%) (see Figure 2-2).205
Caucasian representation in drug courts was roughly equal to that of the general and arrestee
populations, but was considerably higher than probation, parole, and incarcerated populations.206
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African-Americans were slightly overrepresented in drug courts compared to the general population, but
were underrepresented relative to all other criminal justice populations. Hispanic and Latino participants
were underrepresented by a small-to-moderate margin in drug courts compared to both the general
population and other criminal justice populations.207
Figure 2‐2

208

Twenty-two respondents (41% of states and territories) provided data on graduation rates for
African-American participants, and 19 respondents (35%) provided data on graduation rates for Hispanic
and Latino participants.209 These graduation rates were compared to the overall graduation rates for those
areas. The average graduation rate for African-American participants was 39% compared to an overall
graduation rate for the same states or territories of 58%.210 The average graduation rate for Hispanic and
Latino participants was 32% compared to an overall graduation rate for the same states or territories of
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57%.211 The data suggest that African-American and Hispanic participants are graduating from some
drug courts at rates significantly below those of other drug court participants.212

A Note on the PCP Data:
Consistent with the criteria for measuring effectiveness used in the Adult Drug Court Best
Practice Standards, the NDCI has suggested that drug courts work based on successful outcomes for
participants, reductions in illicit drug use, reductions in criminal recidivism, and cost-effectiveness.
However, there is evidence of potential racial and ethnic bias in terms of who has access to drug court and
who succeeds in the program. The most notable disparities and underrepresentation were for AfricanAmerican and Hispanic or Latino persons. For evaluating the success of drug court as an alternative to
incarceration, this data is alarming since these are the populations that have historically been targeted by
the American criminal justice system. While the survey acknowledges that drug courts have an obligation
to investigate these disparities, there is no indication yet of an explanation.

II. Overview of the Data
II.a. Explanation of Drug Court in County X and County Y
My study focuses on one drug court in County X with another drug court in County Y as a
shadow, or less-developed but still informative, case study. I do not disclose the locations of the
courts in order to maintain the confidentiality of the interviewees. Ideally I would have been able to
conduct a comparative study of all of the Adult Drug Courts in Maine and interview all members of the
team as well as the participants. However, such a large-N study was not possible given the financial costs
involved and year-long time constraint. I ultimately conducted thirteen interviews and observed drug
court in County X four times.
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One enters Adult Drug Treatment Court in County X after pleading guilty to having committed a
crime.213 There must be a clear connection between the applicant’s substance abuse disorder and the
alleged criminal behavior.214 The person then forms an agreement with the District Attorney’s office that
outlines what the underlying incarcerated sentence will be if he or she fails to complete drug court. An
individual who successfully graduates from drug court receives a “good sentence,” which acknowledges
completion of the program and then generally he or she is placed on probation. The original jail or prison
sentence is suspended meaning the individual is not subject to any period of incarceration. 215 However,
if the individual violates the conditions of probation, they can be required to serve their original sentence.
Alternatively, an individual who ends up being terminated from the program receives a “bad sentence,”
meaning the traditional sentence that was decided prior to his or her enrollment in drug court gets
imposed. In addition, jail time as a sanction while in drug court counts against the individual’s
underlying sentence.216
The County Y Adult Drug Treatment Court is different in that it is probation-only. This means
that the participants have already been convicted of an underlying charge and have been sentenced in the
traditional criminal justice system.217 The original sentence imposed was either a suspended sentence or a
split sentence. A suspended sentence means the court imposes no jail time and the person is placed on
probation with a number of conditions meant to induce rehabilitation. A split sentence means the court
imposes an incarcerated sentence that is only partially completed with the remaining time suspended.
After the initial unsuspended time is served, the person is placed on probation.218 Participants can come
into drug court in County Y when they violate their conditions of probation and the violation appears to
be due to substance abuse.219 In most cases, participants admit to the allegations made in the Motion to
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Revoke Probation when they enter drug court.220 The program also accepts participants who have already
had access to treatment during their probation and who appear to need the additional support of drug
court.221 There are a number of drug court specific conditions that are added to the individual’s
conditions of probation. One who gets terminated from drug court faces the imposition of any or all of
the remaining suspended jail time.222

II.b. Interviews
Most of my data were obtained through qualitative interviews with drug court and traditional
criminal law professionals. I interviewed judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law enforcement
since these roles overlap between drug court and the traditional criminal justice system. The interviewees
from County X included, from drug court: the judge, two prosecutors, defense attorney liaison, and
probation officer; from traditional court: a judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and detective. The
interviewees from County Y included, from drug court, the former judge, former prosecutor, current
probation officer, and case manager. Unfortunately I was not able to interview as many individuals from
County Y due to location and communication issues.
County X and County Y Adult Drug Court Interviewees and Roles
Interviewee
Role Description
County X
Judge X (drug court)
Makes the final decision on whether someone is admitted into drug
court. Monitors and speaks with the participants and imposes sanctions
if needed. Oversees the participants “commencement” (graduation)
from drug court.223
Prosecutor X1 (drug court) Represents the state’s interest and prosecutes the case through drug
court. Splits this role with Prosecutor X2 (drug court).224
Prosecutor X2 (drug court) Determines the public safety issues with a candidate participating in
drug court before he or she applies for drug court. Makes all the
charging decisions and then if the drug court team decides to admit the
candidate, negotiates the underlying sentence or drug court plea
agreement.225
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Defense Attorney Liaison
X (drug court)

Probation Officer X (drug
court)

Judge X (non‐drug court)
Prosecutor X (non‐drug
court)
Defense Attorney X (non‐
drug court)
Detective X (non‐drug
court)

Judge Y (drug court)

Prosecutor Y (drug court)

Represents and advocates for the participants’ interests. Makes sure
that the drug court process is fair and predictable. Advocates for
policies that will be fair and allow participants in County X to benefit
from drug court.226
Brings forth any history a drug court referral has with probation or
incarceration through the Maine Department of Corrections. Relays
information on the individuals’ risk level, violations and the
circumstances surrounding those violations. Also brings forth any
concerns expressed by victims and the community. For drug court
participants not on probation, facilitates house checks and brings forth
any information on them to the team and assists with community
interventions such as with bail checks. For those on probation, she
supervises them weekly until they advance to higher phases, and
conducts their house checks and other duties of a normal probation
officer. Describes herself as “the liaison from local law enforcement to
the team regarding clients/community information concerns” and “the
eyes on the streets.”227
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. Adjudicates in trial courts and
mostly in the superior court.228
Manages all felony and misdemeanor adult cases that come out of
specific police departments, with the exception of felony drug cases and
Operating Under the Influence (OUI) cases.229
Criminal defense attorney. Court‐appointed for most cases. Represents
people accused of crimes from when they are indicted to when they are
sentenced. May follow up with appeals if he loses the case.230
Worked on patrol for three years. Worked undercover in drug
enforcement for four years. Now works both as a criminal detective and
a task force officer for the FBI. Works on many out‐of‐state cases
involving drugs and gangs.231
County Y
Former Adult Drug Treatment Court judge. Participated along with the
rest of the team in overseeing the drug court. Engaged in ongoing team
discussions regarding each of the participants and had direct contact
with them on a weekly basis. Made final decisions on whether to
impose sanctions or assisted in deciding when to reward the
participants. Ultimately determined the disposition to impose when a
participant was terminated from drug court.232
Former drug court prosecutor. Identified the right kind of defendant to
come into drug court. Attended weekly meetings and weekly court
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Probation Officer Y (drug
court)

Case Manager Y (drug
court)

sessions to check in with participants. Worked with other team
members to decide on sanctions. If someone was terminated from drug
court, would work with the individual’s defense attorney and the other
team members to determine the ultimate sentencing disposition. If
someone graduated from drug court, she would make sure he or she
received the sentence that was decided prior to the person’s
enrollment.233
Supervises the participants. Enforces violations and brings participants
into custody and files their paperwork. Conducts bail or probation
checks at the participants’ residences, which entails searching and
verifying the residence. Performs case management duties in terms of
having the participants report to his office at least twice a month
depending on the phase.234
Supervises the participants by holding weekly sessions with them,
checking to make sure they are attending their meetings, following up
with their physicians on medical issues, and administering urine drug
tests at least twice a week. Performs case management duties in terms
of helping the participants find employment and accessing residential
treatment facilities if needed. Visits participants at the jail when they
are incarcerated and works on their case for releasing them.235

The role descriptions are based on interview responses to the question, “Please describe your role in Adult Drug
Court/in the court system/ as ____.”

I sought to gauge the interviewees’ understandings of the purpose of drug court and how it
presents an alternative to incarceration. I asked the team members to reflect on their roles in drug court
and how their interactions with clients and the other team members differed from interactions in the
traditional criminal justice system. I asked those unaffiliated with drug court about their impressions of
the program and whether they thought it effectively responded to mass incarceration. Taken together, the
interviews gave insight into how drug courts in Maine compare with traditional incarceration, probation,
and criminal court with respect to the degree and type of punishment and surveillance used and bias in
access. (In order to make the concept “the carceral state” tangible to the interviewees, I defined it as
traditional incarceration, probation, and criminal court in the interviews). The interviews also helped
reveal whether Maine’s drug courts reflect the demographic (PCP) data on access and graduation rates.
The PCP report acknowledges problems of disparate access and success in drug court and the interviews
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reveal whether these problems exist in Maine. Interviewing is important for explaining why practices are
implemented and the ways in which drug court either fits within or counteracts the carceral state. For
example, why might a high level of surveillance be perceived as necessary for promoting success in drug
court? If there are disparities in access, why might this be the case? I obtained a first-hand perspective
on the reasons for drug court’s performance with respect to the selected areas of study and why aspects of
the program may resemble or contradict carceral state responses to crime and drug addiction.
According to Svend Brinkmann, qualitative interviewing is important for understanding our
“conversational world.”236 Our relationships with others and with ourselves are conversational and our
ability to inquire and interpret derive from our relationships with other people. 237 Qualitative
interviewing enables us to analyze our conversational world through “human experience, talk and
interaction.”238 The method is ideal for studying drug court since conversation is at the core of the
program’s model for monitoring treatment progress. Conversations occur among the team members
during team meetings, between the team and the participants at status hearings, between participants and
their private defense attorneys, and among the participants with each other. Additionally, participants are
required to meet regularly with a treatment provider, case manager, and a probation officer if they are on
probation. Drug court also requires participants to engage in pro-social activities.239 Conversation is
more central to drug court than traditional criminal court in that the participant speaks directly with the
judge and the prosecutor during status hearings rather than through an attorney. Fundamental to my
research was studying these interactions and how our conversational world is conceptualized in drug court
versus in incarceration, probation, and traditional criminal court. By comparing the “experiences,
motives, and opinions” of experts in the field, I sought to accurately portray drug court and its
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relationship to the carceral state.240 Qualitative interviews helped me gauge the level to which drug courts
utilize surveillance and punishment in promoting compliance and whether and how these interactions help
include or bar people from the program.
Brinkmann warns that interviews with too much structure can impede valuable insights and
interpretations that are beyond the structure. Although there can be structures with enough flexibility to
allow interviewees to raise their own questions and give their full perspectives.241 The interviewer should
provide a structure that encourages active participation from the interviewee and does not constrain the
discussion within various social science frames. “In the semi-structured interview, the researcher has a
specific topic to learn about, prepares a limited number of questions in advance, and plans to ask followup questions.”242 It provides more leeway in following the interviewer’s agenda while treating the
interviewee as a source of knowledge.243 There being some structure also enables the interviewer to focus
the discussion on issues relevant to the research project.244 Given these merits, all of my interviews were
semi-structured. I began with a list of standard questions and would follow up with more specific
questions or ask interviewees to elaborate on their responses if needed. I collected the data by either
digitally recording the interviews (with the consent of the interviewee) or by taking detailed notes in my
field notebook and then transcribing them onto Word documents. Below I display both sets of interview
questions and explain how they helped me answer my research question. After reviewing the interview
questions and describing my process for analyzing the data, I explain in greater detail why I chose the
semi-structured style of interviewing.
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II.b.i. Drug Court Team Member Interviews
I began each interview with ten standard questions. The first eight allowed interviewees to
broadly reflect on drug court.
1. Please describe your role in Adult Drug Court.
2. How do you measure success in Adult Drug Court?
3. What aspects of the program do you find are most important for promoting success?
4. What do you find to be the program’s main weaknesses?
5. How effective do you think Adult Drug Court is as an alternative to incarceration and probation for
drug offenders?
6. From your perspective, how does the drug court model differ from incarceration, probation and parole
for the defendant? In what ways is it similar?
7. How do your interactions with drug court participants compare with those of defendants in the traditional
justice system?
8. How does your role as part of the drug court team compare with your role in a traditional trial/criminal
court?

Having the interviewees openly reflect on drug court and its effectiveness through questions 1
and 2 helped me gauge their uninhibited perceptions of drug court and their roles within it. It enabled me
to appropriately frame my more specific inquiry into drug court regarding punishment, surveillance, and
access and bias. Having reviewed the literature on evaluating drug court, I expected that many would say
they viewed effectiveness in terms of reducing recidivism and substance abuse. I was however interested
to learn whether members of the team also viewed success as the program being less punitive and more
rehabilitative than probation or incarceration. Specifically, questions 3 and 4 could have potentially
compelled interviewees to reflect on how methods of monitoring (e.g. drug testing) and punitive sanctions
either enhance or detract from the program’s success, which would be relevant to the areas of punishment
and surveillance.
Beginning with question 5, I asked the interviewees to compare drug court to incarceration and
probation. Questions 5-7 are open-ended in asking for the interviewees’ overall perceptions of drug court
as an alternative to incarceration. I expected that many would comment on the high level of surveillance
for drug court participants as similar to incarceration and also that drug court conceptualized punishment
in a different way from the traditional criminal justice system given its overall focus on treatment.
Allowing interviewees to broadly reflect on the relationship of drug court to the carceral state could have
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potentially given me a foundation for asking about this relationship more specifically with regards to the
three areas of study. These more open-ended questions are what Herbert J. Rubin and Irene Rubin call
“main questions,” which ensure the research question is answered from the perspective of the
interviewee.245 I proceeded with questions directly related to the three areas.
9. How do the mechanisms of monitoring clients’ compliance relate to the mechanisms of surveillance
employed in incarceration and probation?
10. In your experience, have you found that certain defendants have more access to drug court than
others?
Question 9 mentions “monitoring” and “surveillance”, and question 10 mentions “certain
defendants” and “access.” I expected that responses to question 9 would give insight into differences
both in the type and level of surveillance used in drug court compared with incarceration and probation. I
expected that responses to question 10 would suggest if there was bias such that any one type of person
was more or less likely to participate or succeed in drug court. As such, my ten questions were able to
address all aspects that I was interested in: punishment, surveillance, and the possibility of bias in access.
Having asked the ten standard questions, I proceeded with questions tailored to the interviewees’
specific roles in drug court. These questions were also more specific to the three areas of study and they
were based on my knowledge of each member’s expertise and involvement in drug court.
Judges:
1. Please describe the screening process for admission to Adult Drug Court.
2. What characteristics do you look for in potential participants?
3. How much is willingness to obtain treatment and change one’s life a factor in your decisions on
admission to Adult Drug Court? How do you gauge this expression of willingness?
4. Have there been cases in which participants were initially reluctant but ultimately succeeded in the
program?
5. Please describe the use of sanctions. In what cases and how often are jail sentences imposed?
Questions 1-4 pertain to the drug court admissions process and who can access drug court.
Question 5 mentions the use of “sanctions,” specifically “jail” which pertains to punishment and possibly
surveillance as a sanction may be increasing the level of surveillance.
Prosecutors:
1. How do you determine if a case is appropriate for Adult Drug Court?
2. What characteristics do you look for in potential participants?
245
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3. How much is willingness to seek treatment and change one’s life a factor in your decisions on
admission to Adult Drug Court? How do you gauge this expression of willingness?
4. Have there been cases in which participants were initially reluctant but ultimately succeeded in the
program?
5. Please describe the techniques of surveillance and judicial monitoring employed in Adult Drug Court.
6. On what do you base your recommendations for implementing sanctions for noncompliance?
Questions 1-4 pertain to decision-making in the drug court admissions process, which is key for
assessing who can access the program. Questions 5 and 6 mention “surveillance,” “judicial monitoring,”
and “sanctions,” and thus pertain to surveillance and punishment.
Defense Attorney Liaison:
1. Please describe how you advise clients in drug court?
2. How do you keep your clients motivated to remain in treatment?
3. In what cases do you recommend clients to enroll in Adult Drug Court? When do you advise against
it?
Question 1 is open-ended to grasp how the defense attorney interacts with clients in drug court.
Question 2 is open-ended but is also connected with access to the program insofar as it asks how the
attorney works to ensure that the client has continued access to drug treatment and other services.
Question 3 asks about advising clients on whether to apply for drug court, which also enabled me to
understand what types of clients were more likely to pursue admission to drug court.
Law Enforcement:
1. Please describe the mechanisms used by probation officers/law enforcement to monitor participants’
compliance?
2. What is the role of probation officers/law enforcement in implementing sanctions as ordered by the
court?
3. What type of information is disseminated to officers?

Questions 1 and 2 pertain to my focus on surveillance and punishment with specific key words of
“monitor” and “sanctions.” Question 3 also relates to surveillance by implicitly asking how much
information on the participants’ lives is accessible to law enforcement in drug court.

II.b.ii. Traditional Criminal Justice Interviews
I asked those unaffiliated with drug court all the same five questions. There were no
predetermined questions tailored to each professional because none had a direct role in drug court. I
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sought to draw out their knowledge and perspectives on drug court and its use as an alternative to
incarceration and traditional criminal court.
Similar to the set of interview questions tailored to the drug court team members, there are a
number of broad questions meant to capture the interviewees’ overall understandings of the program and
its relationship to the carceral state. I expected the responses to help direct how I asked about drug
court’s relationship to the carceral state pertaining to the three areas of study. I also included two
questions that explicitly address two of the areas.
1. What is your understanding of Adult Drug Court in terms of its goals and operation?
2. Why are you not participating in Adult Drug Court?
3. Do you feel that the program responds to the general critique of mass incarceration in the United
States? Why and how?
4. From your perspective, how do the mechanisms of monitoring client’s compliance relate to the
mechanisms of surveillance employed in incarceration?
Questions 1 and 2 are open-ended and meant to gauge the interviewees’ overall understandings of
drug court and their relationship to it. Question 3 invited the interviewees to reflect on the relationship of
drug court to the carceral state in a broad sense. This question also relates to access insofar as it asks how
drug court might help reduce the prison population by placing more people in treatment. Question 4
contains keywords of “monitoring” and “surveillance,” which I thought would help me ask about
surveillance.
Both sets of interview questions contain more open-ended questions than questions specific to the
three areas of study. I structured the questions in this way for two reasons, 1) I wanted to gain a thorough
understanding of the individuals’ perspectives to best direct the discussion, and 2) based on the literature
it seemed that certain subjects pertaining to the three areas of study such as monitoring and punishment
were central to discussions of drug court.
The semi-structured aspect of this interview protocol was important. First, it allowed me to
account for variation in implementation of drug court between the two courts. Additionally, interviewees
could potentially mention unfamiliar terms or concepts. As Rubin and Rubin state, follow-up questions
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enable the interviewer to gain more depth and detail and to clarify examples, concepts and themes.246 I
was able to clarify new information as well as ask directly about the three areas of study if the responses
to the predetermined questions did not give enough insight.
Following the interviews, I reduced the data to discussions of the three areas by coding the
interviews for specific terms pertaining to each area. Coding means “[marking] on a copy of the
transcript a word or phrase that represents what you think a given passage means.”247 Below are some
key words and how I chose to define them for coding interview responses in relation to each area.
1) Punishment:
“Sanctions” – consequences imposed by the court on participants for noncompliance.
“Termination” – when a participant is expelled from drug court.
“Jail sanction” – when a participant is sentenced to time in jail for noncompliance.
“Non-compliance” – any violation of the terms of one’s participation in drug court.
2) Surveillance:
“Drug testing” – participants are randomly checked for drug or alcohol use through urinary analysis.
“Call-in” – participants must regularly call and report to their case managers and probation officers (if
they are on probation).
“House checks” – when a probation officer visits a participant’s place of residence to check for
evidence of drug involvement.
“Court appearances” – status hearings, admissions hearings, termination hearings, graduation.
3) Access: discussions of race, ethnicity, gender, age, socioeconomic status, etc.

I transcribed and coded each interview using (but not limited to) the above terms. Following the
guidance of Rubin and Rubin, I then extracted all excerpts coded with the same theme and combined
them within a single document.248 I then examined the data and looked for connections to understand how
the interviews as a whole defined and explained the relationship of Maine’s drug courts to the carceral
state in terms of punishment, surveillance, and access and bias. I followed Rubin and Rubin’s guidance
and continually referred back to the data to ensure there was sufficient and convincing evidence to
support my conclusions.249
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I structured both sets of interviews to begin with a set of broad questions to gauge the
interviewees’ honest impressions of drug court, their roles within it (for those on the team), and how they
would define its relationship to the carceral state. These responses allowed me to appropriately structure
more direct questions on drug court’s relationship to the carceral state with regards to punishment,
surveillance, and access and bias. Beginning with more open-ended questions allowed me to gain more
information and insight that might otherwise be left out in an interview that was entirely structured
according to the three areas of study. In addition, the two sets of interviews enabled me to conduct an
assessment of this relationship that balances perspectives directly from drug court with purely traditional
criminal justice perspectives.
II.c. Observations250
I also based my assessment of the relationship of drug court to the carceral state on my
observations of actual drug court proceedings in County X, including team meetings, admissions
hearings, status hearings, and termination hearings. Team meetings were held in the judge’s chambers in
which the team members updated each other on their understandings of the program participants’
treatment progress. The team discussed each case by reporting on their interactions with the individual,
thoughts on his or her potential for success in drug court, and what should be the next steps in the
program. The team also, at times, discussed whether defendants should be admitted to drug court or
terminated from it. Admissions hearings were where the judge would formally admit a defendant (with
the assistance of his or her criminal defense attorney) into drug court. The judge checked that the
defendant fully understood the terms of the program and the rights he or she would temporarily waive
before obtaining his or her consent to participate. Status hearings were where the drug court team spoke
directly with the program participant in the courtroom to discuss the next steps in treatment based on what
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was discussed in the team meeting. Additionally, the program participant reported on his or her progress
and had the opportunity to explain any non-compliant behaviors. Termination hearings were where the
judge expelled someone from drug court based on failure to meet the demands of the program.
As Barbara B. Kawulich cites from Kathleen Musante DeWalt and Billie R. DeWalt’s Participant
Observation: a Guide for Fieldworkers (2002), participant observation enables researchers “to learn about
the activities of the people under study in the natural setting through observing and participating in those
activities.”251 I observed drug court directly from the judge’s chambers during team meetings and from
the courtroom during status hearings, but did not participate in the operation of drug court. Participant
observation enables researchers to examine nonverbal expressions, determine who interacts with whom,
understand how participants communicate with each other, and find out how much time is spent on
different activities.252 In terms of observing drug court, this meant I would examine the interactions of
drug court team members amongst themselves, as wells as team member-program participant and
program participant-participant interactions, and see how much time was spent discussing each program
participant’s case and what types of issues were afforded more discussion time. I engaged in what
Kathleen M. DeWalt and Billie R. DeWalt call “passive participation,” meaning the researcher observes
from the actual scene of activity but only observes and does not participate.253
Whereas interviewing helped me gauge the impressions of drug court professionals on their roles
and the program’s effectiveness as an alternative to incarceration, the observations allowed me to see
them in action. As Michael G. Maxfield and Earl R. Babbie stated, “being there is a powerful technique
for gaining insight into the nature of human affairs.” 254 I was able to gauge the dynamics of the
interactions between the program participants and the team, among the participants themselves, and
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among the team members themselves. I also heard from program participants about what they found to
be most helpful and most difficult in the program. Direct observations also allowed me to compare the
actual operation of drug court with how it was depicted in the interviews. As Kawulich cites from
Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman’s Designing Qualitative Research (1995), participant
observation allows researchers to verify definitions of terms used in interviews, observe events that
interviewees may be unable or unwilling to discuss, and observe scenarios described in the interviews,
thereby revealing inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the interview content.255 As well as helping me verify
the interviews, my observations also generated follow-up interview questions based on what I saw.
One method of notetaking that I used for recording drug court interactions was “mapping the
scene.”256 Maps include the layout of the physical space, the placement of people within that space, the
activities and movements of the people, the interactions among people in the scene, and both verbal and
nonverbal interactions.257 At the beginning of the court proceedings, I would draw rough sketches of the
physical space and indicate the location of the program participants (consisting of the participant who is
discussing his or her case and the other participants waiting their turn), and the different team members. I
also looked at how many of what type of persons (participants) were present (e.g. race, gender) and how
many and what type of persons received a certain outcome in drug court (e.g. a sanction or reward).
Mapping the scene was useful for examining how the team would use the layout of the courtroom as a
surveillance technique.
For recording observations, I used a combination of what DeWalt and DeWalt call “jot notes,”
“expanded field notes,” and “meta-notes.”258 Jot notes or scratch notes report on the dialogue and other
observations recorded during the session and mostly serve as aids to memory for producing more
coherent field notes.259 The authors emphasize that notes should be detailed in depicting the physical
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space, the participants involved, and as much of their behavior and interactions as possible. When
recording speech, the observer’s notes should closely reflect the words used by the participants. 260
During team meetings I took detailed notes, using a pen and a field notebook, on the discussion of each
case and tracked who said what. These notes allowed me to assess what the team looked for in deciding
whether to admit defendants or terminate them from drug court, how they measured success and failure,
their intent for implementing certain incentives and sanctions, and how they made decisions. I examined
these observations under the three areas of study – punishment, surveillance, and access – to further
conclude how the team members decide who may access drug court, the extent to which they measure
success by reductions in recidivism and other end goals mentioned in the literature on drug court, and the
frequency and intensity with which they employ punishment and surveillance through monitoring and
assigning sanctions. During drug court proceedings I noted the language used in conveying the court’s
verdict and the interactions between the program participants and the team.
As Kawulich cites from Paul Kutsche’s Field Ethnography: A Manual for doing Cultural
Anthropology (1998), the combination of interviews and observations would be useful for helping to
determine how drug court team members make decisions because in doing so, the researcher attempts to
build a model to help understand what participants do.261 In observing drug court proceedings, I tried to
capture an accurate portrayal of the discussion of each participant’s case while paying attention to who
said what. I also noted the body language, attitudes, and power dynamics between the various actors and
viewed them in response to the circumstances of the case (e.g. a negative report of a relapse and a positive
report of new employment). I kept track of how many program participants and under what
circumstances they received certain outcomes (e.g. phase advancement, graduation, sanctions).
According to Maxfield and Babbie, “field notes should include both empirical observations and
interpretations of them.”262 In addition to observing the scene, I noted any patterns I found and my
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interpretations. Whereas jot notes consist of empirical observations, meta-notes involve inference or
analysis.263 “They include comments on notes, summary of the evidence for a particular argument
collected to that point, preliminary interpretations, hypotheses, and questions for further research.”264
DeWalt and DeWalt mention that a benefit of using a computer to capture field notes is being able to have
several files open at the same time.265 Transcribing my jot notes and writing my meta-notes by computer
helped me to look at documents on different observation sessions and those of the different courts at the
same time and draw connections.
Examples of the types of connections I looked for included: how certain circumstances (e.g. level of
drug use and criminal history) factored into decisions on admission and termination; circumstances under
which program participants were subject to higher levels of surveillance and punishment; the types of
incentives and sanctions used most often; patterns in how the drug court team and program participants
interacted (e.g. the types of questions the team would ask the participants and the attitudes and responses
of the team members and the participants). My observations and corresponding analysis provided me
with a picture of how drug courts in Maine operate and from which I could gain clarification and insight
into the program’s relationship with the carceral state as chiefly explored through the interviews.

III. Conclusion
I used a combination of empirical quantitative data from the PCP survey, qualitative semistructured interviews, and participant observations to study the relationship of Maine’s drug courts to the
carceral state. In comparing the qualitative findings with the survey data, I first determined how Maine’s
drug courts fit into the national picture of drug court in terms of recidivism, drug use, and demographics.
The interviews helped explain why drug court operates in the way it does and whether preserving certain
aspects of the carceral state were seen as necessary for promoting success in the program. The interviews
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gave deeper insight into the non-quantifiable evaluation of how people gain access to drug court and the
types of punitive and surveillance mechanisms used in comparison with carceral state mechanisms. By
using the semi-structured style of interviewing and a balance of open-ended and more direct questions, I
gained a thorough understanding of what drug court was as an alternative to the carceral state and
examined this relationship more specifically under the three areas of study. Together, the two sets of
interviews provided the perspectives of those directly affiliated with the program and from a purely
traditional criminal justice standpoint to evaluate this relationship. The observations allowed me to see
drug court in action and thereby verify what was said in the interviews as well as help me generate more
questions.
Evaluating drug court as an alternative to incarceration cannot simply rely on looking at the
numbers of people who use drugs or recidivate. Insofar as problems of harsh punishment, high
surveillance, and bias have restricted the lives, opportunities, and political participation of an enormous
number of people, drug court need also be assessed in these areas. In moving from the “three Rs”266 to
my three areas of study, I sought an understanding of the role and approach of drug court and its
relationship to the carceral state.
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Chapter 3: Punishment:
This chapter examines the use of punishment in drug court in contrast with its use in incarceration
and probation. It analyzes passages from the interviews to reveal differences in the emphasis on
punishment versus rehabilitation, the type of punishment used, and how personalized interactions with the
drug court team build mutual trust and help restore the participants’ confidence in the court. Part I
describes how drug court utilizes the specter of punishment or incarceration as a backstop, which is to say
that the participants face a sentence of incarceration should they fail to complete the program. The
consequence of an incarcerated sentence is in part meant to motivate the participants to comply and
engage in drug court. Part II examines drug court’s theory that the participants’ criminal activity is
primarily motivated by drug addiction and can be resolved through an emphasis on treatment. The
section illustrates how drug court’s treatment-centered approach substantially differs from incarceration
and probation which focus on punishment and monitoring. Part III explains drug court’s model of
punishment that is based on graduated sanctions. Within this system, the team has discretion to be more
lenient on participants who commit minor violations or misstep early on and have not yet been able to
take full advantage of the program. It shows the team’s understanding that drug addiction recovery is
arduous and relapse is not unexpected. More punitive sanctions such as jail are rather reserved for severe
violations of dangerous criminal conduct, consistent dishonesty, and disengagement from the program.
Having explained the concept of graduated sanctions, Part IV describes how sanctions are decided
through team deliberation which allows for thorough consideration of what is most appropriate. The
section also highlights a criticism from Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) about not being able to have
a substantial role in the team deliberations as well as a possible response from Defense Attorney Liaison
X (drug court). Part V draws on interviews with drug court team members and observations of drug court
in County X to show how the personalized interactions in drug court can build mutual trust between the
team and the participants. As a result, the participants are more honest with the team and the team is
more open to allowing the participants to manage themselves in the community. Part VI is the conclusion
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and argues that despite drug court being more rehabilitative and fairer in its use of punishment through a
system of graduated sanctions, it is nonetheless a part of the carceral state in relying on the threat of
punishment and the team’s expansive subjective power to punish.

I. The Underlying Sentence
A key aspect of punishment in drug court is the underlying sentence that gets imposed if the
participant is terminated from the program. Prior to enrolling in drug court, the terms of one’s
participation are decided, including the underlying incarcerated sentence.
The underlying sentence as a motivating factor for compliance in drug court
Judge X (non‐drug court): “[…] they [the participants] plead guilty and they sign up and if they
successfully complete the drug court, they either get released or they get a sentence that is not a
serious sentence. If they flunk, if they fail out of the drug court by failing to follow the regimen by you
know, by testing positive for drugs, they are subject to a serious sentence.”267
Judge X (drug court): “Essentially the difference is that a good sentence means no jail time, and a bad
sentence means you go to jail. […] We are not putting these people in jail and drug court is a
motivating reason to avoid time in jail. We want people to say they can’t live this life anymore. Even if
they receive a sanction of say seven days that is much better than the underlying four years.”268
Detective X (non‐drug court): “[…] you know they’re charged with a crime, they have to plead guilty,
they get into drug court, and it truly puts it back on them. If they don’t want to go be incarcerated, if
they want to help fix themselves, drug court gives them all the tools. So it’s a chance for them to not
be part of that statistical prison population, given all the tools, but it also shows that, you know, [if]
they can’t make [it through] that program, and they’re given all these chances then maybe
incarceration is what they need for a little bit.”269

While in drug court, the participants are continually aware of the incarcerated sentence that hangs
over their heads. Therefore, a key motivation to engage in drug court is the opportunity to avoid
incarceration. While drug court does not entail immediate punishment for one’s crimes, there is always
the threat of punishment that is meant to induce compliance.
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The role of the underlying sentence as a motivating factor can be understood through Foucault’s
discussion of effective punishment as conceptualized by the “great reformers” of the Eighteenth
century.270 The reformers sought to replace public executions with a more effective and generalizable
form of punishment. 271 They believed punishment should function to prevent repeat offense.272 Foucault
explained that this “semio-technique” of punishment was based on five or six rules, one of which was
“the rule of sufficient ideality.”273 This rule stated that the effectiveness of punishment is not in the direct
infliction of pain but rather in the “idea” of pain.274 The expectation is that people will be deterred from
committing crimes in fearing pain or by the threat of punishment. The drug court team understands that a
key motivation for compliance is the threat of the underlying incarcerated sentence. As Judge X (drug
court) and Judge X (non-drug court) explain, participants who complete drug court receive a “good” or
“not a serious sentence” of no incarceration whereas if they fail they are subject to a “bad” or ”serious”
sentence of incarceration. The threat of punishment is thus built into drug court and is meant to motivate
compliance and discourage drug use and recidivism. Foucault also stated that beyond the general idea of
pain, the “memory of pain” prevents one from repeating a crime.275 In both counties, the drug court
judges explained that most (but not all) of the participants have prior experience with being
incarcerated.276 In County Y, all of the participants are on probation and many have already completed
the incarcerated portion of their sentence.277 In many cases it is not only the idea of incarceration but also
painful memories of being incarcerated that are meant to motivate compliance. Detective X (non-drug
court) gave his impression that if the participants are not motivated to avoid time in jail or prison, then
they not will not make it through the program and incarceration may be what they need. It is therefore
clear that drug court relies on the traditional punishment model that people can be effectively controlled
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by the threat of punishment. This practice at least suggests that drug court can never fully replace
traditional incarceration precisely because it requires the specter of that system to motivate the
participants’ compliance.

II. A Rehabilitative Purpose
A key way in which drug court differs from the traditional model is its focus on treatment and
rehabilitation as opposed to monitoring and punishment.
Drug court’s focus on rehabilitation and treatment
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “Incarceration is just failure and there’s no real treatment or
learning or training that goes on there. It’s defeat. It engenders depression, broken families, more
problems, everything. […] Incarceration and jail is primitive. There are times when people need that.
They can’t be safe. […] Most of the time these are individuals from poor, disadvantaged families and
backgrounds who have come to gradually use drugs and choose sometimes to sell drugs or trade
stolen items to get their drugs in the lack of any type of medical treatment that they can get. […]
We’re trying to get things accomplished in the real world where people can actually change and
where…umm… they can change their…learn how to control and understand their addiction.”278
Judge X (drug court): “It’s different [from probation and jail] in that the focus is on treatment and
trying to help the defendant get over their addiction. We recognize that people commit crimes
because they are addicted, not just because they are criminals.”279
Detective X (non‐drug court): “It’s the alternative sentencing for crimes with the underlying drug
nexus if you will [...] It’s drug monitoring, it’s counseling, it’s kind of a total approach to the individual
and trying to rehabilitate them so that when they’re done they’re not back into drugs.”280
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “It’s very different [from probation and incarceration]. You know the
reason I like drug court is I believe that it is premised upon the theory that given an opportunity, an
individual who’s in trouble can correct course. And so as opposed to a traditional, a case handled in
the traditional model, which is you committed an offense, there should be a consequence so we’re
gonna impose a sentence and then we’re done, in drug court you can advocate more for trying to
direct them towards the alternative. Treatment’s the alterative as opposed to incarceration. When
you are left with a traditional model, you still have probation, but if they’re not complying, you can’t
call the counselor for them or have someone doing extra supervision. So you just pull the trigger and
send them to jail, which I’m happy to do. I mean if you’re, if it’s a question of public safety, and
someone going to jail, they have to go to jail. But if it’s a question of they’re going to jail because they
just didn’t have the services necessary to correct course, that’s frustrating.”281
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Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “[In drug court] you have much more ready access to
substance abuse treatment and of the services that are mandated by the drug court team.
Probation’s designed to monitor primarily, to make sure someone’s staying out of trouble. It’s not
really designed to provide treatment although they try to do it. They don’t have any money for it.
They just tell somebody, ‘go get your treatment’ and they’re [the probationers] like, ‘I just got out of
prison. I don’t have a job. I don’t have insurance. There’s no way I can do treatment.’ They go back
into jail for a probation violation because they can’t do the treatment. Because they don’t have the
money and the state doesn’t provide it. So in that respect the probation is so far inferior to what drug
court can do that they shouldn’t even be compared quite honestly. […] You know incarceration will
get people clean very quickly. But there’s virtually no services in there and it’s not designed to
provide services. It’s designed to punish essentially. And so I…my position is that because almost all
crime that I am involved in, in terms of as being the defense attorney, involves substance abuse or
mental health problems, it doesn’t make sense to me to have the primary response be incarceration
where they will not get the treatment that they need.”282

Judge X (drug court) and Detective X (non-drug court) conveyed that drug court is based on the
theory that some people are driven to crime primarily because they are addicted to drugs or commit
“crimes with the underlying drug nexus.” In a sense, the free will to choose to commit crime is depleted
by the addicted mind. Furthermore, drug court recognizes that many people are incarcerated not because
of a nefarious intent to commit crimes, but because they lack the services and support needed to cope with
drug addiction. Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) stated that most of the participants are from
poor, disadvantaged backgrounds and commit crimes because they cannot access needed medical
treatment. Prosecutor X2 (drug court) likewise expressed his frustration about people being incarcerated
because they lack the services needed to rehabilitate themselves. Defense Attorney X (non-drug court)
also stated that people on probation are expected to obtain treatment on their own even when they cannot
afford it. The three responses suggest a common understanding that some crimes are the result of
structural problems of poverty and lack of access to treatment and that punishment is not a viable solution
in these cases. There is an understanding that some people cannot be expected to obtain treatment and
move on from crime on their own. Drug court is intended to address these structural problems by
providing people with the resources and support needed to rehabilitate themselves.
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As Prosecutor X2 (drug court) indicated, drug court’s rehabilitative approach is different from the
traditional model which is based on the idea that one receives a sentence for committing a crime, “and
then we’re done.” Drug court recognizes that drug-addicted offenders cannot be left to their own devices
upon release from prison or jail. It thus differs substantially from probation and incarceration in its
primary focus on treatment and rehabilitation. As Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) indicated,
whereas probation is designed to monitor and incarceration is designed to punish, drug court actually tries
to help people out of a life of crime. Similarly, Detective X (non-drug court) described drug court as
“kind of a total approach to the individual.” The idea is not simply to punish or and monitor but to guide
people through rehabilitation and teach them to be productive and prosocial in the community. In
focusing on the “individual,” drug court is not merely concerned with preventing recidivism in the
community but also enabling the participants to live better, more productive lives for themselves.
Drug court’s rehabilitative purpose relates to Foucault’s argument that “punishments must be a
school rather than a festival; an ever open-book rather than a ceremony.”283 In other words, punishments
should be learning tools as opposed to vehicles of condemnation. Foucault utilized the example of
Rasphius of Amsterdam, which was a prison that conceptualized incarceration within a system of
restrictions and obligations, supervision, and practices such as religious readings meant to instill virtue in
prisoners and divert them from criminal behavior.284 In accordance with Foucault’s argument that
“punishments must be a school,” Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) criticized incarceration as “just
failure” in that it entails no treatment or learning.285 In his view, incarceration is largely ineffective in that
it does not provide people struggling with drug addiction with the means and motivation to rehabilitate
themselves. In connection with the idea of incarceration as “failure,” Foucault criticized that
imprisonment was contrary to rehabilitation in that it kept prisoners idle, which he believed was the
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general cause of most crimes.286 Drug court seeks to address the problem of idleness by having the
participants engage in prosocial activities.
Another way in which Foucault criticized the prison system was that it was “obscure” or isolated
from normal society.287 It confines and punishes people and does not prepare them for reentry. Foucault
believed the prison should rather “constitute the space between two worlds” that would transform the
individual into a productive, law-abiding citizen.288 Drug court is essentially an extension of Foucault’s
re-conception of the effective prison. It is not exactly the “space between” the worlds of incarceration
and the community but is a system of surveillance, treatment, and learning situated within the
community.289 As Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) described, drug court tries to make progress
in the real world. Rather than promoting rehabilitation within a space apart from the community in which
that learning will ultimately be tested, the effectiveness of drug court is seen in that it teaches people how
to change and attain sobriety within the community. The idea of drug court building upon Foucault’s
reconceptualization of the prison as “the space between two worlds” will be explored more thoroughly in
Chapter 4.290
Drug court differs from traditional probation and incarceration in its understanding that some
criminal behavior stems from structural problems of poverty and lack of access to drug treatment. It
addresses the suspected cause of crime, drug addiction, through treatment as opposed to simply
punishment and monitoring. Drug court is also effective in trying to heal and change people within the
community as opposed to incarceration where many inmates leave prison or jail unprepared for reentry
and probation where there is limited oversight and support.
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III. Realistic Expectations of the Team
The drug court team has discretion over how to sanction non-compliance. A common
understanding among the team members was that a relapse, at least at the beginning of one’s
participation, is a natural part of addiction recovery and is not deserving of harsh punishment. The team
will often try to address initial relapses through heightened treatment and other rehabilitative methods as
opposed to more punitive sanctions like jail.
Reflections from the drug court team on the use of graduated sanctions and responses to relapses
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “We certainly don’t expect people to come into drug court and stop using
altogether immediately. We’re realistic that you’re going to have relapses. And so when you do
relapse, you’re put on what’s called a RAP, a Relapse Action Plan, and that could be increased
treatment, increased home visits, increased counseling, things like that. And that’s all a team decision
and it is individualized.”291
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “You know nobody says if you have a relapse or if you make a poor
decision that you’re gonna immediately get kicked out. […] so sometimes the sanction can just be
more treatment. You know, you’ve got to go to more meetings or you’ve got to do something
different.”292
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “Well, someone has a use for instance and it’s reported to
us, if there’s no safety problems most oftentimes that person will go into some type of Relapse Action
Plan whereas that person is being treated with a focus on rehabilitation instead of a more punitive
measure of detention and jail. […] To use an example, if someone from probation, they say they use
drugs. They’ve used drugs four times. On that model that person’s going to be held in jail and
detained and may be at risk of revoking their entire probation, of going to jail or prison, losing their
family. Drug court understands that a relapse […] is something we can actually work with and learn
from, educate that person around… and that’s a huge difference.”293
Judge X (drug court): “[…] we do expect that people will relapse and ideally we won’t send them
immediately to jail, but that is one of the options for sanctions.”294
Judge Y (drug court): “Sanctions are graduated sanctions. In other words, the theory in drug court is
that if somebody is early on in the program and they haven’t really been given the opportunity to be
exposed to, and be comfortable with, and actually incorporate the tools to be healthy that are really
taught to them in the process of drug court by the treatment providers, the case managers, and the
probation officers […]. So somebody early on in the process, let’s say they were found to have used in
a drug test two or three weeks into the program or months into the program. Well, as a result there
needs to be a sanction because there’s a use. On the other hand the sanction that would be imposed
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would be much more minor than a sanction which would be imposed upon a participant who has had
the opportunity and has actually availed themselves of the opportunity to use the tools to stay
healthy. […] So somebody who missteps early on might get a sanction like a short community service
that needs to be done as a result of a use or they may have to write an introspective essay to share
with the others at the next drug court session about their use and what it means, how it relates to
their own health.”295

The interviews suggest drug court has realistic expectations that participants will not able to
immediately abstain from drug use. The Relapse Action Plan and other treatment-based sanctions show
that the team views relapse as a symptom of addiction rather than a criminal act. The team also
understands that a relapse can be a learning opportunity for the participants and considers what sanctions
would be most appropriate in terms of recovery and education. The idea of sanctions as learning tools
was conveyed by Judge Y (drug court) in his examples of possible sanctions to include community
service activities and introspective essays. The treatment-centered approach to addressing relapse and the
understanding that it can be handled safely within the community is very different from the traditional
model, which would necessitate some form of punishment. Judge Y (drug court) suggests drug court
recognizes that those who relapse early on have not yet had the opportunity to become fully integrated
into the program and be able to abstain from using. Since these participants are still intensely struggling
with addiction, it does not make sense to apply more punitive sanctions for less serious violations. The
approach of graduated sanctions is very different from traditional probation as described by Defense
Attorney Liaison X (drug court) in which a use would result in a jail sentence and possibly a probation
revocation.
The understanding that relapse is to be expected and that sanctions should be graduated shows
that drug court is fairer in its treatment of the participants than in the traditional model. Additionally, the
various types of sanctions that are less punitive and more rehabilitative such as increased treatment and
community service show that drug court sanctions are less punitive than the traditional model.
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To understand the team’s rationale for assigning more punitive sanctions, I asked the interviewees
to reflect on what they based their recommendations for sanctions and, under what circumstances they
would recommend jail.
Reflections of the drug court team on what they base their recommendations for sanctions
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “It varies. I’ve seen people get jail for consistently being late. Which
sounds very minor. But when it’s again and again, just clear disregard for what they’re supposed to
be doing, or for missed appointments, or for lying to the team, or for use violations… The point isn’t
just to incarcerate someone when they mess up so we don’t use it lightly, but it is used as a tool to
remind the drug court that you will go back to jail unless you really put everything you’ve got into
making this work.”296
When I asked Prosecutor X2 (drug court) on what he bases his recommendations for sanctions, he
replied: “Try to look if the noncompliance is addiction‐based. Look to see if any new criminal conduct
was committed in the process of the noncompliance. And then look to see what their history has
been to date. […] So, criminal conduct. Does it affect others in the court? Does it affect public
safety? Those are the three factors I look at for how intense the sanction should be up to
termination.”297
And, on the subject of when he would recommend jail, the prosecutor responded:
“Depends what we’re talking about. So if you are, if it’s a use and a first‐time use, I would not
recommend jail. I would say you know house arrest and go to your treatments. If you are you know
taking a relative’s money. You know and we suspect it’s to buy drugs, that to me yeah, you would do
a week or something like that. And then if somebody is just relapsing on multiple occasions or taking
steps to circumvent the testing, then it should be longer.”298
Judge X (drug court): “We look for honesty. If they are not truthful we can require more counseling
and more monitoring. If they cannot be honest and have continued the behavior and continued using
without being honest, we will send them to jail.”299
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “Our drug court team has always had sort of a list of available sanctions.
It’s not in a book that’s written down but it’s anywhere from writing essays to moving back a couple
of weeks in your phase up to jail time. […] It’s not always jail. You try to reserve that. I mean you
can’t start off by sending people to jail. You have to graduate the sanctions, so we just talk about
it.”300
Judge Y (drug court): “Later on if the person’s twelve, eleven months into the program and they use,
the sanction would quite likely be a jail sanction of some sort. […] I’m not saying that that would
necessarily be the sanction because every case…it’s always dependent on the circumstances and
296
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there’s never a blanket decision made before…you know there’s never a blanket decision that’s
already premade. You always consider all the circumstances to try to fashion something that makes
sense. […] Because you know if you put somebody who’s that far along in the program in jail, you
have to understand that you’re upending a lot of the work that’s been done and you’re upending the
circumstances in their life. For example, they may have a job and you may risk…you may present a
risk that they will be fired from the job which would be entirely counterproductive. You know you
may risk them losing their housing. There are a lot of different considerations that would be you
know looked into when we decide what kind of a sanction to give somebody.”301

A common theme among the interviews was that more punitive sanctions such as jail are
typically used in cases of dishonesty and disengagement. This suggests the rationale for punishment in
drug court is different from probation and incarceration where a criminal act is seen as deserving of
punishment. In many cases drug court punitively sanctions wrong attitudes and the person who has
proven to be dishonest or resistant. The severity of the punishment can be decided based on the team’s
impression that the person does not want to engage rather than simply because they committed a
violation. This is evident in Prosecutor X1 (drug court)’s statement that people can be given jail for
consistently being late because, while it seems less serious, it demonstrates the person’s refusal to engage.
The interviews also suggest that jail is used to sanction patterned behaviors of dishonesty and
disengagement. Prosecutor X2 (drug court) said he would recommend jail for multiple relapses and
instances of trying to circumvent testing and Judge X (drug court) said that while dishonesty at first may
require more counseling and monitoring, continued dishonesty will result in jail. The interviews reveal
that jail can be used to sanction perceived dishonesty, especially that which has been consistent.
Similarly, during my observations of County X’s drug court, I noticed that many times jail
sanctions and terminations were imposed for dishonesty. Multiple times the case manager would report
on someone testing positive for drugs and describe it as “pulling teeth” to get them to admit they had
used.302 For example, the case manager of drug court in County X once said she was “disheartened by her
[the participant’s] thought process. She did not want to be honest that she used.”303 This participant was
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taken into custody and then scheduled for a termination hearing. On the other hand, the team was more
understanding of clients who were struggling but were honest. For example, the case manager reported
on a woman who had not attended enough prosocial meetings “but was honest about it.”304 Another
factor that was a cause for jail or termination was disengagement from the program. They reprimanded
participants who they deemed were not listening to the team and continuing doing as they pleased. About
a client who had both used and violated her condition of house arrest, the treatment provider said, “she
says, “I know, I know,” but doesn’t hear us.”305 This participant was also taken into custody and set up
for a termination hearing. What the team seemed to find most frustrating and most deserving of jail or
termination were participants who were dishonest or not engaging in drug court.
The reflections of Judge Y (drug court) and Case Manager Y (drug court) also indicate there are
no set circumstances in which the team decides to impose a certain sanction. The team considers a
number of factors, including the best interests of the participant. Since the team members get to know the
participants on a personal level, they find it more difficult to impose jail and are conscious of how a jail
sanction might disrupt important aspects of their lives. Prosecutor X1 (drug court) likewise reflected, “It
is a difficult decision to send these people back to jail. […] you get to know them more, you know what
you’re taking them away from when you sanction them to jail.”306
In addition to sanctioning dishonesty and disengagement, the team will also assign sanctions
based on the severity of the violation. Prosecutor X2 (drug court) said he would recommend jail for more
serious instances of criminal conduct and that which affects other participants or threatens public safety.
Judge Y (drug court) also stated that jail can be imposed for relapses that occur later on in the program,
once the participant has had enough time to avail themselves of the tools and coping strategies acquired
through drug court. Both interviewees indicated that jail sanctions can be used for severe violations of
criminal conduct and violations that occur further along in the program.
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The jail sanction also invokes the traditional punishment model of the carceral state by utilizing
the threat of incarceration. The statement of Prosecutor X1 (drug court) that jail sanctions are meant to
remind the participants of the possibility of ending up in jail shows they are not mere punishments for
violations. They are meant to induce compliance by reinforcing the underlying incarcerated sentence in
the minds of the participants. The purpose of jail sanctions therefore relates back to Foucault’s idea that
the “memory of pain” prevents one from repeating a crime.307 Jail sanctions subject participants to a short
period in jail, thereby reminding them of what they will face if they do not change their ways. In addition
to being a form of direct carceral punishment, jail sanctions use the threat of punishment in order to
induce compliance.
In conclusion, drug court is less punitive in its treatment of the participants in reserving more
punitive sanctions for more serious violations. The process of sanctioning is also more humane in that the
team is not simply concerned with whether a violation was committed but considers how sanctions would
affect the participant’s life and treatment progress. The salience of dishonesty and disengagement in
deciding to impose more serious sanctions shows that drug court utilizes a type of punishment that is
different from the traditional model. In many cases, drug court is more concerned with punishing the
person who is resistant rather than simply the person who commits a violation. Drug court uses sanctions
to motivate participants to engage in the program and to attain sobriety rather than simply to punish.
Nonetheless, the jail sanction is another example of the threat of punishment being used to induce
compliance. While drug court is more humane toward participants who violate, the jail sanction relies on
the traditional model of punishment in using the “memory of pain” as a threat.
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IV. Team Approach
With regards to sanctions and almost all decisions in drug court, the interviewees emphasized the
importance of team decision-making and consensus. 308
Team decision‐making in deciding sanctions
Probation Officer X (drug court): “Sanctions we talk about as a team. If I’m worried someone is about
to commit a crime, I will call for them to be in‐custody as a public safety concern. We talk about
these issues in drug court together and deal with matters when we see the judge but can fall off when
we do not see the judge.”309
When I asked Prosecutor X1 (drug court) on what she bases her recommendations for sanctions, she
responded: “That’s a group decision. Usually Maine Pretrial [case manager] is the first one to know
that because they’re the ones who do the UAs [drug tests]. So if there’s a dirty urine test we get a
notification from the pretrial person about what’s going on. We try and figure out where this person
is in the steps, is it early enough where this makes sense that they’re still relapsing.”310
Case Manager Y (drug court): “You know if somebody’s late for a session with me, it’s at my
discretion what I would do for a sanction. With that said we are a really strong team and before I was
to say to a client, ‘listen, you’re going to spend 24 hours in jail because you’ve missed two sessions
with me,’ I would consult my team and say, ‘I’m thinking about doing this. What are your guys’
thoughts, is there anything I need to take into consideration?’ And within a couple of minutes
typically we’ll come to a consensus of like, ‘no, maybe not 24 hours, let’s do 10 hours of community
service.’ So I have some flexibility and autonomy. However, there’s always a caveat to… you’re also
going to see the judge in a week or three days or whatever and he may decide to impose more.
Typically what I would do is I would send an email to the judge saying ‘hey, this was the infraction.
You know I talked with the…you know probation and treatment. We decided that this would be an
appropriate sanction. What are your thoughts?’ We usually agree on it, agree on the sanction […].”311

All three interview passages stress the importance of team deliberation and consensus in making
decisions with respect to the participants. As indicated by Prosecutor X1 (drug court), the team does not
automatically punish someone for a violation but gauges what the motivation is and the surrounding
circumstances. The statement of Case Manager Y (drug court) is interesting in suggesting that although
members of the team can impose sanctions unilaterally when someone violates in their presence, they will
rather consult the rest of the team. Strong communication among the team also allows individual
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members to make relevant information about a participant known to everyone before a sanction is
decided. The emphasis on team deliberation suggests a commitment to gaining an accurate understanding
of the client’s situation and making sure the sanction is fair and appropriate.
Team approach in drug court vs. traditional criminal court
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “In a regular trial court I am a sole team representing the state and asking
for a certain sentence. […] When I am part of the drug court I am part of the team, so my voice is one
part. […] When we meet about what we think is appropriate to do with the participants, whether it’s
violations, sending them back to jail, asking for more treatment, things like that, I am just one vote
and then [Judge X (drug court)’s name], the judge, gets a vote, the defense attorney gets a vote,
probation gets a vote, Maine Pretrial [case manager] gets a vote, and treatment gets a vote. So I
become just part of the team whereas in my regular role in the court as a prosecutor I am the one
asking for what I see fit as part of the state. It’s a team approach. And sometimes I lose out on what I
want but it’s a group decision on what we think is best for that person.”312
Probation Officer Y (drug court): “You know when something’s going on everybody knows about it.
In a regular trial court […] if someone’s placed on probation and they do well on probation, the judge
will never hear their name again from the day they sentence ‘em. Out of sight out of mind. The only
time a judge or the DA’s [district attorney’s] office gets involved is if they’re not doing well so you
know and over the course of you know regular probation let’s say, let’s say the person does well and
there’s never an issue, I’ll never once talk to a DA on that case. Whereas if someone’s in drug court
and let’s say they do well and there’s never an issue in drug court, I’ll still have a conversation weekly
with the DA’s office and hundreds if not sometimes upwards thousands of emails talking about clients
and where they’re at.”313

The above interview passages indicate that drug court’s practice of deliberative, group decisionmaking does not occur in normal probation and traditional criminal court. Prosecutor X (drug court) said
that whereas in her traditional role she is the sole person representing the state, in drug court she works on
a team. Her priorities are different in that she is concerned with what is best for the participant beyond
the interests of the state. She considers the team approach to be important for making decisions that are
appropriate, even if the rest of the team does not share her opinion. Probation Y (drug court) stated that
whereas in normal probation, the defendant is only brought to the attention of the judge and the
prosecutor in the instance of a violation, the drug court team discusses the participants regularly,
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regardless of how they are performing. Therefore, a key difference between drug court and the traditional
model is that the team cares about the participants apart from when they are faring poorly. The team will
consider its regular interactions with the participants, both positive and negative, when making decisions.
Drug court therefore contradicts the traditional model in that it is not solely concerned with clients who
misstep and when there is need for a sanction. Additionally, both interview passages indicate that drug
court entails a different type of role for the prosecutor in that he or she is not solely obligated to represent
the state, but also to consider the best interests of the participant.
Defense Attorney X (non-drug court), however, criticized that the team does not operate as
effectively as it should in that it excludes the participants’ private defense attorneys.
A criticism of the drug court team by Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court)
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “My biggest problem with it [drug court] is they exclude the
defense attorney from the deliberations, from having what I feel is a meaningful role in the decision‐
making process itself. […] And [Defense Attorney Liaison’s X (drug court)]’s a great guy and he’s very
committed to the cause, but he doesn’t know my client the way that I know my client. And so what I
hate about this process, just drives me crazy, is the defense part gets treated as if we’re some kind of
impediment to the workings of the drug court team because I think they think that the defense
attorney is gonna put roadblocks in the way of the team from getting the treatment in place. But
when nothing could possibly be further from the truth because these applications don’t get sent in
unless the defense attorney’s the one shepherding them through the process. […] When the
prosecutor is a prime member of that team, probation is, and the idea that you should exclude the
defense attorney I think is wrongheaded and I think that they really need to fix that part of it.”314

Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) felt it was important for him to be part of the discussions
that humanize the participants. He recognized the team’s intent to understand the person apart from the
criminal and expressed concern that the team’s understanding will not be accurate without the input of the
private defense attorney. He also seemed to suggest it was unfair to the best interests of the client for the
team that has a prosecutor and probation officer to exclude the defense attorney.
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Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) seemed to indicate there was a reason for the private
defense attorney not being part of the team. He contrasted his own roles as the drug court defense
attorney liaison and being a traditional defense attorney advising individual clients.

Traditional defense attorney vs. drug court defense attorney liaison roles
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “We have a system where I’m representing the defendant’s
interest and…as much as I can and should, the particular interest of each person in drug court. But
they also have at the same time their own individual attorney who’s advocating for them just as an
individual attorney would for any other case. I will contact their attorney lots of times, let them know
the situation that’s going on, maybe offer them advice. But I don’t specifically counsel their clients
and that’s much different. In that kind of way I can also be reasonable. I can…if I was just someone
who’s always a hundred percent of the time saying the defendant is always right, the prosecution’s
always wrong, that wouldn’t advance the process very much.”315

Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) highlighted the importance of distinguishing his role in
drug court from his role as a traditional defense attorney. He explained that in his traditional role he
would be required to advocate for what the client wants regardless of what he thought was most
appropriate. By contrast, in drug court he is able to make decisions that are fair and reasonable, even if
they are in fact contrary to the expressed preferences of the participant. This reasoning seems to come
from an understanding that while struggling with addiction, the participants may not exercise the best
judgement and it would make it more difficult to arrive at a team consensus if the defense attorneys were
always advocating for their clients’ preferences. The debate regarding whether the participant’s defense
attorney should be given a more substantial role in drug court is interesting in that on the one hand, it is
important to ensure the interests of the participant are adequately represented but also there is the
realization that the addicted person may not have the best judgment at the time.
In conclusion, the centrality of collective decision-making in drug court shows that the process of
deciding sanctions is different from punishment in probation and traditional criminal court. The process
is more humane in that the team cares about the participants beyond when they are faring poorly.
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However, Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) criticized that the decisions could be better informed if
the participant’s defense attorney had a more substantial role in drug court. Defense Attorney Liaison X
(drug court) suggested a reason for this may be the team’s understanding that the drug-addicted
participant does not necessarily have his or her best interests in mind and that having someone on the
team solely advocating for those interests would impede the decision-making process. It is an interesting
debate as to whether the team gains enough information about the participants through regular
interactions or whether the defense counsel should have a more active role.

V. Honesty and Building Trust
The County Y prosecutor and case manager both reflected that the frequent and personalized
interactions in drug court encourage the participants to be honest with the team and engaged in the
program. Honesty and engagement breed mutual trust between the participants and the drug court team.
Honesty breeds mutual trust between the team and the participants
Case Manager Y (drug court): “Being honest about your relapses and being honest about your use will
get you further in treatment as opposed to lying and covering up and creating more sanctions for
yourself. I think once that sort of lightbulb goes off for people, they’re able to recognize that ‘yeah,
they’re not just here to supervise me and bust me, you know, send me to the department of
corrections because I used. They really do care. They really do want the best for me and if I’m just
honest with them about my, you know my situations, my triggers, my cravings, my inability to be
around people that are using, they’re gonna support me rather than just say, you know too bad
you’re going back to jail.’ […] You know there’s unfortunately a lot of negative talk in the jail about
drug court. You know, ‘you’re never gonna make it. It’s too hard. They just wanna see you fail.’ I
mean I think early on for clients that are in the referral process they still feel that. And I think that’s
overall the flavor of being in jail as well for you know people in the court system. I think once people
are into drug court and they’ve been able to function and adapt to the scheduling, the treatment, I
think it’s almost a self‐esteem booster because they’re feeling like they are getting more competent
in being outside of jail and being successful, paying their bills, being sober, going to your
appointments. I think there is a switch. I think it doesn’t happen early on. I think it’s probably I
would say three months into the program where, you know. You start letting, you know letting their
hands go and say ‘okay, now you’re starting to do this on your own. This is something you’re really
able to do,’ and they start getting it.”316
Probation Officer Y (drug court): “You get to know them again as a person and not just a name and a
number. You know I like to think that that breeds trust on both ends. That you know the flip side of
316
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it, they get to know me a little bit too and hopefully when they’re in a pinch, when they’re in a tight
spot, they feel a little more comfortable picking up that phone and saying ‘Hey, I’m struggling. This is
what’s going on.’ Or if they do mess up, you know me saying ‘Hey [participant’s name], come in, let’s
deal with this.’ And instead of going on the run and me having to put a warrant out for them, they
have some faith knowing, ‘hey, [probation officer’s name]’s not a bad guy. He’s just doing his job and
I know that he’ll do good by me.’ And even if that means them going to jail. For example, this
morning a guy came in to see me and he knew he was going to jail. Yet he showed up and did so and
when I dropped him off at the jail, we parted ways, he said, ‘thank you.’ I said, ‘Hey, behave yourself
here and we’ll see you soon.’ Those interactions don’t tend to happen with a probation officer who’s
got a caseload of 150 and you know, again, hasn’t been able to take that time to get to know that
person and what their struggles and strengths are.”317

Case Manager Y (drug court) suggested that initially participants tend to be wary of the drug
court team based upon previous negative experiences in the criminal justice system. They at first view
the team as merely concerned with punishing them for violations. However, as the participants develop
personalized and supportive relationships with the team members, they come to understand that “they
really do care.” This newfound trust leads the participants to become more open with the team about
when they are struggling and when they have committed violations. Case Manager Y (drug court) also
indicated that honesty from the participants makes the team more inclined to trust them to manage
themselves in the community and who will then loosen the reins on the supervision and program
requirements. The participants are also more trusting upon receiving positive reinforcement from the
team when they are doing well.
Similarly, Probation Officer Y (drug court) indicated that as the participants get to know him,
they are more honest about when they are struggling and they seek help. Interestingly, he reported on a
case in which the participant was so trusting that he even turned himself in for a violation in knowing he
would be jailed. It is important to note that the probation officer recalls ending the exchange with, “we’ll
see you soon.” The participant turned himself in because he knew it was not the probation officer’s intent
for him to stay in jail. Rather both were looking forward to when the participant would be released and
they could start afresh and renew progress.
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In my observations of drug court in County X, I noticed that the team would attempt to build
confidence and trust in the participants through positive reinforcement. About a client who was
struggling with prosocial engagement but improving otherwise, the judge had other participants stand up
and speak on his behalf. She then said, “Did you hear the positive things people said? You’re doing
great.”318 Another telling example of encouragement from by the team was regarding a client who had
recently spent time in a recovery center:

Observation of drug court in County X: An example of encouragement from the team
Judge: “Tell me what you learned [in the recovery center].”
Participant: “Not to make assumptions. Do my best.”
Judge: “Not to make assumptions, what does that mean?”
Participant: “Just because things do not look the brightest […]”
Judge: “Who is this person?!”
Participant: “I’m [participant’s name]!”
Treatment Provider: “You’re coming for help. You’re talking. Doing what we’re asking you to
do.”
Defense Attorney Liaison: “You’re carrying yourself in a different way.”319

The participant exuded a palpable expression of confidence when he said, “I’m [participant’s
name]!” The exchange demonstrated how the team’s positive reinforcement and having the participant
reflect on his progress was important for restoring his sense of human dignity. It showed that the team
was not simply concerned with him complying, but wanted him to internalize the importance of living a
sober life.
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A similar expression of care came from the judge at the end of one of the status hearings when
she made a compassionate speech before all of the participants.
Observation of drug court in County X: The judge’s words of encouragement to the participants
Judge X (drug court): “What you’re doing is the hardest thing I can imagine to do. Waking up and
saying I’m not going to use drugs today. I’m going to be part of my life and the world. We learn from
you every day. What you say, what you go through, it helps us live better lives.”320

The judge reminded the participants that she understood that drug court is demanding and that
remaining sober is difficult. In discussing how drug court helps her and the rest of the team live better
lives, she assured the participants that they are valued by the team and in the community and are not just
names on a court docket. In doing so, the judge presented herself as a caring and compassionate human
apart from an authority figure. The passage reveals that not only are the participants and the team
connected through their direct and personalized interactions, but that both benefit from drug court as an
opportunity to learn from each other.
This section shows how the regular and personalized interactions of drug court are important for
rebuilding the participants’ trust in the court system and their sense of human dignity. They also suggest
the program’s ability to build the team’s trust in the participants as they demonstrate engagement and
responsibility. Additionally, drug court is a learning process for both the participants and the team. The
participants learn to cope with drug addiction and become prosocial and the team is alerted to the
difficulty of overcoming drug addiction and the powerful impact that regular, personalized interactions
can have in changing people’s lives for the better.

VI. Conclusion
According to Foucault, the effectiveness of punishment is in manifesting the idea of pain in the
mind of the potential offender.321 The idea of pain is the threat of punishment which incites fear and
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deters someone from committing crimes.322 The literature on the modern carceral state further indicates
that a key component of punishment is control through the threat of punishment. Defendants may consent
to plea deals with prosecutors, whether or not they are innocent or guilty, in fear of receiving longer
sentences if found guilty.323 The effectiveness of drug court relies on the threat of punishment as a source
of control through the underlying sentence and through jail sanctions. An awareness of the underlying
sentence as well as painful memories of being incarcerated are meant to motivate compliance. Insofar as
drug court depends on the threat of punishment as a source of control, it can never truly be an alternative
to the carceral state.
In considering Joshua Kaiser’s concept of hidden sentences, the team’s discretion in sanctioning
can also be seen as an extension of carceral state control.324 Kaiser stated that in the case of hidden
sentences, punishment need only follow from an authority’s perception of wrongdoing.325 Similarly, the
drug court team has the power to define what constitutes dishonesty and disengagement. It is these
violations that often lead to more punitive sanctions such as jail. In other words, the team may punish
based on their own perceptions of dishonesty and disengagement rather than stable definitions of
wrongdoing. Therefore, drug court is an extension of carceral state development both in terms of relying
on the threat of punishment and the subjective power to punish.
While not distinct in its model of control, drug court is more humane in its treatment of the
participants given its focus on addiction rehabilitation rather than punishment and monitoring. The team
has a more humanized view of the participants as driven to crime primarily by drug addiction rather than
criminal intent. It recognizes that many addicts resort to crime because they lack the support, resources,
and motivation to stop using. Drug court is unique in that some of the sanctions for non-compliance are
treatment-based rather than formal punishments. The team also has realistic expectations that the
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participants will misstep in the beginning and will likely refrain from imposing more punitive sanctions in
these cases. This is different from the traditional model in which a violation requires formal punishment.
While incarcerated people are restricted from drug use within a controlled environment, they do
not leave prepared to cope on the outside where they may encounter drug-involved peers and other
triggers. Similarly, those on probation are largely expected to stay clean and obtain treatment on their
own. The literature on the carceral state describes how many ex-offenders are branded as criminals in
normal society and thus have restricted access to important resources including housing, employment, and
education.326 Although drug court cannot ultimately decide how people will be treated in the community,
it does facilitate access to treatment and other resources and teaches the participants to be prosocial. Drug
court therefore works to undermine the stigma imposed by the carceral state that people cannot move on
from their criminal pasts.
Drug court’s model of punishment is also unique in that sanctions are decided through team
deliberations and that the team cares about the participants apart from when they misstep. The team also
considers how sanctions will impact the participants’ lives and treatment progress. Although there is a
debate on whether the participants’ defense attorneys should be given a more active role in the team
deliberations. Drug court sanctions also seem less harmful than carceral state punishments in that they do
not tend to undermine the participants’ trust in the team. The interviewees described how the participants
gradually learn that the team wants to see them succeed and is not solely looking to punish. This is in
contrast to the attitudes of incoming participants who may be wary of the team based on previous
negative experiences in the criminal justice system. The participants grow to be honest with the team and
the team becomes more trusting of the participants to be independent.
With respect to punishment, drug court is more humane in its treatment of people through a
system of graduated sanctions. Nevertheless, the very fact that drug court relies on the threat of
traditional incarceration as a source of control, which is heightened by the subjective power to punish,
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indicates that drug court can never be a true alternative to the carceral state. Instead, it is a part of it; it
relies on it in order to function optimally.
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Chapter 4: Surveillance
This chapter contrasts the use of surveillance in drug court with that of probation, incarceration
and traditional criminal court. The contrast is depicted both in the amount and more substantively in the
type of surveillance. Part I describes how surveillance in drug court operates through a relationship of
mutual accountability between the team and the participants and the participants with each other. Part II
consists of interview reflections on how the surveillance used in drug court relates to that used in
probation, incarceration and traditional criminal court. Part III shows that the personalized interactions
between the team and the participants make surveillance in drug court more humanizing than in the
traditional model. This section also includes two criticisms of drug court in County X with respect to
unrealistic expectations for participants to find and manage employment along with their drug court
responsibilities as well as change their peer associations. Part IV reflects on the issue of participants
graduating from drug court and then struggling to live independently in the community. Part V discusses
a recommended solution of providing participants and recent graduates with sober housing. Part VI
displays my observations of a drug court graduation proceeding and remarks on how it signals both a
congratulations and a warning not to relapse and recidivate. Part VII is the conclusion and argues that
while surveillance in drug court is more rehabilitative and humanizing in terms of the team’s treatment of
the participants, insofar as it does not attend to larger structural issues surrounding reintegration, it is not
an alternative to the carceral state.

I. Mutual Accountability
The interview respondents agreed that the degree of surveillance used in drug court is more
intense than is used in probation. There was also agreement that the level of surveillance is higher in
incarceration, although many also suggested the intensity of the surveillance in drug court is greater than
or at least comparable to incarceration. The variation in responses regarding the comparison with
incarceration depended on how the respondents defined “surveillance.” All of the interviewees implied

85

drug court was built on a mutually accountable relationship between the participants and the team and
with each other based on: 1) the frequency and variety of ways in which the team conducts monitoring, 2)
the duty of the participants to check in and fulfill many requirements as ordered by the team, 3) the team
members communicating regularly about the participants, and 4) the participants knowing about each
other’s cases through group meetings and status hearings. In fact, many of the interviewees described
“accountability” as one of the most important aspects for promoting participants’ success or that it was an
essential part of the surveillance used in drug court. Those who thought surveillance in drug court was
more intense than incarceration incorporated this relationship of mutual accountability into their
definitions of surveillance whereas those who thought it entailed less intense surveillance had a more
traditional definition of surveillance as monitoring being done to someone. The remainder of this section
uses interview and observational data to elaborate on the nature of the mutually accountable relationship.

Surveillance Roles in Adult Drug Court
Participant Duties
Team Duties
House checks
Call‐ins to the case manager and probation
Phone checkups
Attending treatment
Drug testing
Prosocial engagement, e.g. AA meetings
In‐court status hearings
Drug testing
Pre‐court team meetings
In‐court status hearings
Treatment meetings
House arrest
This table lists the duties (gleaned from the interviews and observations) of the participants and the team that
enable surveillance in drug court. Notice how the number of duties is equal between the two roles, hinting at the
salience of mutual accountability. In‐court status hearings, treatment, and drug testing are listed in both columns
because they rely on the responsibility of both the team and the participants.

Since the participants have the freedom to live in the community as opposed to being confined in
jail or prison, they have to prove to the team that they are engaged in drug court and are abstaining from
drug use. A variety of monitoring (by the team) and self-reporting methods (by the participants) are
employed to ensure these outcomes. It was conveyed that the case manager and probation officer conduct
most of the supervision but all members of the team contribute in one way or another. One surveillance
mechanism mentioned often was participants calling in each day to the case manager.
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Participant call‐ins to the case manager
Case Manager Y (drug court): “They [the participants] call in every morning to my office between
7:00 and 7:30 and what I do is I leave a message. Everybody has been assigned a color. And if I say
that color on the message, they have to report to me within the hour. If not, they have to say their
first name, they have to spell their last name, and it’s time‐stamped so that I can see if they actually
did call in on time.”327

If a participant’s color is called, he or she must report for drug testing. The schedule is
randomized so that the participant does not know when he or she will be called. Case Manager Y (drug
court) explained, “weekends, holidays, it doesn’t matter. They still have to call in.”328 This is different
from probation where drug testing happens on a set schedule.329 Call-ins are a telling example of the
mutually accountable relationship between the team and the participants. Drug testing not only depends
on the decision of the case manager to call a specific color group but also on the agency of the participant
to call in on time and report for testing. Other ways in which the participants enable their own
surveillance include attending status hearings in which they appear before the entire team once a week or
once every other week, reporting to probation as regularly scheduled if they are on probation, meeting
with the treatment provider, requesting out-of-county passes if they wish to travel and are not on a phase
that allows it, as well as prosocial engagement such as attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings.
330

Therefore, surveillance in drug court not only relies on the team monitoring the participants but on the

active role of the participants to report to the team and enable their own surveillance
While observing drug court in County X, I noticed that the judge would use the layout of the
courtroom as a surveillance tool. Usually the team (apart from the judge who sat on the bench as in a
traditional court) would sit at a bench across the room from the participants who sat in the jury box.
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A rough sketch (not to scale) of the typical drug court courtroom in County X: the two Xs at the top left represent
the participant who is checking in and his or her defense attorney (who occasionally participates in drug court
hearings) by the podium facing the judge. The X at the top right represents the judge on the bench. The four Xs at
the bottom represent the rest of the drug court team (case manager, prosecutor, defense attorney liaison,
treatment provider, and probation officer). Not depicted but still present are the rest of the participants who sit in
the jury box behind the participant who is being called.331

On a day in which she was reprimanding a number of participants for dishonesty, the judge had
the rest of the team sit in “the well,” a row of chairs located much closer to and facing the participants.332
It seemed as though she wanted to remind the participants of their responsibility to be honest with the
team and that the team would ultimately find out about their missteps if they tried to hide them.

A rough sketch (not to scale) of the drug court courtroom in County X in which the drug court team (except for the
judge who sits on the bench) sits in the well. The participants are represented by the circles in the jury box (the
rectangle in the back right). The single circle on the top left represents a participant who is sitting beside but not
within the jury box. In front of the participants is the podium where the participant who is being called stands.
The Xs in front of the participants represent the drug court team (case manager, prosecutor, defense attorney
liaison, treatment provider, and probation officer) who sit in the well and are much closer to the participants than
usual.333
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On a different day (not pictured) the judge had five of the participants sit in the middle of the
courtroom below the jury box where the rest of the participants sat. Each of the five participants were
being reprimanded. Some were behind on their court fees (criminal fines and restitution) and one person
had tried to substitute his AA meeting requirement with volunteer work. The setup resembled a public
shaming. The sketches show how the drug court team would use the structure of the courtroom to make
the surveillance more or less intense depending on the circumstances of the cases being heard. The
surveillance seemed more intense on days in which more participants were being reprimanded.334
The team members also described how they monitor the participants outside of the courtroom.
Monitoring of the participants outside of the courtroom
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “We have treatment providers that meet with them every week and they
talk to them about what they’ve done. The treatment providers are connected with a lot of the group
meetings that occur in the community. So if somebody’s not going to the meetings, they usually get
that information back even if the person…especially if the person’s professing that they are going.”335
Case Manager Y (drug court): “They [the participants] have to prove that they went to at least five
prosocial meetings a week. The probation officer, myself, we’ll go check those meetings, make sure
they’re there.”336
Probation Officer Y (drug court): “I’m the one who does either the bail or the probation checks at
their given residences. I’m often out…you know I try to be out at least one night a week, and if not
night early mornings when I tend to find people home. That’s when I make sure that folks are sticking
to their conditions of probation and bail. Through these checks. I usually go with another officer and
we do searches at the residence if need be.”337

Prosecutor X2 (drug court) and Case Manager Y (drug court) described how the team verifies that
the participants are at the meetings they claim to be attending. Also, Probation Officer Y (drug court) will
conduct house checks at the participants’ places of residence.
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In addition to the participants in County X reporting to the team, it seemed they were also called
upon to monitor each other. At status hearings, the judge would take attendance and then call the
participants one-by-one to ask how they were doing and inform them of the team’s understanding of their
progress. Each participant observed everyone else’s check-in and occasionally the judge would ask one
of the team members or another participant to weigh in on someone’s situation. An instance of
participants offering advice to another occurred in the case of someone who had recently completed a jail
sanction for failing to report for drug testing and then trying to evade the team.338
Observation of drug court in County X: The importance of being honest
Judge: “What did you learn from being in jail?”
Participant: “Not to lie. Be honest.”
Judge: “How hard is it to do?”
Participant: “Hard.”
Treatment Provider: “Honesty is the hard part.”
Judge: “Learn from your peers. Honesty, honesty, honesty.”339

The judge then had two other participants explain the importance of being honest in drug court.
One person said, “Everyone’s talking about how it’s hard to be honest. But it’s a lot harder to lie.”340
The judge would also advise the participants to learn from each other’s mistakes. As two participants
were being handcuffed on a jail sanction, the judge asked the participant standing before her, “How does
it feel to watch that?”341 Additionally, the judge would acknowledge role model participants. She stated
to the rest of the group regarding a participant who had recently experienced a traumatic event, “She’s
asked for help and is getting help.”342 It seems that accountability in drug court is not only based on
interactions between the team and the participants, but also the participants are accountable to each other.
In this way drug court attempts to foster a sense of community among the participants as well as create
another mechanism of accountability. In fact, Prosecutor X1 (drug court) said she viewed the participants

338

Observation of Drug Court in County X, December 9, 2016.
Ibid.
340
Ibid.
341
Judge X (drug court): Observation of Drug Court in County X: December 9, 2016.
342
Judge X (drug court): Observation of Drug Court in County X: December 2, 2016.
339

90

as a team. “I mean their treatment and counseling is individualized […] but as a prosecutor who only sees
them in court once a week, I do view them as a team.”343

This section depicts the various mechanisms of surveillance used in drug court, which depend on
mutual accountability between the team and participants and the participants and each other. The team is
responsible for monitoring the participants to make sure they are in compliance and the participants
contribute to their own surveillance by actively reporting to the team and showing proof of compliance.
The participants are also accountable to each other in that they meet regularly and observe each other’s
check-ins with the team during status hearings. The next section illustrates how some of the interviewees
incorporated this relationship of mutual accountability into their definitions of surveillance.

II. Levels of Surveillance Compared with Probation and Incarceration
II.a. Comparison with Probation
The type of surveillance used in drug court was said to be more similar to probation than
incarceration. However, the level of surveillance in drug court was said to be much higher.
Similarities between drug court and probation
Judge Y (drug court): “There are some similarities with regards to probation but they are the obvious
similarities that are… I don’t think are very significant. For example, the person’s out on…the person’s
out in the community like they are on probation. They have some entity that’s monitoring them to
some degree like they have on probation. And they’re required to obey certain rules that are much
more stringent than you and I have to obey.”344
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The consensus that the surveillance used in drug court is higher than in probation was in part
based on the fact that the team conducts the monitoring as opposed to a single probation officer. Also, the
participants have much less privacy because the team knows a lot of personal information about them.
Descriptions of the drug court team’s monitoring of the participants
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “You have the treatment providers, you have the case manager, and then
you have a… if you’re on a probate, a probation officer, and then you have the judge you know sitting
on the bench, sitting there staring at you every couple of weeks. So the level of oversight is much
greater. Much more intense.”345
Probation Officer X (drug court): “We [the team] talk about everything, including clients’
relationships, educational needs, and mental health. We learn about their whole world. We know a
lot of information about people, such as who are all of their doctors. […] I spend more time focused
on the drug court folks. We meet twice a week and they have to report in to me. In my regular
caseload there’s weekly reporting but they only come to court for a probation violation.”346
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “When you’re in drug court you probably have a lot less
privacy because the participants sign releases and all of the information is discussed by the team. I
don’t think probation has that ability. I’d say the process of getting information, such as from a
cellphone, Facebook, or email is similar to someone on probation but even more intrusive I guess
would be the word. I don’t mean it in a negative way.”347

Prosecutor X2 (drug court) described the level of surveillance as higher in drug court than in
probation in that the participants are monitored by an entire team. Probation Officer X (drug court) and
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) agreed that the level of surveillance in drug court is greater
based on the large amount of information the team knows about the participants. Probation Officer X
(drug court) said the team knows about the participants’ “whole world” and that she has more direct
contact with the participants than with normal probationers. Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court)
described the way in which the team accesses information about the participants as more “intrusive” than
in probation. Taken together, these passages show that the process of being monitored by an entire team
as opposed to one probation officer, more direct contact, and the greater amount of information known
about the participants means drug court entails a higher degree of surveillance than probation.
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The consensus that surveillance is higher in drug court than probation further stressed that the
team monitors the participants more often.
A comparison of the frequency of monitoring within drug court and probation
Detective X (non‐drug court) described regular probation as a type of “loose monitoring.” “[In
probation] you [the probationer] check in occasionally. You might have to take a drug test. With drug
court they’re not getting a free pass as far as you know just not going to prison. I mean there is a lot
of work they have to do to be successful. Just as a whole, a general probationer has way more
freedom and lack of supervision than a drug court individual. Probation, as long as you don’t get in
trouble or get arrested, you know they don’t drug test as much. They don’t…the supervision’s not to
the same degree.”348
Probation Officer Y (drug court): “I can’t even venture a guess you know…how much higher it is that
we supervise [in drug court] but it’s significant. For example I would think a drug court client
probably gets upwards of 120‐150 drug tests a year versus a standard client on probation with a
random search and test condition for alcohol and illegal drugs may get maybe a dozen if they’re really
high risk.”349

In comparison with the surveillance used in drug court, Detective X (non-drug court) described
probation as a type of “loose monitoring.” Drug court participants are monitored on a regular basis and
have to undergo more drug testing. Additionally, Detective X (non-drug court) said more work is
required of the drug court participants. Probation Officer Y (drug court) further emphasized that drug
court participants are drug tested much more frequently.
In conclusion, while drug court and probation use similar methods of surveillance and both
operate within the community, the surveillance in drug court is greater and more intense. An entire team
monitors the participants as opposed to only a probation officer and the team knows much more about
them. There are also more frequent interactions with the participants as well as more monitoring done by
the team. Additionally, the surveillance in drug court relies on the participants devoting a lot more effort
to engaging with the team as opposed to a normal probationer with his or her probation officer.
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II.b. Comparison with Incarceration
While all agreed that incarceration required the highest level of surveillance, some interviewees
viewed surveillance in drug court as more intense than in incarceration (see Figure 4-1). These
interviewees remarked on the difference in the unique mutual accountability of drug court whereas
surveillance in jail or prison does not rely on the agency of the inmate.
Figure 4‐1
Opinions of the interviewees in comparing the intensity of surveillance in drug court compared with
incarceration (Total: 6 Respondents)
More intense
3
Less intense
3
A count of the number of interview (drug court) responses regarding whether drug court is more or less intense
than incarceration. The table includes only six responses because not everyone shared an opinion on the intensity
of the surveillance in drug court compared with incarceration. Others described differences in the type of
surveillance used but did not indicate whether they believed the surveillance was more or less intense in drug
court than in jail or prison.

Interview opinions suggesting surveillance in drug court is more intense than in incarceration
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “It’s actually more severe from probation and jail in terms
of…there’s a lot of things that the people have to do and comply with.”350
Case Manager Y (drug court): “I think that you know in jail it’s a constant supervision. You know
there’s not a lot of decisions to be made. There’s not a lot of education going on. You know you’re
basically told from the moment you wake up to the moment you go to bed what to do […] You kind
of have a deflated ability to not do anything other than be in jail and be unhappy. But you know
oftentimes when I have people who sort of give up and feel like they can’t do it [drug court], the
tagline they often say to me is, ‘I’m just gonna do my time. It’s easier.’ The reality is it probably is
easier. It probably is easier to sit for two years and do your time and do nothing, but you’re not
getting out of jail in two years any better. You’re not having the ability to work on those life skills, to
work on you know the substance abuse treatment and recovery skills. You’re not able to […] you
know go to prosocial activities and meet sober people who are you know good influences. You know
they’re just coming out of jail probably worse than they went in.”351
Probation Officer Y (drug court): “[…] you know if they’re incarcerated that’s a controlled
environment. […] they may be sober for six months in a year they’re incarcerated but until they’re
out in the community and put that to practice and put them back in their old situation, it really
doesn’t mean anything. So while they’re incarcerated, it’s easy to keep an eye on them. Obviously
out in the community it’s more difficult, takes a little more effort. You know but we see…you know
we see what’s really happening. We’ve got people who are model inmates. Never have an issue and
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when they’re in the community they’re a nightmare because you know everything that was going
wrong or can go wrong does and they don’t handle stress well.”352

The interviews highlight the difference in the intensity of the surveillance in terms of the amount
of freedom the individual retains. Inmates are under constant supervision and have almost no freedom to
make decisions whereas in drug court surveillance relies on the decisions of the participants to comply.
Yet given their many obligations, their freedom is quite limited. The main decision for drug court
participants may be whether or not to follow the program. Case Manager Y (drug court) depicted
incarceration as “easier” in that the inmates are passively monitored and do not have to make a concerted
effort to enable their own surveillance. By contrast, in drug court participants have to actively engage in
substance abuse treatment and in the community and prove that they are complying. Probation Officer Y
(drug court) also said that the drug court participants being monitored within the community as opposed
to within a controlled environment makes it a more meaningful type of monitoring. Drug court actually
tests the participants’ abilities to live drug free and productively within the community.
Chapter 3 discussed how drug court was a reconceptualization of Foucault’s argument that the
prison should constitute the space “the space between two worlds” in that the participants are permitted to
live in the community.353 Another way in which drug court resembles this idea is that it is intended to be
a medium between the controlled environment of prison and living independently within the community.
The drug court participants have the freedom to make decisions but it is largely limited by their many
program obligations and by the intense monitoring. Incarceration may be seen as “easier” or less intense
in that the participants are within a controlled setting and do not have to actively resist temptations to use
out in the community. In this way, surveillance in drug court was seen as more intense in that the
participants have to actively enable their surveillance. Surveillance in drug court was also seen as more
meaningful in that it prepares the participants to live out in the community.
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Prosecutor X (non-drug court) and Detective X (non-drug court) rather viewed the level of
surveillance in incarceration as more intense than in drug court but held a different definition of
surveillance that did not incorporate the active role of the participant.
Interview opinions suggesting surveillance in drug court is less intense than in incarceration
Prosecutor X (non‐drug court): “I think that the kind of monitoring that someone deals with when
they’re in drug court is obviously less stringent than if they were in jail because to a certain extent
we’re trusting or we’re trying to trust that these people can be out in the community and just avoid
all of these pressures to use substances or do criminal behavior, whereas for the most part in jail
there’s obviously a much smaller percentage of that even being possible. In jail [….] it’s much stricter
because they’re actually confined somewhere and the possibilities of that happening are severely
limited whereas in drug court there’s very stringent monitoring I know at least at the beginning of
drug court and I think they wean them off […]. And I think that’s done purposefully too. That’s the
incentive for people to do well. That eventually those restrictions will be lightened a little bit but
comparatively, obviously I think that with incarceration the monitoring is a lot higher than it is with
drug court.”354
Detective X (non‐drug court): “So in prison, you can monitor every aspect of a person’s life, their
letters, their phone calls, their communication, there’s no surprises. You know with drug court, you
might not be able to monitor everything, you know you might not know about a phone, you might not
know about an email account.”355

Prosecutor X (non-drug court) understood the surveillance in drug court to be less intense than in
incarceration in that the participants are allowed the freedom to remain in the community. She also noted
that the level of monitoring for drug court participants becomes less intense as they progress in the
program. Detective X (non-drug court) saw surveillance in incarceration as more intense in that inmates
are under constant supervision within a controlled environment as opposed to living in the community.
These interviewees suggested holding a more traditional conception of surveillance as monitoring being
done to someone. People in jail or prison are heavily restricted and monitored whereas drug court
participants have the freedom to make decisions and are not monitored within a controlled environment.
The disagreement among the interviewees suggests the freedom to make decisions in drug court
is seen as entailing more or less surveillance based on one’s definition of surveillance. Those who saw
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surveillance in drug court as more intense than incarceration considered the active role of the participants
in enabling their own surveillance. In other words, the intensity of the surveillance was measured in
terms of the large amount of work required of the participants. By contrast, those of the opposite opinion
viewed the freedom to make decisions as opposed to being confined in a facility as involving less intense
surveillance. They noted how the drug court team reduces its supervision as participants enter higher
phases whereas inmates are kept under constant supervision. These interviewees defined surveillance in
drug court by the amount of monitoring done by the team without considering the active role of the
participants in enabling their own surveillance.
Surveillance in drug court relies on a relationship of mutual accountability between the team and
the participants. Accountability in drug court therefore seems to contradict traditional notions of
surveillance, typically thought of as being passively monitored. The freedom to make decisions was seen
as evidence of surveillance being either more or less stringent than in jail or prison depending on how one
defined surveillance. Those who described it as more intense included in their definitions of surveillance
the large amount of work required of the participants. Those who described it as less intense held a more
traditional notion of surveillance as monitoring and restricted freedom. Surveillance in drug court differs
qualitatively from its use in incarceration by incorporating an active role for the person being supervised.
The intensity of the surveillance in drug court also makes it more effective than probation and
incarceration in that the participants develop important life skills with the support of the team and are able
to apply them within the community.

II.c. Justifying the High Level of Surveillance
The interviewees stressed that there is a unique need for the high level of surveillance in drug
court because the participants are addicted to drugs and cannot be trusted to hold themselves accountable.
Explanations for the high level of surveillance in drug court
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “You [the participant] have to trade off your privacy for your
ability to stay out of jail and treat your addiction. […] it’s important to monitor them, and to challenge
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them or to check on them, because they have an addiction. That they can’t trust themselves. But that
attitude filters down to our drug court clients and they know that.”356
Probation Officer Y (drug court): “I mean they can sit in treatment all day long and say, ‘I’m doing
well and I’m hanging out with good people and making good decisions.’ It’s not until I’m out there
and knocking on the door after curfew at 9:30 and finding out they’re not home and then tracking
down where they’re at or knocking on the door and seeing that you know ‘oh, there’s [name],’
another probationer I know who’s not doing well who’s hanging out with him […] folks who are
addicts are master manipulators and you know they survive by lying and being dishonest so until you
actually get out there, boots on the ground, and you’re seeing that their putting into practice what
they’re learning, it’s kind of pointless.”357
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “I think it keeps the drug court clients honest about what they’re doing
and that kind of supervision is necessary because you can’t take them at their word that they’re not
using and that they’re not breaking curfew and that they are going to meetings. You have to be able
to verify all of those things. After a time the things that you want them to do will become a habit and
you don’t have to check up as much but at the beginning of the program you have to verify all of
that.”358
With regards to how he keeps his clients motivated in drug court:
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “As you know drugs are a chemical. They change your brain,
the brain’s chemistry to the point where they want to have drugs rather than take care of their own
kids. So you’ve got to get that poison out of their system. While that process is occurring they want
to relapse and so you’ve got to stay in touch with them, have them stay in touch with their care
providers and make sure that people are listening to them.”359

The interviews indicated that the intense surveillance in drug court is necessary because the
participants’ sense of reason and self-control is impeded by drug addiction. They cannot be trusted to
operate on their own schedules and avoid drugs in the community where they likely have friends and
family who are drug-involved. As Probation Officer Y (drug court) stated, addicts are “master
manipulators.” The interviewees also suggested that high accountability is important for keeping the
participants honest with the team. As Prosecutor Y (drug court) indicates, the team will reduce its watch
on participants who have shown significant treatment progress and have made positive lifestyle choices.
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Towards the beginning, however, when the participants’ decision-making is distorted by their drug
dependency, the team has to verify that they are abstaining from drugs and are in compliance.
The interviews reveal that the effectiveness of drug court relies on there being high surveillance
because the participants are addicted to drugs and are not able to care for themselves in the community.
Additionally, the high level of surveillance was seen as important for keeping the participants honest and
thus maintaining that relationship of mutual accountability with the team. Prosecutor Y (drug court)
revealed that the team is deliberate and fair in deciding how closely to monitor the participants and will
allow them to exercise more freedom after having demonstrated considerable progress. Surveillance in
drug court is therefore more meaningful than in probation and incarceration. It uniquely enables the
participants to rehabilitate themselves within the community while also closely monitoring them at
appropriate levels.

III. Humanizing Surveillance
In addition to being qualitatively different from surveillance in probation and incarceration
through a relationship of mutual accountability, surveillance in drug court is seen as more humanizing in
that the team gets to know the participants on a personal level. Having this thorough knowledge of the
person enables the team to see the participants as people and not just addicts and criminals. Surveillance
in drug court occurs through personalized interactions in which the participants share with the team how
they are doing as well as their strengths and weaknesses, and the team listens and helps them accordingly.
The interview passages below from drug court judges and prosecutors convey how their interactions in
drug court differ substantially from those in traditional criminal court.
Comparing interactions with drug court participants with interactions with defendants in traditional
criminal court
Judge X (drug court): “In traditional trial court I do not have much interaction with defendants. Just
during sentencing where I only listen to what they say and what people say on their behalf. I also
often do not address defendants directly. In drug court I have direct communication with the
defendant. In drug court people look at them as people, not just criminals. We try and help them out
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of a life of addiction and help them understand that there is a positive experience for them. The
interactions personalize the system. We are concerned about them and not just about crime.”360
Judge Y (drug court): “My experience has been that the…even though the judge only spends a few
minutes, literally a few minutes, maybe four or five minutes with each participant during drug court
sessions face‐to‐face, I think those minutes are very valuable and I think they’ve…I think they tend to
be underestimated, undervalued in terms of how efficacious it is in the grand scheme of keeping the
person healthy. […] I became so connected with the participants and so involved in their
circumstances that […] I almost felt like the dad to everybody that was in the program. And I think
there’s a certain relationship, judge and participant, that is much, much different in the drug court
than it is in a traditional criminal court setting, judge and defendant. […] And you know I’m not
suggesting that there’s this you know intimate father‐child relationship at all. I’m not saying that.
What I’m saying is, because there’s this much greater knowledge of the person, their life, their
circumstances and there’s a clear connection made so that I think most participants in drug court
understand the judge really is concerned about them in a way that is quite different from the judge to
defendant in a criminal, standard criminal court setting. It’s much, much different in the drug court.
And I think the participants understand that very quickly. They get to understand that and I think
they benefit from that.”361
In contrasting his interactions in drug court with traditional criminal court, Prosecutor X2 (drug court)
stated, “It’s more familiar. You know more about their lives. […] Because of the regular meetings,
you know when they’re having stress in their life because of a family issue or because of job issues.
Whereas on a regular defendant, typically they walk in the courtroom, all I know about them is what
I’ve read in the police report and what their criminal history tells me. So it’s a much more familiar
process. […] It makes me more human to them and them more human to me. We make better
decisions when you have a better understanding of the situation the person’s in.”362
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “[In traditional criminal court], as a prosecutor I cannot legally talk to a
defendant if they are represented by an attorney. I can’t just go up to a defendant in court and say
‘hey, what do you think about this?’ and talk about the case. That’s a violation. In drug court, you are
openly talking about their issues with them, so you get to know them, you get to know their families,
where they work, what they do. It’s a conversation, which is incredibly different. I usually have zero
interaction with the defendants themselves in regular cases, whereas I talk to defendants in drug
court every week.”363

In drug court, the participants have personalized interactions with the team that they would not
have with members of a traditional criminal court. As Judge X (drug court) stated, the direct
communication and thorough understanding of the person enables the team to see the participants as
people and not just as criminals. And in the same way, the team is concerned with the wellbeing of the
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person beyond reducing crime in the area. Prosecutor X2 (drug court) also conveyed that the frequent and
personalized interactions are humanizing and that knowing the participants on a personal level enables the
team to make better decisions. Judge Y (drug court) even described that in a sense he felt like the father
figure to the participants. He reflected that although the judge only meets with the participants briefly, he
believes the direct and personalized contact is important for them coming to understand that the judge
truly cares about them. The interactions in drug court are therefore more humanizing than in traditional
criminal court.
Likewise, in my observations of drug court in County X, the judge seemed to sincerely care about
the participants as people. She would often encourage and sometimes probe them to reflect on their
sobriety. Around the time of Thanksgiving, the judge concluded each check-in by asking the participant
what he or she was thankful for.364 Some responses included: being sober, one’s children and family, and
one person even said “to be me.”365 The judge also began most check-ins by asking the participants,
“How are you doing?”366 When the responses were brief and unrevealing such as “good,” and “fine,” she
would respond, “not fine, not good, not happy, tell me how you are,” or “tell me something good,”
probing them to reflect on why they felt the way they did.367 By holding the participants accountable to
their word, the judge seemed to want them to internalize the importance of being sober, being honest, and
engaging in drug court.
For example, one participant had attended AA meetings outside of Maine over the holidays and
said he had enjoyed meeting new people and hearing their stories:
Observation of drug court in County X: The judge having a participant to be reflective
Judge: “Tell me somebody’s story.”
Participant: “I’m drawing a blank right now.”
Judge: “Tell me in a minute.”368

364

Judge X (drug court), Observation of Drug Court in County X, November 18, 2016.
Ibid.
366
Judge X (drug court), Observation of Drug Court in County X, December 2, 2016.
367
Ibid.
368
Ibid.
365

101

After checking in with another participant, the judge re-called him and told him to share one of
the stories he had heard.369 Key to surveillance in drug court is following up with the participants to keep
them honest and let them know they will be held accountable for what they say and do. Having the
participants reflect on their lives not only kept the participants honest but seemed to help restore their
sense of individual dignity. Drug court was keeping the participants very busy and the judge gave them
the opportunity to remind themselves why they were in the program and how it was helping them. This
reflection also allowed the participants to engage in a deep self-evaluation that they probably could not
have done in the past when under the influence of drugs. The personalized interactions and ability to
reflect in drug court seemed important both for the participants’ rehabilitation and for restoring their
human dignity. For those who reported doing poorly, the judge had them reflect on why they were
struggling. She was firm with people for being non-compliant but also reminded them that the team cared
about them and wanted to help.
In addition to showing sincere care for the participants, the interactions I observed in County X
also showed that the team knew a lot about their personal lives. The team knew about each person’s daily
routine including his or her living situation, relationship status, and employment status. The team was
concerned with knowing what the participants were doing outside of drug court and wanted to make sure
they were engaged in enough prosocial activities. Regarding a participant who only recently enrolled in
drug court in County X, the team wanted him to bring in a weekly calendar “to know what he’s doing and
whether we need to fill up his days.”370
The team in County X seemed particularly concerned with monitoring the participants’ social
lives. Participants were told that they needed to interact with different people and leave behind their
drug-involved peers. “You may want to move on from the people who brought you here.”371 “You’re
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hanging out with the same wrong people.”372 Leaving behind their former drug-involved peers seemed to
be one of the main challenges for participants. Some of these people were likely close friends and family
members. The team would tell the participants that they had to let go of these peers but it seemed
unrealistic to expect them to walk away from those they loved and who loved them, despite being poor
influences. The judge seemed to acknowledge how difficult it was when she told the participants, “It is
the hardest thing to leave people behind, but sometimes you have to.”373 One criticism, therefore, is that
drug court can have unrealistic expectations that the participants will be able to leave behind their close
friends and family who are poor influences. Perhaps rather than trying to entirely detach the participants
from these people, drug court can encourage sober peer associations while also teaching people to cope
while in relationships with people who are drug users or criminals. It seems especially important for the
participants’ to develop these coping strategies since many return to drug-involved communities after
graduating from drug court.
Another criticism of monitoring in drug court is that because the program is so demanding, it may
interfere with the participants’ employment schedules. In County X, when there would be the problem of
one’s employment conflicting with drug court, a typical response from the team would be, “this is drug
court, not work court.”374 I once observed a participant who was reprimanded by the team for not
attending enough prosocial meetings. She explained it was difficult to fit the meetings into her work
schedule but the team was not sympathetic. The team told to her to ask her boss about changing her work
schedule.375 However, the participant likely did not have the authority to ask her employer to
accommodate her schedule. While drug court provides the participants’ with structure and trains them to
be responsible, it is important to remember that they are also dealing with the responsibilities of normal
life. They need to earn enough money to support themselves and their families and pay for the services
they receive in drug court. Gainful employment should be regarded as more of an achievement,
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especially since it is so difficult for people with drug convictions to find work. Employment can also
keep people busy and help them avoid relapse, which will be important when people graduate and no
longer have the drug court team monitoring them. Drug court should therefore try to accommodate
participants’ employment schedules. A related criticism is the way in which the team would demand that
the participants find work. “You must find over the table work. There are jobs out there.”376 The team
should fully consider how difficult it is for people with drug convictions to obtain work, especially that
which would fit a demanding drug court schedule. Similar to the way in which the team wants people to
abandon their drug-involved peer associations, it seems that the team unrealistically expected people to
find work but did not appreciate it enough when they had it.
As described in the interviews, interactions in drug court are more humanizing than in traditional
criminal court in that the team makes better decisions in getting to know the participants on a personal
level. The team views the participants as people and not just as criminals. The interactions I observed in
County X humanized the participants in the eyes of the team, kept them honest, and in many cases helped
restore their sense of human dignity. Apart from the general nature of how the participants were treated,
however, the team in County X at least did not always seem to be fair in addressing matters related to the
participants’ employment and social lives. This shows that while the surveillance in drug court may be
more humanizing, it may not always account for surrounding structural obstacles in the participants’ lives.
The next section discusses the problem of participants from disadvantaged communities relapsing and
recidivating upon leaving drug court.

IV. The Consequences of Intense and Personalized Surveillance
Drug court conducts surveillance that is less restrictive than jail or prison but entails more
monitoring and accountability than normal probation to keep the participant from relapsing.
Intended advantages of the type of surveillance in drug court

376

Judge X (drug court), X (drug court), Observation of Drug Court in County X, November 18, 2016.

104

Detective X (non‐drug court): “The advantage to drug court monitoring is, it’s kind of a halfway point.
If you’re in prison, it’s like a feaster famine. When you’re in prison you have like no communication
or limited communication, and then we let them out and they’re on probation, all of a sudden they
went from being strictly monitored to like the gates are wide open. Drug court’s kind of an in
between. So you’re kind of easing them back into hopefully beneficial behavior […]. [In drug court]
they kind of wean them off the monitoring. It’s more of a…it’s a good way to kind of ease them into it
if that makes sense.”377

Detective X (non-drug court) explained his impression that surveillance in drug court is meant to
provide enough oversight and accountability in the beginning to keep people from reverting back to drugs
and crime. The surveillance is scaled back over the course of one’s participation to prepare him or her to
live independently upon graduation. This is different from incarceration in which the individual is under
constant supervision and then released on probation in which the surveillance is much less intense. Drug
court is unique in that monitoring is deliberately used to ease the individual back into the community.
The interviewees mentioned, however, that even with the gradual lightening of the surveillance,
former participants may struggle to stay sober and may recidivate in lacking the support and
accountability they had while in drug court.
Difficulties faced upon leaving drug court
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “And so the most dangerous time is when they, not during
drug court, is when they get out of it. And they lose all that support and then they’re back in their
same very difficult community. We’re taking people out of that community, putting them in front of a
team that are watching them like hawks, and then setting them free. Kicking them out of the nest.
Unfortunately they have to fly right back into that nest. And that’s where recidivism comes is when
they lose the support.”378
Detective X (non‐drug court): “Some of the tough parts are, you know I can take you out of the
community and I can rehabilitate you and I can do all these different things for you. But when I’m
done with you, if I take you and I put you right back in the same neighborhood, the same friends, the
same community you grew up in, how long do you think it’s going to be before you fall back into your
same ways? And I see that as sometimes we’ll take people out and we’ll rehabilitate them, but when
they go back into literally the same neighborhood, the same friends, and the same lifestyle, it’s only a
matter of time before they kind of fall back into their ways.”379
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Judge X (drug court): “When they get out of drug court they are no longer monitored and do not have
the same treatment resources. They return to their old friends who got them here in the first place
and it is hard for them to let go of those friends.”380
Prosecutor X (drug court): “The last couple of people that have graduated drug court in the last say
three months have already used substances or committed new criminal conduct. […] The people that
graduated seemed to do very well in drug court, didn’t seem to have any issues. We’re now
reevaluating whether or not that means they just knew how to get through the program but we
weren’t really hitting what we needed to change in their perspective so that when they got out
without all of these resources from the drug court team they could manage on their own.”381

The drug court team attempts to provide enough freedom for the participants to learn to lead
productive lives but is also aware that they cannot be trusted to stop using drugs on their own. The
surveillance is more intense towards the beginning of the program as the clients are intensely struggling
with addiction. The supervision is gradually diminished as the participants advance to higher phases.
However, the interviews indicate that the process of weaning them off of the surveillance does not always
sufficiently prepare people to live on their own in their original, drug-involved communities. Defense
Attorney X (drug court) emphasized this point in describing the team as watching the participants “like
hawks” and then setting them free in the community where they may face a number of addiction triggers.
It seems that the participants may grow accustomed to the drug court schedule and come to depend on it.
Similarly, the personalized interactions mean the participants learn to trust the team and reach out for
help. The participants may struggle in lacking those supports in the community and where people know
them as drug users and criminals. Therefore, the high and personalized surveillance, while important for
monitoring addicts and helping restore their sense of individual dignity, does not resolve the structural
problems associated with living in difficult, drug-involved communities.
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IV.a. Sober Housing
One possible way in which drug court attempts to help the participants find more sustainable
living situations is through sober housing.
Descriptions of sober housing and its role in drug court
Case Manager Y (drug court): “So what ends up happening is a sober house will have a manager who
typically owns it or runs it. And they will have you know curfews in place which they [the
participants] already have one with us but you know for the house as well. They will have random
drug tests at their house as well. They will have AA expectations. They will say you know, in order to
live in this house you need to be going to three AA meetings a week. They also get rewarded for
working hard. You know they can be leaders in the house. They can be able to run their own AA
meetings in the house. So overall there’s another set of eyes. There’s a structured environment and
they’re in the house with other people who are in the same kind of situation that they’re in, working
to try and figure it out.”382
Judge Y (drug court): “It [sober housing] plays a role because there are lots of times very limited or
not very useful places for people to live. Frequently, people have come into drug court and their
options of living in certain circumstances are quite lousy. They may have spent… they may have a
single option with a family member, or a friend, or something like that and that person that they are
living with or near is, you know, is a substance abuser himself or there may be other circumstances
that are completely contrary to the aim of getting the person healthy and substance‐free. […] So
sometimes sober houses are an option that the case manager, the probation officer look into to see if
the person can live in that kind of a setting. And the right kind of sober house, that can really make a
big difference and be very helpful for people.”383

Judge X (drug court): “A critical component of getting sober is changing ‘people, places and things.’
Hanging out with the same people and living in the same location does not bode well for success. That
doesn't mean it can't happen, it's just more challenging.”384
Case Manager Y (drug court) described sober housing as providing participants with living
situations away from drugs and with more accountability. Sober housing also seems to provide the
participants with opportunities for demonstrating initiative in that they can be leaders and run their own
AA meetings. Additionally, sober housing allows people struggling with drug addiction to build a
support network with others in similar situations. Judge Y (drug court) conveyed that sober housing can
make a positive difference in people’s lives in that it removes people from unsustainable living situations.
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Judge X (drug court) conveyed that changing one’s living situation can be important for being able to
succeed in drug court.
Judge Y (drug court) explained that while there are many more sober housing options available in
County Y than in other parts of Maine, there is still the problem of limited availability.385 Judge X (drug
court) explained that there is one sober house in County X. While there is no formal affiliation between
drug court and the owner of the sober house, she will let the team know if there is an opening. Judge X
(drug court) expressed that the team is grateful for there being at least one sober house in County X, but
wishes there were more.386
Reflection on the need for a residential component to drug court in County X
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “It would be wonderful if we had a drug court residential,
either long‐term or short‐term, residential part of our program where people could, instead of
coming out of jail, and were going to that program, that residential part of our program instead of
going to a shelter. […] There are, especially with opiate addiction, it’s real hard for somebody from a
troubled part of our community who lives next to people who are using drugs…by who….who
encounter people every day who know them as drug users maybe even criminals. It’s real hard for
people to have the perspective and the ability not to relapse and…umm and some of that is just,
especially people that don’t have homes or go to shelters, it’s … it’s not just treatment it’s their
environment that… If you can imagine how you’d feel if you went home tonight to a shelter instead
of a place where people are there and supporting you and caring about you in a more obvious
way.”387

Since a problem in drug court is participants not being able to manage themselves in the
community outside of drug court, sober housing would be a way to help them attain better living
situations. Living amongst other people seeking to get sober would also provide participants with
additional support. Consistent with the recommendations of Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court), it
would be ideal to add a residential component of the program that would allow the participants to build
more sustainable lifestyles. Additionally, part of a residential program might be to help drug court
graduates acclimate for a period of sober living outside of drug court before having to face the
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responsibilities of normal life on their own. This idea in particular was suggested by the drug court
treatment provider in County X.388

V. Graduation/Commencement
In my observations of drug court in County X, I witnessed one woman graduate from the
program. Graduation was an emotional interaction in which the judge came down from the bench to hand
the graduate her certificate and give her a hug. Next, every other member of the team stood up and
congratulated her. The treatment provider and case manager walked up to stand right in front of her as
they congratulated her and also hugged her. Following the words of the team, the graduate addressed the
rest of the participants and encouraged them to remain in the program and to trust the team.389 The judge
concluded by saying, “remember, it’s hard when you leave. You need people to help you and are always
welcome to come back.”390 Although drug court graduates are no longer obligated to report to the team,
they are encouraged to come back in times of need. Post-graduation, the drug court is viewed as a
voluntary support system rather than a surveillance mechanism. It therefore seems that part of the
surveillance in drug court is teaching the participants to reach out for help.
Pertaining to the idea of accountability in drug court carrying forward post-graduation, the judge
recently decided to replace the term “graduation” with “commencement.” “Graduation sounds final.
Commencement is heading forward.” 391 The idea seems to be that the participants’ time in drug court
essentially never ends because hopefully the coping mechanisms, sober connections, and life skills they
gain will remain with them throughout their lives. They transition from the mutual accountability of the
team’s supervision to informal self-policing in which they know what is important in life, how to avoid
relapse, and when to reach out for help.
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Following the commencement ceremony, all of the drug court participants exited the courtroom
and the graduate underwent her official sentencing. The prosecutor and defendant (drug court graduate)
sat where they would during a normal criminal sentencing. The judge reviewed the graduate’s
convictions and explained that having successfully completed drug court, her prison sentence was entirely
suspended.392 The sequence of events was interesting. Following the celebratory event of graduation, it
was reinforced that this was all because she had committed crimes. It suggests that upon completion of
drug court the state forgives you but wants the last word to be a reminder that you have done wrong and
that your record is not clean. Additionally, undergoing her official sentencing reminded the graduate that
if she were to recidivate and get caught, she would face incarceration. It suggests a dual surveillance in
which the state has watched and helped you rehabilitate yourself and it will still be watching to make sure
you do not relapse. In this way, drug court reinforces carceral state control by concluding one’s
participation with the threat of punishment.

VI. Conclusion
In terms of the type of surveillance used, drug court seems to be distinct from incarceration,
probation, and traditional criminal court. There was a consensus that surveillance in drug court was
greater and more intense than in probation, and some even saw it as more intense than in jail and prison.
The latter opinions incorporated the relationship of mutual accountability between the participants and the
team into their definitions of surveillance. The high level of surveillance in drug court was seen as
necessary because, at least in the beginning, the participants cannot be trusted to manage themselves in
the community while severely struggling with addiction. The participants must actively enable their own
surveillance and are accountable to the entire team. This is in contrast to being passively monitored
within a controlled environment while incarcerated or loosely monitored by a single probation officer.
Whereas people leave prison and jail no more prepared to avoid drug use and recidivism, drug court
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actually teaches people to live and change for the better within the community. Similar to the focus on
treatment rather than punishment discussed in Chapter 3, surveillance in drug court also stresses
providing the participants with resources and opportunities in contrast with the carceral state. The
literature indicates that carceral state surveillance largely causes people to withdraw from important
aspects of society such as avoiding the police, the courts, and local hospitals in fear of being reincarcerated.393 Drug court, by contrast, provides the participants with treatment and other services and
connects them with prosocial opportunities. Therefore, whereas the carceral state uses surveillance
largely to restrict ex-offenders from participation in various aspects of life, drug court prioritizes
providing people with resources and involving them in the community.
The surveillance in drug court is also qualitatively different and more humanizing than in
traditional criminal court. The literature on the carceral state suggests that the surveillance is largely
intended for catching people who commit crimes and probation violations. People also tend to have
adversarial and dehumanizing interactions with the criminal justice system such as being stopped and
searched without one’s consent.394 In drug court, interactions with the team are much more direct,
frequent, and personalized. The team cares about the participants as people and does not simply view
them as criminals. Additionally, the team is able to make better decisions for the participants in knowing
more about them. In this sense, drug court is effective in diminishing the enduring criminal status
bestowed upon defendants by the carceral state.
The humanizing, personalized relations in drug court also have implications for surveillance with
respect to Foucault’s portrayal of carceral surveillance through Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticism.395 The
Panopticon is a circular-shaped prison in which the inmates occupy prison cells along the circumference
and the prison guards are situated in a high tower in the middle of the building.396 According to Foucault,
the structure maximizes discipline by having the inmates monitor one another in addition to being under
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the watch of the prison guards.397 The mutual accountability of drug court might be likened to the
Panopticon in that the participants are not only supervised by the team but also supervised by each other.
My observations of drug court in County X reveal that in having the participants monitor each other, the
team is not only concerned with maximizing discipline through greater accountability. Rather the judge
would help foster meaningful relationships between the participants by distinguishing role models and
encouraging the participants to advise one another. The team also uses a more humanizing form of
surveillance in that it is not only intended to discipline the participants. Rather the team gets to know the
participants and is concerned with their wellbeing beyond their ability to avoid relapse and recidivism.
Foucault describes the skewed power dynamic within the Panopticon in that the inmates are “totally seen,
without ever seeing” and the guard in the central tower “sees everything without ever being seen.”398
Whereas the guard can monitor all of the inmates from the central tower, the inmates cannot see him or
her. While the drug court team has a lot of control over the participants in being able to monitor them
heavily, the surveillance is not like in the Panopticon where compliance is seen as contingent on the
inmate not seeing the guard.399 In drug court, by contrast, the participants have direct contact with the
team members on a regular basis. Compliance is therefore in part promoted through the participants
building trust with team as opposed to inciting fear of being caught in violation.
The effectiveness of drug court is largely seen in its being a medium between the constant
surveillance of incarceration and the loose monitoring of probation. The team attempts to prepare the
participants to live independently in the community by gradually reducing the monitoring over the course
of the program. However, the interviews suggest that even with the strategic diminishing of the
surveillance, drug court does not always work for people from disadvantaged, drug-involved
communities. It seems that participants grow attached to the personalized, regular interactions with the
team and may not know how to manage themselves once they lose the support and resources. In this

397

Ibid., 207.
Ibid., 202.
399
Ibid.
398

112

sense, drug court does not necessarily present an alternative to the carceral state in that it does not disrupt
the cycling of people from disadvantaged, drug-involved communities in and out of the criminal justice
system. The team in County X also seemed to treat those with structural disadvantages less fairly in that
they were unrealistically expected to leave behind close peer associations instead of learning to cope in
these relationships. The team also expected the participants to find stable work despite having a record
with a drug felony but was not as appreciative when they had work that conflicted with drug court. This
is potentially problematic in that the participants also have to deal with the responsibilities of normal life
outside of drug court and will need a stable job upon completing the program. Lastly, drug court seems
to be an extension of carceral state development in that carceral surveillance is maintained through the
underlying sentence. This was evident in seeing the participant undergo a formal sentencing after her
graduation ceremony. Her participation in drug court ending with receiving a suspended prison sentence
reinforced that built into the drug court model is the threat of punishment.
In conclusion, the type of surveillance in drug court is different and more humanizing than
traditional carceral surveillance. The participants are more productive in enabling their own surveillance,
they have the freedom of living in the community, and they have personalized interactions with the team
and the other participants. The uniquely humanizing surveillance strengthens their sense of individual
dignity. Nevertheless, drug court is an extension of carceral state development insofar as people can grow
dependent on the surveillance and may end up relapsing and recidivating and then back in the criminal
justice system. Additionally, people from disadvantaged communities are more prone to failure postgraduation. Therefore, while surveillance in drug court is in many respects more humanizing, it does not
present an alternative to the carceral state given its larger structural implications. Chapter 5 will further
discuss structural as well as other forms of bias in drug court on the subject of access.
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Chapter 5: Access and Bias
This chapter examines whether there is bias in access to drug court, both in terms of who is
accepted and who succeeds in the program. Part I frames the chapter by providing an overview of the
drug court screening and admissions process from the perspectives of the two drug court judges. Parts II
and III examine two distinct points of access to drug court: the process of applying and admissions. Part
II draws upon the reflections of Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) and Defense Attorney Liaison X
(drug court) to determine whether there is any type of bias in their decisions to have clients apply for drug
court. While the chapter suggests no bias on the part of the defense attorneys, the threat of punishment
through the underlying sentence can discourage people who could otherwise benefit from the treatment
from applying. This section also suggests there are certain structural advantages that might determine
success over failure in the program. Part III discusses access to drug court at the admissions stage and
suggests that while there is no intentional bias in the teams’ decisions, some groups of people are
unintentionally excluded from participation. Part IV examines a specific point of disagreement among
the interviewees regarding the importance of candidates expressing a willingness to obtain treatment and
change their lives in order to gain admission. Some interviewees argued that an expression of willingness
was not essential at this stage but was rather developed during one’s participation in drug court whereas
others believed an initial expression of willingness was an important predictor of success in drug court.
Part V examines a third point of access, the participant’s success in the program, and suggests there are
certain factors prior to drug court, having the right attitude and structural advantages, that can be
conducive to success in the program. This section also highlights the variety ways in which the
interviewees measure success and effectiveness in drug court. Interestingly, many of the interviewees
measured success and effectiveness in ways other than the traditional metrics of reducing recidivism and
substance abuse and saving money. Most were concerned with the ability of the participants to lead
healthy and productive lives and incorporate the skills learned through drug court beyond simply avoiding
future criminal behavior. Part VI is the conclusion and argues that drug court is an extension of carceral
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state development in that there are a number of biases in access and some of which may perpetuate biases
within the carceral state.

I. Overview of the Admissions Process
To enroll in drug court one must first apply and be screened by the team, which then decides
whether or not to admit the person into the program.
In order to apply for drug court in County X, the applicant must have at least one pending serious
criminal charge or be subject to a probation revocation and pose a significant risk of committing future
crimes.400
Explanation of the drug court screening and admissions process in County X
Judge X (drug court): “They have to be screened by the case manager and the treatment provider and
they have to have their criminal history looked at by the district attorney’s office and have the nature
of their crimes discussed. Their attorneys have to present. Probation weighs in. It is also different for
higher scrutiny cases which are more in‐depth.”401

Judge Y (drug court) explained that in County Y the person is first referred to the drug court by a
defense attorney, prosecutor, or probation officer.402 He or she is referred to the drug court probation
officer who then informs the rest of the team. The team discusses the referrals in its regular meetings and
determines whether or not to screen the referents. The treatment provider would then meet with the
applicant and to conduct the screening. If the screening process indicates that the applicant would benefit
from the program, the team meets again to consider the results and then decides whether to admit the
applicant. The judge also mentioned that the applicant’s defense attorney can attend the meetings and
explain why he or she should be admitted.403
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II. Access through Application
Defense attorney X (non-drug court) and Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) described the
types of cases in which they would have clients apply for drug court. Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug
court) clarified that in his drug court role he typically does not counsel participants as their private
defense attorneys would.404 He mainly assists the participants’ attorneys but will assume a more
traditional role when standing in for someone’s attorney during a court proceeding. He nonetheless was
able to reflect on his experience in advising clients in the application process as a traditional defense
attorney outside of drug court. He explained that he withdraws from being the client’s attorney once he
or she enrolls in drug court.405
Regarding which cases the defense attorneys would have clients apply or not apply to drug court
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “If you’ve got a kid, an eighteen‐year‐old kid who’s tellin’ me to
go F myself and you know he’s gonna do whatever he wants and blah, blah, blah…he’s not going to
drug court. Right? But if I’ve got some young…I’ve got a young lady right now. I just adore her. [...]
She’s got so much hope. Great family. All this stuff. I really want her into drug court. But then you
get the forty‐year‐old guy who’s just comes to me and says ‘[Attorney’s first name], I need ya. I really
need a change. I can’t keep doing this.’ I’ll put him in drug court. So my job is to kind of look at
them, talk to them, assess them, whether I think a) they’re appropriate for the program, but even if
they are appropriate for the program, do I think they can finish it.”406
He elaborated on when he recommends clients enroll in drug court.
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “The easy one is to answer when I advise against it. That’s
people who are not motivated, who I suspect are just trying to avoid jail time. Because they’re gonna
fare worse in the long run. Also people that I just think lack perhaps the intellectual capacity to
participate in this program, mentally compromised to the point where I… they just can’t participate
cause they have an inability to understand. […] The hard ones are, you know you get some nice
person that you like. They’ve had a long‐standing substance abuse but they’ve got a significant
criminal history.”407
“The people who I do put in are the people who are motivated. You just get a sense with people. But
I’ll be honest with you too. I get fooled all the time. You know people come in and they say the right
thing and I, because I want to believe, they fool me. […] And so those guys that you want to believe
them, I’ll refer them too. Even some guys if I don’t think they can make it. Because I can be wrong.
You know they can get in and they just love the program. So…but it’s…you also have to realize that
404

Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court), "Interview, November 11, 2016."
Ibid.
406
Defense Attorney X (non-drug court), "Interview, November 14, 2016."
407
Ibid.
405

116

there’s a screening process. Right? So it’s not my decision to put them in. It’s my decision to submit
an application. And then guys who I don’t think are gonna get through that screening process by the
way, I’m not putting them in either. Because I know how the process is.”408
Regarding when to recommend clients apply to drug court, Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court)
stated, “If there’s a case where someone’s criminal behavior is a product of their addiction…that the
state can prove that case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the person is amenable to treatment
and can probably benefit from that treatment and be able to stay out of jail, that’s when I’ll work
them in or I’ll have a person apply to drug court. […] I would advise against it when…the person isn’t
able to meet the criteria for drug court, let’s say they…I don’t think they really have an addiction.
That when their crimes are involving serious violence or they have serious records in their history of
violence and I know that the odds of them getting in are slim to none.”409

The above passages reveal that both attorneys base their decisions on whether to have a client
apply for drug court on their impressions of the person’s eligibility and ability to complete the program.
Defense Attorney X (non-drug court)’s example of the resistant eighteen-year-old kid in contrast with the
forty-year-old man who says he is ready for a change suggests he looks for motivation in assessing a
client’s likelihood for success. He is reluctant to have someone apply who will not engage in the program
and is only looking to avoid jail, knowing they will likely be terminated and worse off in the end.
Similarly, Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) looks for clients who are open to treating their
addictions. Motivation seemed to play a factor in both attorneys’ decisions.
Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) conveyed that while he is not biased in having clients apply
for drug court, there are certain factors he believes would make one more or less likely to succeed in drug
court. His example of the young lady who has “so much hope. Great family. All this stuff,” shows his
belief that having resources and supports outside of drug court increases the client’s chances of
graduating. The attorney’s emphasis on “wanting to believe” people suggests he generally does not base
his decisions on his own biased impressions of who is most likely succeed. He will have people apply
even who he thinks might not graduate. He would rather give clients the benefit of the doubt and allow
them to access the treatment and other resources. Having clients apply even when he is not confident
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they will finish suggests his belief in the ability of drug court to induce substantial, positive change in
people. While this attorney is relatively unbiased in his decisions to have clients apply to drug court, he
nonetheless indicated that having structural advantages prior to entering drug court increases one’s
chances of success. Both attorneys suggested that part of their baseline criteria for deciding whether to
have someone apply for drug court is the client’s demonstrated motivation, although Defense Attorney X
(drug court) indicated motivation alone might not be sufficient for determining success.
Negotiation of a better sentence as a barrier to accessing drug court
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “You know if I can negotiate it down to a misdemeanor
because it’s a weak case, you know those are harder because I want my clients to get the treatment
but I can’t subject them to a felony plea and probation when I think I can get them a misdemeanor
and get them out of the situation, so I have to. And they want me generally to do that for them. So
those guys won’t. They won’t be going to drug court either although they probably need it.”410
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “[I will advise against it] where the result I will achieve
without drug court is far more favorable than anything they’d get in drug court, or where, I’ll give you
an example, of whereas I think they can achieve and I could attain this as a negotiation, where they
could be on probation, stay out of jail and successfully complete their probation instead of going into
the long, difficult, intensive, drug court program.”411

Both attorneys said they would not recommend clients apply for drug court who would otherwise
receive a lighter penalty in traditional criminal court. The decision not to recommend drug court for these
clients who might otherwise be eligible for and benefit from drug court highlights a potential problem of
access. The threat of punishment that is built into drug court can create a barrier to access. Those who do
not pursue drug court in seeking a “better deal” may be worse off in the end since they do not acquire the
resources or motivation to keep from using drugs and recidivating. In essence, they leave with a more
lenient sentence but are more likely to relapse and reoffend having not addressed the underlying addiction
issue. This is not to the fault of the defense attorney since any client would likely prefer a lighter penalty
than having to go through the arduous process of drug court and live with the threat of a more severe
sentence. However, the way in which the underlying sentence in drug court can discourage people from
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applying indicates that many are not getting the treatment and supervision that they need. In connection
with Chapter 3, not only does the threat of punishment serve as a way to motivate participants to comply
in drug court but also in the case of negotiating a sentence, it can preclude one from accessing the
program and from obtaining needed treatment.
Imbalance of power in negotiating the terms of one’s participation in drug court
Defense Attorney X (non‐drug court): “Before they even enter drug court […], I enter into
negotiations with the prosecutor and I have no leverage in those negotiations. That’s one thing that
can be fixed by the way. I think the judge…judges can sometimes and sometimes do but they need to
get more involved in the negotiation process with the prosecutors because they [the prosecutors] can
at this point tell us, because I… because I’m not on the team remember, they can tell me what they
want to do and we…my client pretty much has to do it.”412

Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) suggested that the problem of the threat of punishment
barring access to drug court may stem from a power imbalance in the negotiations. He argued that the
prosecutor has too much power to determine the terms of one’s participation in drug court. The
prosecutor may be able to impose a harsher sentence than is fair and necessary that would dissuade
someone from pursuing drug court. Defense Attorney X (non-drug court) therefore believes the judge
should take a more active role in making sure the negotiations are fair.
In conclusion, when deciding to have clients apply for drug court, defense attorneys look at their
clients’ eligibility and likelihood of finishing the program. A client’s motivation to overcome his or her
drug addiction and make substantial lifestyle changes is seen as a predictor of success. This section
highlights two ways in which there is bias in access to drug court through the application process. Firstly,
although he does not let it influence his decisions on having clients apply for drug court, Defense
Attorney X (non-drug court) suggested that people with existing supports are more likely to finish the
program. Additionally, both attorneys said the threat of punishment in terms of the underlying sentence
can preclude people from acquiring the treatment and oversight they need.
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III. Access through Admissions
Having outlined the first point of access being the application process, this section evaluates
access at the stage of admissions. There was variation among perceptions of equal access to drug court in
admissions. Figures 5-1 and 5-2 display the distribution of interview responses on questions of bias in
access to drug court through the admissions process.
Figure 5‐1
Drug court team interview responses on the question of bias in access to drug court
(Total: 9 respondents)
Response
Number of Interviewees
No bias
3
Yes, there is bias
6
More than one type of bias
4
A count of the number of interview (all are drug court team members) responses to the question of whether
certain types of people have more access to drug court than others. The table includes the number of
interviewees whose responses indicated “no bias,” or “yes, there is bias,” and within the group of those who
answered “yes,” the number of interviewees who indicated more than one type of bias.

Figure 5‐2
Number of interviewees who mentioned each type of bias
(Total: 9 respondents)
Type of Bias
Count
Immigrant or refugee status
3
Serious mental health issues
3
Violent criminal history
3
A count of the number of interviewees (all are drug court team members) who mentioned each type of bias in
access to drug court. These were the most commonly mentioned types of bias. Each category of bias represents a
reason someone might not be admitted to drug court.

Figure 5-1 indicates that there likely is bias in access to drug court in that 6 out of the 9
interviewees (more than half) said certain types of people had more access to drug court than others.
Figure 5-2 indicates that the types bias most commonly mentioned were in terms of someone being an
immigrant or refugee, having serious mental health issues, or having a violent criminal history.
No Bias in Admissions
On the question of whether she found that certain defendants have more access to drug court than
others, Judge X (drug court) responded, “Not really.”413
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Judge Y (drug court): “I didn’t experience that in my work as [the] [County Y] drug court judge, not in
my tenure there and I don’t think I’ve ever heard that it was a concern there. […] The team has no
interest in screening folks based upon their economic situation, their social situation, or any other
situation. […] We took every measure to get folks into the drug court who should be in drug court.”414

Bias 1: Immigrant and Refugee Status
Probation Officer X (drug court): “We struggle most in getting immigrants in the program. It’s
complicated. There are difficulties when they’re out on bail.”415
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “The only group that I’m curious about is immigrants. And I’m not sure if
it’s because they think that there’s language barriers that would prevent them from being able to
actively participate. Or if it requires them to plead to specific charges, and that means it would
trigger deportation issues for them […] I think [name of the location]’s population includes 7‐10%
Somali population and are charged, and then the cases that are brought in clearly reflect you know at
least 7‐10% involving Somali individuals. So why aren’t we seeing that number correlated in our drug
court. That’s the only group that I think to myself, where are they?”416
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “We haven’t figured a way to allow the refugee population
to apply to drug court and that’s because they can’t plead guilty to a federal, to a felony especially a
felony involving drugs because the federal criminal justice system considers even a plea to a felony as
a conviction, subjecting the refugee to deportation.”417

Judge Y (drug court) explained that when he served on the drug court team for County Y, there
were participants who were not born in the United States but not very many. He explained that people
who were not born in the United States would not be able to access drug courts like in County X, in
which people are facing new, non-adjudicated criminal charges and would have to plead guilty in order to
enroll. Federal immigration law causes those non-citizens who plead guilty to face the possibility of
deportation. He explained that this application of federal law does not affect drug court in County Y
because all of the participants have already been convicted and are on probation.418
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Bias 2: Serious Mental Health Issues
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “So, if you have significant mental health issues, we don’t have the
resources to deal with mental health issues in conjunction. And I mean significant. You know
somebody who’s psychotic. You know we just…we’re not gonna help much. So that would preclude
you from getting in.”419
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “If you have a very serious mental health condition but you
have a drug addiction, we can’t take you but we’d hopefully refer that person to co‐occurring court in
Augusta.”420
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “The only real barrier to our drug court would be if the person has
significant mental health issues that they couldn’t succeed in our drug court, which doesn’t…it
focuses on substance abuse issues, not mental health issues.”421

This group of interviews suggested that drug court, given its focus on substance abuse, does not
have the resources to treat people with serious mental health issues.

Bias 3: Violent Criminal History
Probation Officer X (drug court): “[…] we look at violent histories under heightened scrutiny for the
safety of the team and the community. Meaning we look at the case more intensely. Public safety is
priority.”422
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “As a usual rule, we do not accept violent criminals. There are
exceptions. These are not black and white rules. We have taken people who have violent criminal
pasts. But that’s a very large concern for the safety of everyone that’s involved in the drug court to
make sure we’re not putting people in unsafe positions.”423
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “So if you have somebody who is committing armed robberies with a
firearm, not a good idea to put them in drug court, you know but… if you have somebody who
committed say a heinous assault of some sort, because of the public safety issues…they become so
great, you know I, you can’t take that risk on behalf of the community. If you have somebody who
committed a burglary on a camp because of addiction issues but there was no crime against the
person and there was nobody who felt threatened, than that individual to me is somebody who is low
risk for the community with the possibility of a high outcome.”424
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Another potential barrier to admission is having a violent criminal history. Both drug courts in
County X and County Y have denied people who have committed violence due to public safety concerns.
A violent criminal history, however, does not automatically preclude people from admission. Rather they
are examined under “higher scrutiny,” meaning the team examines them more intensely to make sure they
would be able to live in the community without posing serious threats public safety.
There were other characteristics said to be barriers to enrollment that were each mentioned by one
interviewee. Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court) mentioned that some private defense attorneys are
less open to drug court than others.425 Additionally, in order for participants to be eligible for drug court
they have to live in the community where the court is located. In my observations of drug court in
County X, I noticed it had roughly an equal number of male and female participants, all of which were
white.426 Probation Officer X (drug court) said there have not been many Hispanic or African Americans
in the drug court because they have not been referred by their lawyers and probation officers. She said
African Americans had been particularly absent in drug court because they tended to have had violent
histories deemed to be public safety concerns. She also mentioned drug court does not accept sexoffenders.427 The interviewees conveyed that socioeconomic status does not preclude someone from drug
court and Defense Attorney X (drug court) said most of the participants in County X are facing
poverty.428 Two interviewees, Prosecutor X1 (drug court) and Probation Y (drug court), said that one
obstacle can be if someone does not have insurance due to the intensive treatment and counseling that is
provided in drug court. Although both interviewees stated that this has never been a reason for not
admitting someone. If someone does not have the ability to pay the drug court will use sliding scale fees
or find grants for them.429
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Unequal access does not appear to be the result of intentional bias in favor of certain types of
candidates. Nonetheless, the program’s design, capacity, and broader criminal law implications create
perhaps unintentional exclusions. Immigrants (County X only) cannot access drug court due to federal
immigration law requirements, those with serious mental health issues cannot participate because drug
court does is not equipped to treat them, and certain violent offenders may be denied in the interests of
public safety after being examined under higher scrutiny.
The limited capacity of drug court
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “[…] part of it is just our ability to take people. We don’t
have the ability to take in huge amounts of people under drug court, because there are limitations,
so, umm, that’s also an obstacle to people getting in.”430
Judge Y (drug court): “Well, I think one of the weaknesses [of drug court], it happens to be is the
number of participants that can join the process. Because it’s such an intensive process. And because
there are limited judges available to conduct drug courts and because there are limited probation
officers, and prosecutors, and defense lawyers that are available to do this and social workers, I think
that the limitation is the number of people who can actually participate. Where I was in [name of
county], there were, we had pretty good numbers in our court by and large but there were times
when there were people that probably could have been admitted to the drug court but we just didn’t
have the room for them.”431

Another barrier to access apart from the type of candidate is the sheer size of the caseload, which
pales in comparison to the overall number of drug-addicted offenders involved in the criminal justice
system.432 Given the unique intensiveness of the surveillance of the program, drug court can only afford
to accept a handful of participants. County X reported having 26 participants in its drug court and County
Y reported having 25.433 This is much fewer than a normal probation caseload which, according to
Probation Officer Y (drug court), consists of about 150.434 Prosecutor X2 (drug court) said the drug court
is limited in how many people it can admit also because the team members have additional
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responsibilities in the traditional criminal justice system. Ideally there would be a team of professionals
designated solely for drug court but there is not enough funding for it.435
In conclusion, the interviewees indicate there is no intentional bias in admitting certain types of
persons, although immigrants and refugees, people with serious mental health issues, and some violent
offenders may not access this program. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to accessing drug court is the
program’s capacity, which is significantly smaller than other court dockets and probation.436

IV. The Importance of an Expression of Willingness:
Nonetheless, there was some evidence of bias in terms of seeking to admit people with the “right
attitude.” There was stark disagreement in perspectives on the importance of an applicant expressing a
willingness to obtain treatment and change one’s life as an important factor in a team member’s
admissions decisions. Most expressed that it was not important for applicants to demonstrate a strong
willingness prior to participation (see Figure 5-3). There was no indication that any particular type of
person (e.g. gender, race, class) has demonstrated more or less of a willingness.
Figure 5‐3
Drug court team interview responses on the importance of candidates expressing a willingness as a
factor in admissions decisions
(Total: 7 respondents)
Important
3
Not important
4
A count of the number of interviewees (all are drug court team members) who thought an expression of
willingness from candidates to obtain treatment and to change their lives was either an important or was not an
important factor in their decisions on whether to admit someone to drug court.

An expression of willingness is not important
Judge X (drug court): “At the time of admission they have to say “yes, I want to participate.” But
everyone says that. We are not really looking for willingness at the time that they get into drug court.
It’s something we hope they’ll develop over the course of the treatment.”437
Judge Y (drug court): “It [willingness] goes a long way, but I can’t tell you that it’s dispositive or that
it’s one of the most important factors that’s looked at because there are plenty of people, probably
435
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the majority of people who come into drug court at least in [County Y], are people who did not want
to be there but they had no other choice because of the circumstances they were in. In other words
they were looking at going to prison for months or years as a result of their circumstances nearly
certainly. So their only best option was really, even though they didn’t want it, was to be in drug
court and that’s okay. We took a lot of folks like that and we were hopeful that the participation in
the process would change their attitude and change their view and many, many, many times it did.
Sometimes it didn’t. There were a few people who came to the drug court who were really
motivated, at least they expressed motivation. They expressed a desire to do the right thing and
maintain the right attitude and those folks succeeded sometimes and sometimes didn’t so you can…I
don’t think you can really put a predictive value on somebody’s attitude and statements that they
make as they come into drug court.”438

Both judges expressed that their main prerequisites for admission are that the person has a drug
addiction that likely explains the criminal behavior and that he or she voluntarily agrees to participate.
An initial expression of willingness to engage was not seen as a decisive factor. Judge Y (drug court)
even expressed that in his experience, those who expressed an initial willingness to engage were no more
likely to succeed than those who were more resistant at the beginning.
In fact, the only team members who viewed the expression of willingness as important in their
decisions on admissions were all of the drug court prosecutors.
An expression of willingness is important
Regarding what characteristics she looked for in potential participants Prosecutor X1 (drug court)
responded, “basically making sure that they have a real willingness and a real want to get better
because we can force all of the counseling and treatment on people but if they are not ready to make
that change in their life, it’s impossible. It’s really hard to get sober if you don’t want to and you’re
just doing it because other people are telling you to. So that’s the main thing we look is for.
Someone who, whether it’s their rock bottom or just the time that they realize they can’t keep living
this life.”439
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “It’s important and it pans out. You know if you aren’t willing to do that
you will not successfully complete drug court. So you really ought to just go do your sentence. But if
you are, then it increases your prospects of getting through the program that much better.”440
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “The biggest characteristic I look for is someone who exhibits a willingness
to make, as I said, fundamental changes like not to associate with people they have been associating
with, willingness to go to in‐patient treatment, willingness to live somewhere else, willingness to
abide by the rules. My red flag is always someone who says ‘well, can I get out of jail?’ It’s the people
438
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who would do anything to be in the program that I think have a higher level of success overall in the
program.”441
The prosecutors elaborated on how they gauged these expressions of willingness.
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “The people [applicants] that come or their attorneys say. A lot of times
people that come into drug court are already on services so they have had contact with a Maine
pretrial person or they’re on probation and their probation officer will come in and say ‘they’re
applying to drug court because they told me they don’t want to do jail anymore.’ That definitely
weighs heavily on us to not want to accept them. But when you have people who have been trying to
get sober and just cannot do it on their own…and you see that in a lot of these cases where they’re
making attempts, they’re trying to do it and they just are failing over and over again, and that’s sort of
what we look for. A willingness and open‐mindedness that they can be part of a team and that
they’re going to be able to open up.”442
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “You look to see if they have sought out treatment but that…hey, that’s
the thing about addiction, people generally can’t you know successfully get through treatment.
That’s why they’re committing crimes. So, you…you have to tell us you are willing to do it by signing
the application and asking to come into court. You’re confirming you’re going to engage in treatment
but we don’t look to see have you done it on your own initiative. Most of the time the answer’s going
to be no or if you did, you failed miserably.”443
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “Sometimes it’s letters that the defendant will write to the drug court
team. Oftentimes it’s things that they say to their probation officer. And it’s frequently in [an
applicant’s] willingness to accept a condition to go to drug court without they’re being any pending
violation. So what that means is there’s nothing in it for them other than accessing the treatment.
They’re not avoiding jail time. […] their desire to do drug court comes from a true desire to do drug
court.”444

The difference in opinion on the importance of candidates articulating a willingness to be in drug
court (beyond voluntarily agreeing to participate) as a factor in the interviewees’ admissions decisions is
interesting. It suggests disagreement about the belief in the capacity for drug court to substantially
change people’s thinking and attitudes. Those who saw an initial expression of willingness as
unimportant believed it was a mindset that develops during one’s participation in drug court. The
prosecutors viewed an initial expression of willingness as important for distinguishing who will likely
succeed in drug court. They seemed to view drug court as being less capable of fostering substantial
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change in participants’ attitudes. For example, Prosecutor X1 (drug court) stated her impression that
counseling and treatment will not help unless the person is already willing to engage. There were also
direct contradictions in perceptions of people who enroll in drug court solely to avoid jail. According to
Judge Y (drug court), most of the participants enroll in drug court because they are facing a prison
sentence and that this is okay since many times drug court has changed participants’ attitudes. By
contrast, Prosecutor Y (drug court) saw someone trying to avoid jail as a “red flag” and Prosecutor X1
(drug court) likewise said a report from probation of such a case weighed heavily in the decision not to
admit that person. Those who saw the initial expression of willingness as important viewed willingness
as a precondition for success in drug court whereas those who viewed it as unimportant for predicting
success believed it could be developed over the course of one’s participation.
Interviewees of both opinions reported that there have been successes among those who were
initially reluctant to engage in drug court. The interviewees in the passages below seemed to interpret
success in terms of graduation from drug court in this context.
Reports of success among participants who were initially reluctant to engage in drug court
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “But generally the people who are reluctant and come in I say ‘kicking and
screaming,’ they don’t have much success. But yes, it has happened. But that’s the exception not the
rule. The people who don’t want to be there in the first place, generally bow out pretty quickly.”445
Prosecutor X1 (drug court): “Apparently before my time there were people in drug court who, I don’t
know if I would say reluctant but nobody though it was going to work out well. They were accepted
because the team thought that this person could do it but there wasn’t as much willingness as maybe
the team wanted to see. And that person recently graduated with flying colors. Struggled through
the first part of it but really came out of it as an entirely different person and I think he was in drug
court for probably two years, so it was not something that happened over night.”446
Judge Y (drug court): “[…] people who come into the drug court, who clearly are not happy to be
there have been just as successful mind you in terms of percentage as the number of people who
come into drug court with a really terrific attitude to begin with.”447
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Judge Y (drug court) acknowledged that those who initially did not show a willingness were just
as likely to succeed as those who came into drug court with the right attitude. The two prosecutors said
that while there had been successes among those who were less enthusiastic at the beginning, it was not
the norm in County Y and has taken longer in County X. Evidence of success among those who were
initially reluctant to engage shows that drug court has the capacity to change people’s thinking and
improve their perceptions of the criminal justice system. The team should therefore not limit access to
those who display the “right” attitude from the beginning. The literature on the carceral state suggests
current policies have fostered deep mistrust in the criminal justice system and the government through a
harsh regime of punishment, surveillance and bias. These problematic patterns persist beyond
incarceration into the marginalization of ex-offenders in public life. Assuming that potential participants
who lack the “right” attitude are less likely to succeed in drug court further stigmatizes people involved in
the criminal justice system by assuming they have limited prospects for improvement and are less
deserving of second chances. Additionally, the distrust felt by those involved in the criminal justice
system means people who enter drug court likely come in with deep-seated reservations towards criminal
courts. When viewed in the context of drug court’s core value of team decision-making, this difference in
opinion is especially problematic in that it suggests some members of the team have a higher bar for
eligibility than others. The drug court team should ensure that decisions in admissions are as cohesive as
they are described in Chapter 3 with respect to sanctions.
Another reason not to favor those who express a willingness prior to entering drug court is that, as
illustrated in the previous two chapters, drug court has distinct conceptions of punishment and
surveillance that breed trusting and honest relationships between the team and the participants. The
regular and personalized interactions of drug court go a long way in showing the participants that the
team cares about them and does not simply want to inflict punishment. This change in one’s attitude
towards the team, however, is only attainable if one can access drug court.
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Participants receive services and support in drug court that they did not have before
Judge Y (drug court): “[…] in drug court there’s an intensive connection between the participant and
the team, all the team members, and I think that goes a long way for the participants in drug court.
Some of the people that participate in drug court are people who have had very little of the
advantages that you and I and many other people have in their lives where they’ve had love, they’ve
had support, they’ve had people in their families and some of their friends that have been very, very
helpful to them throughout their lives. A lot of people in drug court don’t have that and for the first
time some of them have that with respect to the drug court experience.”448
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “The [drug court] judge is usually the first figure in the court system that’s
ever been kind or interactive with the defendants, and that’s what makes a drug court really different
from every other treatment program. It’s that personal interaction with the judge.”449

The above passages show that in addition to being more humanizing than traditional criminal
court interactions, support and personalized interactions are privileges many of the participants never had
before. It would makes sense for participants to be less willing to engage in drug court if they have not
had trusting relationships before and their prior interactions with the criminal justice system have been
largely unpleasant. In the way that the team recognizes the importance of not incarcerating people for a
first-time use, it should also have realistic expectations for people coming into drug court that they might
not be as open to engaging in the program at the beginning. In fact the practice seems contrary to the
recommendations of the Adult Drug Court Best Practice Standards Vol. 1 (2013), which states that
eligibility and exclusion criteria should be objective and not based on personal impressions of candidates’
suitability for drug court.450
In conclusion, there was significant disagreement among the team members as to the importance
of participants displaying a willingness to engage in drug court prior to enrolling. Those who viewed it as
unimportant saw this willingness as an attitude to be developed during one’s participation and were not
concerned that some people came into drug court only looking to avoid jail. Those who viewed an initial
expression of willingness as important saw it as a predictor of success and did not see drug court as
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capable of improving people’s attitudes to the same degree. Interviewees of both opinions nonetheless
mentioned previous successes among participants who were initially reluctant. In considering that many
of the participants have never before received the type of support and kindness given to them in drug
court, it would be unrealistic to expect them to come in necessarily willing to engage in drug court.
Therefore, the team should refrain from using its impression of a participant’s willingness as a factor in its
admissions decisions. Having outlined team member biases in predicting success, the following section
examines bias in observed patterns of success for certain types of participants.

V. Bias in Prospects for Success in Drug Court
A few of the interviewees said there were no disparities in success among the participants
whereas others suggested there were factors outside of drug court that could strengthen or weaken one’s
chances of success.
No differences in success
Judge Y (drug court): “I saw no evidence at all, anecdotally of course, in my experience of the drug
court judge of any factor in a person’s life that might predict success over failure.”451

The participant’s attitude as a factor in predicting success
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “[…] the people who are the most successful in our drug court are the
people, who for whatever reason, really want to be in the program and they’re not doing it just as a
way to avoid jail. So the biggest success stories we have are the people who, they didn’t care if they
had to spend six months or nine months or whatever in jail or prison before joining the court. They
just wanted the services that the court had to offer. The people who are the least successful are the
people who are trying to get out of jail and get out of a conviction and get out of doing time and they
see drug court as a way to do that. So the most successful people are the ones who grasp the
opportunity to live a different life. And what we, what we don’t do a good job of doing is identifying
who those people are who are truly ready to make monumental changes.”452
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “What will happen is you will see more relapses for the people who are
not interested in changing or you’ll see them taking steps to try and circumvent our supervision. […]
But if a person sincerely is seeking out treatment and engaging in the process, you can also see a
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difference in them as an individual. You know they stand straighter, they usually look healthier and
usually smile a little bit more.”453

Structural factors in predicting success
Prosecutor X2 (drug court): “[In admissions] I look to see do they have potential employment
because I think when people are employed they’re far less, they’re far more likely to succeed and far
less likely to relapse. Do they have strong support? Although this does not determine whether they
get in. If you have a strong family sort of support surrounding you or community support, you fare
better.”454
Case Manager Y (drug court): “I think overall the services for females is really difficult in the state. So
they have a harder time accessing services in drug court. […] The services don’t exist. There’s I’d
wanna say ninety‐six sober houses in County Y. I think there’s about five female sober houses. I think
there is at least eight to ten residential treatments for men in the state and I wanna say there’s
probably at best four for females. As far as funding goes, if you’re a young female without Mainecare,
without children, you’re probably at the highest risk for waiting the longest for services.”455

The interview passages in the table, “The participant’s attitude as a factor in predicting success”
indicate there may be some bias in the likelihood of succeeding in drug court depending on the person’s
attitude coming in. Both interviewees stressed how a participant’s desire to make significant changes in
their life is a significant factor in predicting his or her chances of success. Also in this context, most
seemed to interpret success as graduating from drug court. Prosecutor Y (drug court) said the people who
have the most success in drug court want to and take steps to “live a different life” and similarly
Prosecutor X2 (drug court) stated that those who are not interested in changing tend to relapse more.
Note that these interviewees were also among those who looked for prospective participants to express a
willingness to change one’s life and obtain treatment prior to entering drug court.
Besides the participant’s attitude, the table “Structural factors in predicting success” indicates that
certain structural factors might in part determine success or failure. Prosecutor X2 (drug court) said
having potential employment as well as strong community support can promote success in drug court. In
line with Defense Attorney X (non-drug court)’s assessment of his clients’ chances for success in drug
453
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court in Part II, Prosecutor X2 (drug court) agrees that having support and resources outside of drug court
can increase one’s chances of success. In terms of structural factors for predicting success in drug court,
it is also important to reconsider one of the unfortunate outcomes of drug court mentioned in Chapter 4.
There have been problems of participants who reside in difficult communities not being able to maintain
drug-free, law-abiding lives upon leaving drug court. Therefore, not only is there evidence of bias in
access to drug court, but also bias in opportunities for success. Case Manager Y (drug court) conveyed
that females may find it more difficult to succeed in his drug court in that there are insufficient services to
support women in drug court, especially those without children. Both interviewees indicated bias in
success both in terms of factors within and outside of the program.

In addition to differing opinions on there being bias in success, interestingly the interviewees had
various definitions of success and effectiveness in drug court apart from the traditional definitions of
reducing recidivism and substance abuse and cost-effectiveness (see Figure 5-4).
Figure 5‐4
Counts of different measures of success and effectiveness
(Total: 9 respondents )
Measure of Success or Effectiveness
Number of Interviewees
Reduced recidivism and criminal‐thinking
5
Attain and maintain sobriety
4
Prosocial engagement and community
3
connections
Able to pick themselves up after falling
3
Babies born non‐addicted
3
This table lists the most commonly mentioned ways in which the interviewees (all are drug court team members)
measured success and effectiveness. Each category is not exclusive, meaning an interviewee may have mentioned
more than one of the different measures of success and effectiveness listed. “Reduced recidivism and criminal‐
thinking” ‐ reducing criminal activity and motivations for committing crimes, “Attain and maintain sobriety” ‐
becoming and remaining drug‐free, “prosocial engagement and community connections” ‐ building relationships
within sober communities and becoming involved in positive community activities (e.g. employment), “able to pick
themselves up after falling” ‐ ability to use the skills developed in drug court to put their lives back on track in the
case of relapse or recidivism after graduation or termination from drug court, , “babies born non‐addicted” ‐
pregnant women in drug court becoming drug‐free and giving birth to babies that are not addicted to drugs.

Most of the interviewees had traditional conceptions of success and effectiveness as reducing
recidivism and drug use but there were a number of alternative interpretations as well. All of the
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interviewees viewed success in terms of improving the quality of life of the participants in being able to
attain sobriety and develop valuable skills and prosocial connections that would last throughout their
lives. For example, Judge Y (drug court) explained that while many view success as reducing recidivism,
in his view that was not the primary explanation for success in drug court. He mainly viewed drug court
as a success in that for the period of time that the participants are involved in drug court, their lives and
the lives of their family and friends are “immeasurably better.”456 Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug
court) even described success not simply in terms of better outcomes for the individual but also regarding
to the effectiveness of the team. He identifies success in cases where the team is able to see that a
person’s criminal activity is in fact connected to their drug use when the district attorney’s office views
him or her as more criminal than addict.457 Additionally, three interviewees (depicted below) had
definitions of success that somewhat contradicted the traditional definition as reducing recidivism. They
viewed success in terms of those who graduated and receded into drug use and criminal activity and even
those who were terminated being able to then apply what they learned in drug court to rehabilitate
themselves.
Measures of success even upon failure in drug court
Defense Attorney Liaison X (drug court): “I measure success even when someone doesn’t
successfully complete drug court but they’re able down the road to apply…realize that they have to
change their lives and they do so. And we’ve had people who have not successfully completed drug
court, who have come back and stood in front of the drug court clients, explaining their
circumstances, encouraging them to really apply themselves and trust the process.”458
Prosecutor Y (drug court): “I guess I can say, people who have graduated from drug court, have
offended and committed worse crimes. And likewise people who are terminated from drug court,
went and did a jail or prison sentence, and then found their way to sobriety and never came back in
the criminal justice system.”459
Probation Y (drug court): “To me, success is if they fall down again or if they struggle with addiction,
they’ve learned some tools to pick themselves back up and seek help for themselves rather than it
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leading to new criminal charges or even worse, you know death which with the opiate crisis that…
that happens quite a bit now.”460

All three interviewees did not measure success in terms of the participants being able to complete
the program and never resort to drug use or crime again. Rather they viewed success as the participants
becoming more responsible and being able to apply what they have learned on their own.
A few interviewees said they viewed success in terms of reducing recidivism and this is indeed
important for ensuring public safety and that the participants are fully rehabilitated. However, it was
interesting to see that the team members more so understood success in terms of promoting the
participants’ wellbeing and showing them their lives had value apart from drug use. The three reflections
on success in terms of participants being able to apply what they learned in drug court when they are
struggling shows these interviewees are not simply concerned with reducing the amount of crime in the
area. They are more concerned with people learning to take responsibility and to reach out for help.
This section shows that there is bias in access to drug court in terms of succeeding in the program
based on participants having the right attitude and structural advantages such as community support and
employment. However, this section also reveals that the drug court team members had more nuanced
conceptions of success and effectiveness beyond the traditional metrics of reducing recidivism and other
end goals.

VI. Conclusion
In terms of access, drug court is an extension of carceral state development although the team
does have alternative and more rehabilitative conceptions of success and effectiveness. The defense
attorneys suggested that the threat of punishment built into the underlying sentence can create problems
of access in applying for drug court. Some people who are eligible might be deterred from applying if
given the option of a lighter penalty. These people nonetheless leave the criminal justice system without
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having received the treatment and support they need and are thus at a greater risk of reoffending. In some
cases, drug court can be another vehicle of carceral state development in that the threat of punishment can
limit access to drug treatment and thereby contribute to the people entering and reentering the criminal
justice system and to mass incarceration. The threat of punishment, in addition to being a key part of
carceral state control as discussed in Chapter 3, can also be a barrier to accessing drug court. Defense
Attorney X (non-drug court) said that part of the problem is that the prosecutor has too much power to
decide the terms of one’s participation in drug court. Therefore, drug court might also contribute to
carceral state development in that it maintains the power imbalance in favor of the prosecutor discussed in
Chapter 1.461
Most interviewees who indicated bias in admissions said there were certain groups, mainly
immigrants and refugees, people with serious mental health issues, and people with particularly violent
criminal histories that would not be able to access drug court. These exclusions were not seen as the
result of intentional bias, but rather due to implications of federal immigration law, lack of mental health
treatment, and public safety concerns. The underrepresentation of immigrants and minorities in the two
courts seems particularly problematic in considering that these populations have been principal targets of
the criminal justice system. It is also potentially problematic in light of the national survey on drug court
presented in Chapter 2 that indicates African American and Hispanic or Latino populations were
underrepresented in drug court admissions and success rates in 2016.462 Although with respect to lower
participation among minorities, it is important to also consider that Maine is the whitest state in the U.S.
Nonetheless, if in fact there is racial bias, drug court in Maine can be considered an extension of carceral
state development in that the same racial groups that have been historically targeted by the criminal
justice system are also underrepresented in drug court. Overall, the findings suggest that even unbiased
eligibility criteria can yield biased outcomes.
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In the application and admissions processes, the defense attorneys and the drug court prosecutors
sought prospective participants with the “right attitude.” The defense attorneys looked for motivation and
the prosecutors looked for an expression of willingness. However, Defense Attorney X (drug court)
mentioned that he would have some clients apply for drug court even when they were not as motivated
and he believed they might not graduate. His outlook on success in drug court therefore was more similar
to the drug court judges who suggested an initial expression of willingness was not important. Evident in
these opinions is the belief that drug court can bring about substantial change in people’s attitudes. The
drug court prosecutors suggested drug court was less transformative in that they viewed an initial
expression of willingness as a predictor of success. However, it seemed unrealistic to expect that people
would be very willing to engage in a criminal court program if their past interactions with the criminal
justice system and even in normal life had been hostile and non-supportive. As Judge Y (drug court) and
Prosecutor Y (drug court) suggested, for some drug court is the first time where people are treated with
kindness by the court and have been able to develop social bonds they had not had in their lives before.
Limiting participation to those who are “willing” underestimates the power of the uniquely humane
interactions in drug court, especially since there have been successes for those who were less willing.
Biased expectations of people having “the right attitude” coming into drug court can be considered
another way in which drug court is a form of carceral state development. Such admissions policies
deepen the stigma of the criminal status by suggesting that some people are incapable and should not be
given the opportunity to change. The bias may in turn target people from disadvantaged backgrounds.
What is worse is that the bias can be circular if the “wrong attitudes” stem from negative criminal justice
interactions and then preclude people from changing within this more humane type of criminal court.
It was also suggested that bias based on structural factors may be relevant to participants’ success
in drug court. In terms of graduating from drug court, some interviewees believed certain structural
advantages could enhance participants’ chances of success. Both Defense Attorney X (non-drug court)
and Prosecutor X2 (drug court) said people with existing supports and resources, such as employment and
strong familial bonds had greater chances of success. This finding seems to complement the data in
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Chapter 4 on surveillance that drug court can have limited benefits for those from disadvantaged and
drug-involved communities. This is important to consider since the interviews suggested that most of the
drug court participants are dealing with poverty and many lack important social benefits. Therefore,
while drug court primarily tries to help people from disadvantaged communities escape crime and drug
abuse, it was suggested that such structural disadvantages actually preclude success whereas structural
advantages can enhance it. Therefore, drug court can be considered an extension of carceral state
development in that it can perpetuate the criminalization of people from poor and disadvantaged
communities.
Despite there being evidence of bias in all three stages of access to drug court, it is important to
note the various ways in which the team members defined success and effectiveness in drug court. As a
whole, the team had more nuanced and rehabilitative definitions of these terms than the traditional notion
of reducing recidivism. While recidivism was the most commonly mentioned measure, the interviewees
also measured success and effectiveness in terms of how drug court improves the everyday lives of the
participants. Three of the interviewees even held views of success that almost seemed to contradict the
traditional definition of recidivism. They recognized success as participants who may fall back into drug
use and crime being able to recover themselves using the skills and support acquired during drug court.
This is another example of how, internally, drug court is a more humane form of social control. The team
cares about the participants beyond the general concern of reducing crime in the area.
In terms of access, drug court is therefore another vehicle of the carceral state development based
on the presence of bias. First is that the threat of punishment through the underlying sentence can be a
barrier to access for those who can benefit from the treatment and oversight of the program. Additionally,
drug court maintains biases against groups targeted by the criminal justice system, namely immigrants
and people with structural disadvantages, although this bias may be unintentional. Nonetheless the goals
of the program itself can still be considered more humane and rehabilitative in that the team holds more
substantial measures of success and effectiveness in addition to reducing recidivism and other end goals.
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Conclusion
This thesis makes visible what recidivism hides. Given drug court’s unique approach to reducing
crime of treating drug addiction, it is tempting to assume it is an alternative to traditional incarceration.
However, Foucault indicated that the prison continues even with rehabilitative institutions through
society’s use of disciplinary control.463 Evaluating drug court in terms of reducing recidivism and other
end goals does not sufficiently capture its relationship to the carceral state to determine whether it is in
fact an alternative to incarceration. In other words, it does not examine whether drug court reproduces
core aspects of the carceral state of punishment, surveillance, and bias. This thesis has uncovered what
recidivism hides by subjecting drug court to a level of scrutiny comparable to that which is experienced
by the participants. In the way that the drug court team considers nearly all aspects of the participants’
lives beyond their criminal histories, I have evaluated drug court in Maine beyond its capacity to reduce
recidivism to how it affects people’s lives both within the program and in relation to broader structural
issues. I have shown how the limitations of focusing on recidivism in evaluating criminal justice
institutions can be overcome through a framework of Foucauldian and carceral state perspectives.
In its treatment of the participants, drug court in Maine is an improvement upon carceral state
conceptions of punishment and surveillance as well as success and effectiveness. The overall focus on
drug treatment as opposed to monitoring and punishment is more rehabilitative. Drug court also
conceptualizes punishment within a fairer system of graduated sanctions, some of which are treatmentbased as opposed to formal punishments. The personalized interactions of drug court build mutual trust
between the participants and the team and help restore the participants’ sense of individual dignity. The
unique conceptions of punishment and surveillance show that internally drug court is not simply an
extension of Foucault’s definition of “the carceral” as knowledge of people used for disciplinary
purposes.464 The team is not only concerned with ensuring compliance and preventing recidivism but
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truly cares about the participants and uses its deep knowledge of them to help them live better lives. The
team members also held definitions of success and effectiveness that were more humane than the
traditional definitions of reducing recidivism and other broader end goals. Drug court is therefore a
normative improvement upon traditional carceral state conceptions of punishment and surveillance as
well as success and effectiveness.
Despite these distinctive features that suggest drug court is an alternative to the carceral state, it is
in fact another vehicle of carceral state development. First is that drug court relies on the threat of
punishment in order to function. Foucault described how discipline through the threat of punishment is
central to the effectiveness of “the carceral.”465 I have shown that the threat of punishment is relevant to
drug court in all three core aspects of the carceral state of punishment, surveillance, and bias. The
underlying sentence is the threat of punishment and the jail sanction is the “memory of pain” meant to
motivate compliance.466 In terms of surveillance in County X, imposing the suspended sentence was the
court’s final interaction with and a warning to the drug court graduate.467 In terms of access, the threat of
punishment can also be a barrier to obtaining the treatment and support needed to overcome a life of drug
addiction and crime. Gottschalk shows that focusing on reentry and reintegration overlooks the punitive
aspects of alternatives to incarceration.468 While more humane in its direct treatment of the participants,
drug court is still a part of the carceral state in relying on a punitive and disciplinary mode of control.
Drug court was seen as an effective alternative to incarceration, probation, and traditional
criminal court in that it provides the participants with the support, resources, and skills needed for
rehabilitation from drug addiction and crime. However, there remains a significant problem of
participants being unable to manage themselves in the community upon leaving drug court. This is in
large part because many return to struggling communities in which they lack the support and resources
they had in drug court. Additionally, some of the interviewees said that having structural advantages
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outside of drug court can enhance one’s chances for success. Gottschalk likewise indicated that reentry
programs with the goal of developing beneficial personal traits that reduce recidivism are often not
attentive to structural impediments to reintegration.469 She suggests that rather than lacking personal
traits, successful reintegration is mainly a factor of social and economic conditions.470 The indications of
bias in access to drug court based on structural factors suggests it perpetuates the limitations of carceral
state solutions that tend to ignore structural obstacles to reintegration.
In addition to structural factors in predicting success, a few interviewees described their
expectations that people come into drug court with the “right attitude.” People who expressed a
willingness to change and undergo treatment were seen by some as more likely to succeed in the program.
Another criticism from Gottschalk is that reentry and reintegration do not address the general disregard of
law enforcement for the potential for offender rehabilitation.471 By expecting the participants to come in
with an already strong willingness to participate underestimates the potential for drug court to change
people. It also does not consider that the participants have had mainly adversarial experiences with the
criminal justice system in the past and would be more wary of the team initially. Insofar as some
members of the team viewed an expression of strong willingness to be important for their admissions
decisions, this can have the effect of perpetuating the criminal label by underestimating the potential for
offender rehabilitation.
Drug court being another form of carceral state development does not mean it is a wholly
problematic institution. In the way that the team gets to know the participants as people and that the
participants gain a renewed sense of human dignity, drug court is a significant improvement in the state’s
treatment of offenders. To understand the full effect of these personalized relations, further research
should interview the participants themselves to understand how their experiences in drug court compare
with those in the traditional criminal justice system. In considering Amy Lerman and Vesla Weaver’s
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study entitled “The Political Consequences of the Carceral State,” we might extend the analysis of drug
court within the field of American Political Development in order to determine whether participation
makes people any more or less likely to be politically engaged and how it affects their perceptions of the
government. 472 Speaking of involvement in government institutions, I made an interesting observation
during the graduation/commencement ceremony in County X. Sitting in the back of the courtroom was a
group of former drug court participants who had returned to help the current participants in the program.
They too stood before the graduate and offered words of encouragement. Participation in drug court
therefore built lasting trust in the team and motivated them to become involved in the court system in a
positive way.473
While the team’s direct treatment of the participants can be considered and improvement upon
carceral state conceptions of punishment and surveillance as well as success and effectiveness, drug court
is nonetheless an extension of carceral state development in that it relies on the threat of punishment and
does not sufficiently address structural obstacles to reintegration. Nonetheless, it is hopeful to see that the
team members held many definitions of success and effectiveness outside of the traditional metric of
recidivism. These nuanced definitions that more deeply consider how the state regards and treats
offenders should guide future evaluations of the program and research into what recidivism hides.
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